Narrative:

On landing rollout I called out to the captain that he had only one thrust reverser on the left side and no right reverse. He continued to try to deploy the reverser, but it would not deploy. Landing rollout was uneventful. The problem here is the way the captain handled this situation, not keeping me informed, about what our maintenance department and chief pilot were telling him. I know from our MEL that we can dispatch without thrust reversers as long as certain procedures are performed by maintenance personnel, ultimately ensuring the thrust reverser is locked in the stowed position. The captain spoke first with the crew chief of the aircraft, who told him that you could dispatch as long as the thrust reverser was locked out as per the MEL. Captain said, that he felt comfortable taking the aircraft as is, and did not want to delay the flight. For maintenance to get to the aircraft and perform the procedure probably would have delayed the flight about 2 hours. At this time the crew chief advised the director of maintenance about the situation. He also spoke with the captain and told him that the thrust reverser needed to be locked prior to departure. Captain insisted he was comfortable and did not want to delay the flight. Maintenance was not happy with the captain's decision so the dom called the chief pilot. The chief pilot responded by saying, well the captain is comfortable and he does not want to delay the passenger so we have no choice. I had asked the captain what maintenance had said, he told me that he was to call after we got to our next destination. I was aware of our MEL and the proper procedures, but assuming 3 auths (maintenance, captain, chief pilot) all above me made the decision to go, I felt I had no choice, but to go. It was not until we got to our next destination and I spoke with the dom and realized that he too was not happy that we departed without locking out the thrust reverser. But, we work for a chief pilot that manages by fear and intimidation and since he told the dom we have no choice, he was afraid to stand up to him. Both the dom and myself knew the correct choice was to lock out the thrust reverser as per the MEL before dispatch. Violating the MEL and putting the aircraft, crew, and passenger in danger showed very poor judgement of both the captain and chief pilot. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a gulfstream 4 and the reverser was not deferred and was dispatched with the log item open. Reporter said the captain completely ignored any input from the reporter and the crew chief when told the reverser must be locked in the forward thrust position before dispatch. The reporter stated the director of maintenance and the chief pilot agreed with the captain's plan of action and approved the dispatch with the reverser inoperative, not deferred and not locked in the forward thrust position. The reporter said the passenger may have influenced the decision to avoid a delay. The reporter states the FAA has conducted interviews of all concerned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GULFSTREAM 4 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE R THRUST REVERSER INOP AND NOT DEFERRED PER THE MEL.

Narrative: ON LNDG ROLLOUT I CALLED OUT TO THE CAPT THAT HE HAD ONLY ONE THRUST REVERSER ON THE L SIDE AND NO R REVERSE. HE CONTINUED TO TRY TO DEPLOY THE REVERSER, BUT IT WOULD NOT DEPLOY. LNDG ROLLOUT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE PROB HERE IS THE WAY THE CAPT HANDLED THIS SIT, NOT KEEPING ME INFORMED, ABOUT WHAT OUR MAINT DEPT AND CHIEF PLT WERE TELLING HIM. I KNOW FROM OUR MEL THAT WE CAN DISPATCH WITHOUT THRUST REVERSERS AS LONG AS CERTAIN PROCS ARE PERFORMED BY MAINT PERSONNEL, ULTIMATELY ENSURING THE THRUST REVERSER IS LOCKED IN THE STOWED POS. THE CAPT SPOKE FIRST WITH THE CREW CHIEF OF THE ACFT, WHO TOLD HIM THAT YOU COULD DISPATCH AS LONG AS THE THRUST REVERSER WAS LOCKED OUT AS PER THE MEL. CAPT SAID, THAT HE FELT COMFORTABLE TAKING THE ACFT AS IS, AND DID NOT WANT TO DELAY THE FLT. FOR MAINT TO GET TO THE ACFT AND PERFORM THE PROC PROBABLY WOULD HAVE DELAYED THE FLT ABOUT 2 HRS. AT THIS TIME THE CREW CHIEF ADVISED THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT ABOUT THE SIT. HE ALSO SPOKE WITH THE CAPT AND TOLD HIM THAT THE THRUST REVERSER NEEDED TO BE LOCKED PRIOR TO DEP. CAPT INSISTED HE WAS COMFORTABLE AND DID NOT WANT TO DELAY THE FLT. MAINT WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE CAPT'S DECISION SO THE DOM CALLED THE CHIEF PLT. THE CHIEF PLT RESPONDED BY SAYING, WELL THE CAPT IS COMFORTABLE AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO DELAY THE PAX SO WE HAVE NO CHOICE. I HAD ASKED THE CAPT WHAT MAINT HAD SAID, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS TO CALL AFTER WE GOT TO OUR NEXT DEST. I WAS AWARE OF OUR MEL AND THE PROPER PROCS, BUT ASSUMING 3 AUTHS (MAINT, CAPT, CHIEF PLT) ALL ABOVE ME MADE THE DECISION TO GO, I FELT I HAD NO CHOICE, BUT TO GO. IT WAS NOT UNTIL WE GOT TO OUR NEXT DEST AND I SPOKE WITH THE DOM AND REALIZED THAT HE TOO WAS NOT HAPPY THAT WE DEPARTED WITHOUT LOCKING OUT THE THRUST REVERSER. BUT, WE WORK FOR A CHIEF PLT THAT MANAGES BY FEAR AND INTIMIDATION AND SINCE HE TOLD THE DOM WE HAVE NO CHOICE, HE WAS AFRAID TO STAND UP TO HIM. BOTH THE DOM AND MYSELF KNEW THE CORRECT CHOICE WAS TO LOCK OUT THE THRUST REVERSER AS PER THE MEL BEFORE DISPATCH. VIOLATING THE MEL AND PUTTING THE ACFT, CREW, AND PAX IN DANGER SHOWED VERY POOR JUDGEMENT OF BOTH THE CAPT AND CHIEF PLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A GULFSTREAM 4 AND THE REVERSER WAS NOT DEFERRED AND WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE LOG ITEM OPEN. RPTR SAID THE CAPT COMPLETELY IGNORED ANY INPUT FROM THE RPTR AND THE CREW CHIEF WHEN TOLD THE REVERSER MUST BE LOCKED IN THE FORWARD THRUST POS BEFORE DISPATCH. THE RPTR STATED THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT AND THE CHIEF PLT AGREED WITH THE CAPT'S PLAN OF ACTION AND APPROVED THE DISPATCH WITH THE REVERSER INOP, NOT DEFERRED AND NOT LOCKED IN THE FORWARD THRUST POS. THE RPTR SAID THE PAX MAY HAVE INFLUENCED THE DECISION TO AVOID A DELAY. THE RPTR STATES THE FAA HAS CONDUCTED INTERVIEWS OF ALL CONCERNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.