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Reporter claims trend where clearance readbacks are incomplete and acknowledged with incomplete call signs.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 376531 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199708 |
| Day | Fri |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : ztl |
| State Reference | GA |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : radar |
| Qualification | controller : radar |
| Experience | controller radar : 15 |
| ASRS Report | 376531 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
I work in an en route center and have noticed a trend towards improper and dangerous readback techniques. At least a dozen times in an 8 hour shift, aircraft will not only give a partial readback, but most importantly will not use their call sign. This puts controllers in a position of having to verify who read back the last clearance issued. I am not talking about the numerous times acrs only use the flight numbers without the company prefix or GA only using 1 or 2 letters or numbers, but this is a complete omission of any identing call sign. To be positive that an incorrect aircraft did not also take the clearance we would have to ask every single aircraft on frequency, not just the one it was intended for. Another problem with readbacks is when a heading and altitude are both issued and the readback response is 'roger, 170, 210' (roger, one seven zero and two one zero') without the words 'heading' 'flight level' or any indication the pilot copied the correct clearance or may in fact have reversed the altitude for the heading and vice versa. This is a very dangerous trend that must be stopped. The importance of proper readback cannot be overemphasized.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RPTR CLAIMS TREND WHERE CLRNC READBACKS ARE INCOMPLETE AND ACKNOWLEDGED WITH INCOMPLETE CALL SIGNS.
Narrative: I WORK IN AN ENRTE CTR AND HAVE NOTICED A TREND TOWARDS IMPROPER AND DANGEROUS READBACK TECHNIQUES. AT LEAST A DOZEN TIMES IN AN 8 HR SHIFT, ACFT WILL NOT ONLY GIVE A PARTIAL READBACK, BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY WILL NOT USE THEIR CALL SIGN. THIS PUTS CTLRS IN A POS OF HAVING TO VERIFY WHO READ BACK THE LAST CLRNC ISSUED. I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT THE NUMEROUS TIMES ACRS ONLY USE THE FLT NUMBERS WITHOUT THE COMPANY PREFIX OR GA ONLY USING 1 OR 2 LETTERS OR NUMBERS, BUT THIS IS A COMPLETE OMISSION OF ANY IDENTING CALL SIGN. TO BE POSITIVE THAT AN INCORRECT ACFT DID NOT ALSO TAKE THE CLRNC WE WOULD HAVE TO ASK EVERY SINGLE ACFT ON FREQ, NOT JUST THE ONE IT WAS INTENDED FOR. ANOTHER PROB WITH READBACKS IS WHEN A HDG AND ALT ARE BOTH ISSUED AND THE READBACK RESPONSE IS 'ROGER, 170, 210' (ROGER, ONE SEVEN ZERO AND TWO ONE ZERO') WITHOUT THE WORDS 'HDG' 'FLT LEVEL' OR ANY INDICATION THE PLT COPIED THE CORRECT CLRNC OR MAY IN FACT HAVE REVERSED THE ALT FOR THE HDG AND VICE VERSA. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS TREND THAT MUST BE STOPPED. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER READBACK CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.