Narrative:

A dual instruction flight was planned to meet the new far requirements (effective for pilots obtaining their private license after aug/xx/97) for eligibility for a private pilot license. The new far 61.109 (a)(2)(I) requires one night cross country of over 100 NM. The student pilot properly prepared the flight and I carefully checked the planning. Annapolis lee airport has an XC00 pm curfew and it was my understanding that the runway lights were turned off a 'few mins' after XC00 pm to enforce the curfew. The time en route from allentown to lee was 1 hour 15 mins. With these constraints in mind we planned a takeoff to occur at XA35. A change of runways at allentown caused the takeoff to be delayed. Alternate plans had been made to land at bwi and someone was standing by to pick us up if we excised that alternative. Passing bwi we checked the ATIS winds so that we could set up a traffic pattern at lee. The winds were reported at 260 degrees at 8 KTS indicating that an approach to runway 30 should be planned. The incident: as we set up the landing pattern for runway 30 we noted that an aircraft had just landed on runway 12. Assuming that this was the most favorable runway, we transitioned to a downwind for runway 30. By the time we had set up on downwind the time was XC00 pm and we expected the runway lights to go out momentarily. The student's approach was high and a little fast. Under normal circumstances I would have directed a go around while well out on final. However, because of the impending turn-off of the runway lights, I took control of the aircraft well out on final and established a slip with flaps extended and idle power. By the time we crossed the overrun area we were on glide path (VASI) but fast -- about 75 KIAS. I was sure that if I could get the aircraft on the ground by mid-field that I could easily stop the aircraft in the remaining runway. I knew the landing was not going to be pretty, but I knew I could get stopped. I had seen people land fast at mid-field and have no problem stopping. I touched down at mid-field and because of the still excessive speed skipped slightly and came back down quickly. Braking was ineffective because of the lift that was still being developed, but I was still sure we were going to stop. However, braking continued to be ineffective as I tried to keep from locking the wheels. On occasion the wheels did start to skid and I released pressure to maintain a near skid condition. The first time that I recognized I was in trouble was when I saw the runway numbers approaching (about 400 ft from the end of a paved overrun). I was surprised that I had traveled so far down the runway. The aircraft went off the end of the runway at about 15-20 mph and further braking was totally ineffective on the grass overrun. I steered the aircraft to impact the chain link fence (about 200 ft from the end of the runway) between 2 fence posts, and impacted at 5-10 mph. Engine was at idle. The 2 fence posts impacted the leading edge of each wing approximately 4 ft from the tips making a substantial dent in each leading edge. The fence broke loose from the posts and brought the aircraft to a stop. Switches were turned off and the aircraft abandoned. Post incident: I observed the windsock and noted that there was a slight tailwind on landing, probably about 5 KTS. We removed the aircraft from the fence (because it was in the approach path for aircraft) and pushed it back to the tie- down area where we secured the aircraft. Damage appeared to be limited to dents in the right and left leading edges of the wing with a wrinkle on the aft inboard left wing. I closed my VFR flight plan with leesburg and called the club manager to report the incident. Remarks: I was totally obsessed with the thought that the runway lights would be going out momentarily, even though I had a good and safe alternate plan. In the dark I lost orientation concerning how much runway was remaining until I saw the numbers coming up. 10 yrs ago I would have automatically retracted the flaps on touchdown. However, as a result of people retracting the gear instead of flaps, I no longer teach this technique and overlooked it myself in this case. If I had retractedthe flaps I would not have hit the fence. This may not be the dumbest thing I have ever done, but it certainly ranks in the top 10. In my previous 40+ yrs of flying I have not damaged an aircraft. Fortunately there were no injuries and only minor aircraft damage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT WITH STUDENT PLT IN C152 LANDS WITH TAILWIND AND GOES OFF THE END OF THE RWY ON NIGHT XCOUNTRY FLT.

Narrative: A DUAL INSTRUCTION FLT WAS PLANNED TO MEET THE NEW FAR REQUIREMENTS (EFFECTIVE FOR PLTS OBTAINING THEIR PVT LICENSE AFTER AUG/XX/97) FOR ELIGIBILITY FOR A PVT PLT LICENSE. THE NEW FAR 61.109 (A)(2)(I) REQUIRES ONE NIGHT XCOUNTRY OF OVER 100 NM. THE STUDENT PLT PROPERLY PREPARED THE FLT AND I CAREFULLY CHKED THE PLANNING. ANNAPOLIS LEE ARPT HAS AN XC00 PM CURFEW AND IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WERE TURNED OFF A 'FEW MINS' AFTER XC00 PM TO ENFORCE THE CURFEW. THE TIME ENRTE FROM ALLENTOWN TO LEE WAS 1 HR 15 MINS. WITH THESE CONSTRAINTS IN MIND WE PLANNED A TKOF TO OCCUR AT XA35. A CHANGE OF RWYS AT ALLENTOWN CAUSED THE TKOF TO BE DELAYED. ALTERNATE PLANS HAD BEEN MADE TO LAND AT BWI AND SOMEONE WAS STANDING BY TO PICK US UP IF WE EXCISED THAT ALTERNATIVE. PASSING BWI WE CHKED THE ATIS WINDS SO THAT WE COULD SET UP A TFC PATTERN AT LEE. THE WINDS WERE RPTED AT 260 DEGS AT 8 KTS INDICATING THAT AN APCH TO RWY 30 SHOULD BE PLANNED. THE INCIDENT: AS WE SET UP THE LNDG PATTERN FOR RWY 30 WE NOTED THAT AN ACFT HAD JUST LANDED ON RWY 12. ASSUMING THAT THIS WAS THE MOST FAVORABLE RWY, WE TRANSITIONED TO A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 30. BY THE TIME WE HAD SET UP ON DOWNWIND THE TIME WAS XC00 PM AND WE EXPECTED THE RWY LIGHTS TO GO OUT MOMENTARILY. THE STUDENT'S APCH WAS HIGH AND A LITTLE FAST. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES I WOULD HAVE DIRECTED A GAR WHILE WELL OUT ON FINAL. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE IMPENDING TURN-OFF OF THE RWY LIGHTS, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT WELL OUT ON FINAL AND ESTABLISHED A SLIP WITH FLAPS EXTENDED AND IDLE PWR. BY THE TIME WE CROSSED THE OVERRUN AREA WE WERE ON GLIDE PATH (VASI) BUT FAST -- ABOUT 75 KIAS. I WAS SURE THAT IF I COULD GET THE ACFT ON THE GND BY MID-FIELD THAT I COULD EASILY STOP THE ACFT IN THE REMAINING RWY. I KNEW THE LNDG WAS NOT GOING TO BE PRETTY, BUT I KNEW I COULD GET STOPPED. I HAD SEEN PEOPLE LAND FAST AT MID-FIELD AND HAVE NO PROB STOPPING. I TOUCHED DOWN AT MID-FIELD AND BECAUSE OF THE STILL EXCESSIVE SPD SKIPPED SLIGHTLY AND CAME BACK DOWN QUICKLY. BRAKING WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF THE LIFT THAT WAS STILL BEING DEVELOPED, BUT I WAS STILL SURE WE WERE GOING TO STOP. HOWEVER, BRAKING CONTINUED TO BE INEFFECTIVE AS I TRIED TO KEEP FROM LOCKING THE WHEELS. ON OCCASION THE WHEELS DID START TO SKID AND I RELEASED PRESSURE TO MAINTAIN A NEAR SKID CONDITION. THE FIRST TIME THAT I RECOGNIZED I WAS IN TROUBLE WAS WHEN I SAW THE RWY NUMBERS APCHING (ABOUT 400 FT FROM THE END OF A PAVED OVERRUN). I WAS SURPRISED THAT I HAD TRAVELED SO FAR DOWN THE RWY. THE ACFT WENT OFF THE END OF THE RWY AT ABOUT 15-20 MPH AND FURTHER BRAKING WAS TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE ON THE GRASS OVERRUN. I STEERED THE ACFT TO IMPACT THE CHAIN LINK FENCE (ABOUT 200 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY) BTWN 2 FENCE POSTS, AND IMPACTED AT 5-10 MPH. ENG WAS AT IDLE. THE 2 FENCE POSTS IMPACTED THE LEADING EDGE OF EACH WING APPROX 4 FT FROM THE TIPS MAKING A SUBSTANTIAL DENT IN EACH LEADING EDGE. THE FENCE BROKE LOOSE FROM THE POSTS AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. SWITCHES WERE TURNED OFF AND THE ACFT ABANDONED. POST INCIDENT: I OBSERVED THE WINDSOCK AND NOTED THAT THERE WAS A SLIGHT TAILWIND ON LNDG, PROBABLY ABOUT 5 KTS. WE REMOVED THE ACFT FROM THE FENCE (BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE APCH PATH FOR ACFT) AND PUSHED IT BACK TO THE TIE- DOWN AREA WHERE WE SECURED THE ACFT. DAMAGE APPEARED TO BE LIMITED TO DENTS IN THE R AND L LEADING EDGES OF THE WING WITH A WRINKLE ON THE AFT INBOARD L WING. I CLOSED MY VFR FLT PLAN WITH LEESBURG AND CALLED THE CLUB MGR TO RPT THE INCIDENT. REMARKS: I WAS TOTALLY OBSESSED WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WOULD BE GOING OUT MOMENTARILY, EVEN THOUGH I HAD A GOOD AND SAFE ALTERNATE PLAN. IN THE DARK I LOST ORIENTATION CONCERNING HOW MUCH RWY WAS REMAINING UNTIL I SAW THE NUMBERS COMING UP. 10 YRS AGO I WOULD HAVE AUTOMATICALLY RETRACTED THE FLAPS ON TOUCHDOWN. HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF PEOPLE RETRACTING THE GEAR INSTEAD OF FLAPS, I NO LONGER TEACH THIS TECHNIQUE AND OVERLOOKED IT MYSELF IN THIS CASE. IF I HAD RETRACTEDTHE FLAPS I WOULD NOT HAVE HIT THE FENCE. THIS MAY NOT BE THE DUMBEST THING I HAVE EVER DONE, BUT IT CERTAINLY RANKS IN THE TOP 10. IN MY PREVIOUS 40+ YRS OF FLYING I HAVE NOT DAMAGED AN ACFT. FORTUNATELY THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND ONLY MINOR ACFT DAMAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.