Narrative:

Diverted from psp to lax due to aircraft landing performance requirements in psp with the anti-skid inoperative. We were scheduled to depart to psp at XA45 and were awaiting the arrival of the aircraft from psp which taxied in at XA30. The captain of that flight informed me that the anti-skid was deferred which was also noted on the dispatch release. I changed the minimum fuel from 3000 pounds to 2300 pounds with the concurrence of dispatch knowing that there would be a weight penalty with the anti-skid inoperative. During the acceptance check, my first officer checked the weight penalty for psp runway 13R, assuming that the wind in psp would be from the southeast as we had experienced on all the previous flts and determined a penalty of 6000 ft leaving us with a maximum landing weight of 18802 pounds. I looked at the WX and the metar wind was 300 degrees at 15 KTS favoring psp runway 31 with the forecast continuing to favor runway 31. By this time passenger were being boarded and it was departure time. I called lax operations for an update on the psp winds as we rushed through the rest of the preparations for departure then checked the maximum landing weight for runway 31 by looking at the psp airport diagram noting the runway was 8500 ft long and that landing flaps 45 degrees would only restrict us to a 600 pounds penalty. This we noted would not affect the flight. Lax operations called us with psp winds being 240 degrees at 12 KTS so with the winds shifting, I told lax operations that I would use lax as an alternate if the wind shifted so that I would not be able to land in psp. While en route, my first officer and I went over the performance data and realized that we had overlooked the fact that the available landing distance for runway 31L was identical to runway 13R and that we would not be able to land at psp at our landing weight, therefore we returned to lax. Contributing factors: 1) previous crew flew same aircraft to psp so we assumed that we could do the same. 2) 15 min turn with a crew change and rushing for an on-time departure, therefore overlooking crucial information. 3) first time flying an aircraft with the anti-skid inoperative and not enough time to thoroughly review all the data. 4) dispatch approving the flight via the release. 5) maintenance deferring the aircraft when it could have been fixed (which it subsequently was, it took 30 mins).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LTT FLC DEPARTED LAX FOR PSP WITH THE BRAKE ANTI- SKID SYS INOP. AFTER THEY WERE AIRBORNE, THEY DISCOVERED THAT THEIR PREFLT PLANNING WAS INCORRECT AND THEY COULD NOT LAND AT PSP IN THAT CONDITION. THEY HAD TO RETURN TO LAX.

Narrative: DIVERTED FROM PSP TO LAX DUE TO ACFT LNDG PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IN PSP WITH THE ANTI-SKID INOP. WE WERE SCHEDULED TO DEPART TO PSP AT XA45 AND WERE AWAITING THE ARR OF THE ACFT FROM PSP WHICH TAXIED IN AT XA30. THE CAPT OF THAT FLT INFORMED ME THAT THE ANTI-SKID WAS DEFERRED WHICH WAS ALSO NOTED ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE. I CHANGED THE MINIMUM FUEL FROM 3000 LBS TO 2300 LBS WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF DISPATCH KNOWING THAT THERE WOULD BE A WT PENALTY WITH THE ANTI-SKID INOP. DURING THE ACCEPTANCE CHK, MY FO CHKED THE WT PENALTY FOR PSP RWY 13R, ASSUMING THAT THE WIND IN PSP WOULD BE FROM THE SE AS WE HAD EXPERIENCED ON ALL THE PREVIOUS FLTS AND DETERMINED A PENALTY OF 6000 FT LEAVING US WITH A MAX LNDG WT OF 18802 LBS. I LOOKED AT THE WX AND THE METAR WIND WAS 300 DEGS AT 15 KTS FAVORING PSP RWY 31 WITH THE FORECAST CONTINUING TO FAVOR RWY 31. BY THIS TIME PAX WERE BEING BOARDED AND IT WAS DEP TIME. I CALLED LAX OPS FOR AN UPDATE ON THE PSP WINDS AS WE RUSHED THROUGH THE REST OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR DEP THEN CHKED THE MAX LNDG WT FOR RWY 31 BY LOOKING AT THE PSP ARPT DIAGRAM NOTING THE RWY WAS 8500 FT LONG AND THAT LNDG FLAPS 45 DEGS WOULD ONLY RESTRICT US TO A 600 LBS PENALTY. THIS WE NOTED WOULD NOT AFFECT THE FLT. LAX OPS CALLED US WITH PSP WINDS BEING 240 DEGS AT 12 KTS SO WITH THE WINDS SHIFTING, I TOLD LAX OPS THAT I WOULD USE LAX AS AN ALTERNATE IF THE WIND SHIFTED SO THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LAND IN PSP. WHILE ENRTE, MY FO AND I WENT OVER THE PERFORMANCE DATA AND REALIZED THAT WE HAD OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE AVAILABLE LNDG DISTANCE FOR RWY 31L WAS IDENTICAL TO RWY 13R AND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LAND AT PSP AT OUR LNDG WT, THEREFORE WE RETURNED TO LAX. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) PREVIOUS CREW FLEW SAME ACFT TO PSP SO WE ASSUMED THAT WE COULD DO THE SAME. 2) 15 MIN TURN WITH A CREW CHANGE AND RUSHING FOR AN ON-TIME DEP, THEREFORE OVERLOOKING CRUCIAL INFO. 3) FIRST TIME FLYING AN ACFT WITH THE ANTI-SKID INOP AND NOT ENOUGH TIME TO THOROUGHLY REVIEW ALL THE DATA. 4) DISPATCH APPROVING THE FLT VIA THE RELEASE. 5) MAINT DEFERRING THE ACFT WHEN IT COULD HAVE BEEN FIXED (WHICH IT SUBSEQUENTLY WAS, IT TOOK 30 MINS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.