Narrative:

This is to report a gear up landing I made on aug/xx/97, at the fot airport. I was scheduled for a flight in C210, for a reconnaissance in the area of the rohnerville airport. I was to take 2 engineers to rohnerville to meet a third individual who would then go with us to photograph the confluence of the eel and van duzen rivers. While in the office I ran a weight and balance for the flight to insure that I was in compliance with the more restrictive requirements of part 135, although I knew the objective of the flight was reconnaissance. I brought the aircraft to the terminal building, met my passenger and briefed the flight. Their objective was to do photography in the rohnerville area as well as examine bridges in the vicinity of ukiah and cloverdale. We discussed whether to do this on the way up or on the return. It was decided to do this on the return in order to meet the schedule at rohnerville. On arrival in the fot area we did a turn around the bridge in question to get an initial layout of the site. We picked up the third technician and conducted the reconnaissance out of rohnerville. We had been operating between 2000 ft and 1000 ft along the river at low airspds with 10 degrees of flaps set. At approximately 1200 ft, we completed the last set of photos of a site just to the south of the fot airport at pattern altitude, approximately 1200 ft. We made a right turn onto a 45 degree to downwind for runway 29 at approximately 20 inches manifold pressure and 100 KTS. I called my position and shortly thereafter called turning downwind. I made the turn and I recall checking flaps at 10 degrees and noting they were already down. I began reviewing the landing checklist. I looked down to check my fuel and noted that the left tank was lower than the right, so I switched to the right tank to land with the fullest selected. I looked over to check my position relative to the runway, but did not make my normal check of gear down abeam the landing point. I do not know why I did not complete this item. I retarded power then pushed the mixture and propeller control forward. I made a normal base turn, airspeed was about 90 KTS and seemed normal for the pattern. I remember rechking the gas, propeller and mixture controls, but not the gear. We descended on final, and I recall the glide path being normal to slightly high, so I brought the throttle to idle. I flared after passing the threshold of the runway and began raising the nose. I believe the first sound I heard was the propeller striking the runway followed by scraping of the rear fuselage. The aircraft settled onto the runway just prior to the 1000 ft marker and slid about 700 ft before coming to rest. I ascertained that the passenger seemed to be uninjured and directed the evacuate/evacuation of the aircraft. At no point did the gear warning sound during the pattern, and, upon reflection, I do not remember it sounding while we were on the reconnaissance flight, although the power settings would have been low enough that it should have at some point. I had checked it prior to the first flight of the day and determined that it was working. The aircraft remained on the runway until mechanics from eureka were able to jack the aircraft, and the landing gear was lowered normally. They said that the damage to the bottom of the aircraft was not severe, but the propeller was not repairable. After the flight I checked the gear warning horn and it was not working. That afternoon I was contacted at the rohnerville airport by mr Y of the FAA. He interviewed me regarding the circumstances of the incident and then reviewed the aircraft documentation, as well as the paperwork for the flight. I showed him the weight and balance calculations for the flight, and he noted that they had been prepared incorrectly. I had run the weight and balance program on flightsoft flight planning software and had inadvertently printed the information for the wrong aircraft, although the passenger weights were correct. I had calculated a similar load many times before and knew it to be within limits, so neglected to check the printout closely. I have flown a large number of these reconnaissance missions, however mainly in the C206 with fixed gear. It is possible that habit patterns from that sort of mission may have carried over to this flight. I have over 2100 hours in the C206, and I would estimate at least 75% have been reconnaissance. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states he is with an air taxi operation, part 135. Reporter contacted the local FSDO and there was no problem except the check ride with the FAA representative. Since he is very precise in his flying he is still trying to figure out why this incident occurred. He and his boss have discussed it and do not have an answer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR TAXI PLT OF C210 ON PHOTO MISSION MAKES GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: THIS IS TO RPT A GEAR UP LNDG I MADE ON AUG/XX/97, AT THE FOT ARPT. I WAS SCHEDULED FOR A FLT IN C210, FOR A RECONNAISSANCE IN THE AREA OF THE ROHNERVILLE ARPT. I WAS TO TAKE 2 ENGINEERS TO ROHNERVILLE TO MEET A THIRD INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD THEN GO WITH US TO PHOTOGRAPH THE CONFLUENCE OF THE EEL AND VAN DUZEN RIVERS. WHILE IN THE OFFICE I RAN A WT AND BAL FOR THE FLT TO INSURE THAT I WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE MORE RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF PART 135, ALTHOUGH I KNEW THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FLT WAS RECONNAISSANCE. I BROUGHT THE ACFT TO THE TERMINAL BUILDING, MET MY PAX AND BRIEFED THE FLT. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO DO PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE ROHNERVILLE AREA AS WELL AS EXAMINE BRIDGES IN THE VICINITY OF UKIAH AND CLOVERDALE. WE DISCUSSED WHETHER TO DO THIS ON THE WAY UP OR ON THE RETURN. IT WAS DECIDED TO DO THIS ON THE RETURN IN ORDER TO MEET THE SCHEDULE AT ROHNERVILLE. ON ARR IN THE FOT AREA WE DID A TURN AROUND THE BRIDGE IN QUESTION TO GET AN INITIAL LAYOUT OF THE SITE. WE PICKED UP THE THIRD TECHNICIAN AND CONDUCTED THE RECONNAISSANCE OUT OF ROHNERVILLE. WE HAD BEEN OPERATING BTWN 2000 FT AND 1000 FT ALONG THE RIVER AT LOW AIRSPDS WITH 10 DEGS OF FLAPS SET. AT APPROX 1200 FT, WE COMPLETED THE LAST SET OF PHOTOS OF A SITE JUST TO THE S OF THE FOT ARPT AT PATTERN ALT, APPROX 1200 FT. WE MADE A R TURN ONTO A 45 DEG TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 29 AT APPROX 20 INCHES MANIFOLD PRESSURE AND 100 KTS. I CALLED MY POS AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER CALLED TURNING DOWNWIND. I MADE THE TURN AND I RECALL CHKING FLAPS AT 10 DEGS AND NOTING THEY WERE ALREADY DOWN. I BEGAN REVIEWING THE LNDG CHKLIST. I LOOKED DOWN TO CHK MY FUEL AND NOTED THAT THE L TANK WAS LOWER THAN THE R, SO I SWITCHED TO THE R TANK TO LAND WITH THE FULLEST SELECTED. I LOOKED OVER TO CHK MY POS RELATIVE TO THE RWY, BUT DID NOT MAKE MY NORMAL CHK OF GEAR DOWN ABEAM THE LNDG POINT. I DO NOT KNOW WHY I DID NOT COMPLETE THIS ITEM. I RETARDED PWR THEN PUSHED THE MIXTURE AND PROP CTL FORWARD. I MADE A NORMAL BASE TURN, AIRSPD WAS ABOUT 90 KTS AND SEEMED NORMAL FOR THE PATTERN. I REMEMBER RECHKING THE GAS, PROP AND MIXTURE CTLS, BUT NOT THE GEAR. WE DSNDED ON FINAL, AND I RECALL THE GLIDE PATH BEING NORMAL TO SLIGHTLY HIGH, SO I BROUGHT THE THROTTLE TO IDLE. I FLARED AFTER PASSING THE THRESHOLD OF THE RWY AND BEGAN RAISING THE NOSE. I BELIEVE THE FIRST SOUND I HEARD WAS THE PROP STRIKING THE RWY FOLLOWED BY SCRAPING OF THE REAR FUSELAGE. THE ACFT SETTLED ONTO THE RWY JUST PRIOR TO THE 1000 FT MARKER AND SLID ABOUT 700 FT BEFORE COMING TO REST. I ASCERTAINED THAT THE PAX SEEMED TO BE UNINJURED AND DIRECTED THE EVAC OF THE ACFT. AT NO POINT DID THE GEAR WARNING SOUND DURING THE PATTERN, AND, UPON REFLECTION, I DO NOT REMEMBER IT SOUNDING WHILE WE WERE ON THE RECONNAISSANCE FLT, ALTHOUGH THE PWR SETTINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN LOW ENOUGH THAT IT SHOULD HAVE AT SOME POINT. I HAD CHKED IT PRIOR TO THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY AND DETERMINED THAT IT WAS WORKING. THE ACFT REMAINED ON THE RWY UNTIL MECHS FROM EUREKA WERE ABLE TO JACK THE ACFT, AND THE LNDG GEAR WAS LOWERED NORMALLY. THEY SAID THAT THE DAMAGE TO THE BOTTOM OF THE ACFT WAS NOT SEVERE, BUT THE PROP WAS NOT REPAIRABLE. AFTER THE FLT I CHKED THE GEAR WARNING HORN AND IT WAS NOT WORKING. THAT AFTERNOON I WAS CONTACTED AT THE ROHNERVILLE ARPT BY MR Y OF THE FAA. HE INTERVIEWED ME REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INCIDENT AND THEN REVIEWED THE ACFT DOCUMENTATION, AS WELL AS THE PAPERWORK FOR THE FLT. I SHOWED HIM THE WT AND BAL CALCULATIONS FOR THE FLT, AND HE NOTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN PREPARED INCORRECTLY. I HAD RUN THE WT AND BAL PROGRAM ON FLIGHTSOFT FLT PLANNING SOFTWARE AND HAD INADVERTENTLY PRINTED THE INFO FOR THE WRONG ACFT, ALTHOUGH THE PAX WTS WERE CORRECT. I HAD CALCULATED A SIMILAR LOAD MANY TIMES BEFORE AND KNEW IT TO BE WITHIN LIMITS, SO NEGLECTED TO CHK THE PRINTOUT CLOSELY. I HAVE FLOWN A LARGE NUMBER OF THESE RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS, HOWEVER MAINLY IN THE C206 WITH FIXED GEAR. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HABIT PATTERNS FROM THAT SORT OF MISSION MAY HAVE CARRIED OVER TO THIS FLT. I HAVE OVER 2100 HRS IN THE C206, AND I WOULD ESTIMATE AT LEAST 75% HAVE BEEN RECONNAISSANCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE IS WITH AN AIR TAXI OP, PART 135. RPTR CONTACTED THE LCL FSDO AND THERE WAS NO PROB EXCEPT THE CHK RIDE WITH THE FAA REPRESENTATIVE. SINCE HE IS VERY PRECISE IN HIS FLYING HE IS STILL TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED. HE AND HIS BOSS HAVE DISCUSSED IT AND DO NOT HAVE AN ANSWER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.