Narrative:

We departed abq. Flight was on aug/xa/97. The aircraft maintenance log revealed the #2 engine 'B' loop was inoperative and properly placarded. The maintenance log also revealed numerous #2 engine fire detection problems within the previous several days prior to the flight. Departure from abq was without incident. At FL330, approximately 20 NM southeast of the lbl VOR, the #2 engine 'a' loop illuminated. We complied with the engine fire checklist, declared an emergency and diverted to ict. A single engine approach and landing was accomplished with no further incident. The aircraft was brought to a complete stop on the runway. An inspection by airport emergency vehicles revealed no external damage. The aircraft was then taxied to the gate. While accomplishing the engine fire checklist, the captain suspected the fire indication to be false and would not allow the extinguishers to be discharged. On 3 separate occasions while accomplishing the checklist, I asked the captain about his decision not to fire a bottle. The #2 'a' loop remained illuminated until after the aircraft was shut down at the gate in ict. It occurs to me that the engine fire loop detection system is the only means available to the crew to determine if a fire exists. While the captain's decision to land at the nearest suitable airport was prudent (and required by the regulations) I believe his decision not to allow extinguishing agent to be discharged into the engine was faulty. One must be careful not to allow a previous maintenance history to taint the decision making process in handling such a situation, especially when that decision is less conservative. Interestingly, I had just been through recurrent training a week before this incident and had flown a similar loft scenario. That recent experience contributed significantly toward maintaining an efficient cockpit environment when the workload increased with accomplishing emergency checklist, communicating with ATC and company, and the subsequent diversion. ATC personnel in ZKC were both professional and very helpful. I cannot stress the importance of both the cockpit and ATC personnel working together to bring about a successful conclusion to any abnormal or emergency situation. One final note: after inspection by maintenance, it was revealed the #2 'a' loop was indeed faulty.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 EXPERIENCES AN ENG FIRE WARNING ON ENG #2'S LOOP 'A' AT FL330. PIC ELECTS TO DIVERT TO ICT. HE HAD ALSO ELECTED, WHEN PERFORMING THE ENG FIRE WARNING CHKLIST, TO NOT USE THE FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYS. THE FO ASKED HIM ABOUT THIS 3 TIMES DURING THE CHKLIST USE. THE #2 ENG LOOP 'B' WAS ON AN MEL DEFERMENT.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED ABQ. FLT WAS ON AUG/XA/97. THE ACFT MAINT LOG REVEALED THE #2 ENG 'B' LOOP WAS INOP AND PROPERLY PLACARDED. THE MAINT LOG ALSO REVEALED NUMEROUS #2 ENG FIRE DETECTION PROBS WITHIN THE PREVIOUS SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO THE FLT. DEP FROM ABQ WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT FL330, APPROX 20 NM SE OF THE LBL VOR, THE #2 ENG 'A' LOOP ILLUMINATED. WE COMPLIED WITH THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST, DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED TO ICT. A SINGLE ENG APCH AND LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ACFT WAS BROUGHT TO A COMPLETE STOP ON THE RWY. AN INSPECTION BY ARPT EMER VEHICLES REVEALED NO EXTERNAL DAMAGE. THE ACFT WAS THEN TAXIED TO THE GATE. WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST, THE CAPT SUSPECTED THE FIRE INDICATION TO BE FALSE AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THE EXTINGUISHERS TO BE DISCHARGED. ON 3 SEPARATE OCCASIONS WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THE CHKLIST, I ASKED THE CAPT ABOUT HIS DECISION NOT TO FIRE A BOTTLE. THE #2 'A' LOOP REMAINED ILLUMINATED UNTIL AFTER THE ACFT WAS SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE IN ICT. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT THE ENG FIRE LOOP DETECTION SYS IS THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE CREW TO DETERMINE IF A FIRE EXISTS. WHILE THE CAPT'S DECISION TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT WAS PRUDENT (AND REQUIRED BY THE REGS) I BELIEVE HIS DECISION NOT TO ALLOW EXTINGUISHING AGENT TO BE DISCHARGED INTO THE ENG WAS FAULTY. ONE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALLOW A PREVIOUS MAINT HISTORY TO TAINT THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN HANDLING SUCH A SIT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THAT DECISION IS LESS CONSERVATIVE. INTERESTINGLY, I HAD JUST BEEN THROUGH RECURRENT TRAINING A WK BEFORE THIS INCIDENT AND HAD FLOWN A SIMILAR LOFT SCENARIO. THAT RECENT EXPERIENCE CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD MAINTAINING AN EFFICIENT COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT WHEN THE WORKLOAD INCREASED WITH ACCOMPLISHING EMER CHKLIST, COMMUNICATING WITH ATC AND COMPANY, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DIVERSION. ATC PERSONNEL IN ZKC WERE BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND VERY HELPFUL. I CANNOT STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF BOTH THE COCKPIT AND ATC PERSONNEL WORKING TOGETHER TO BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO ANY ABNORMAL OR EMER SIT. ONE FINAL NOTE: AFTER INSPECTION BY MAINT, IT WAS REVEALED THE #2 'A' LOOP WAS INDEED FAULTY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.