Narrative:

Incident involved an unexpected encounter with parachute traffic at orange municipal airport, orange, ma. Flight was from richmond airport (west kingston, ri) to orange municipal. Approximately 10 NM south of ore, I turned to CTAF (122.8) to listen for traffic at the field. The frequency was in fairly heavy use from traffic at multiple airports in the vicinity. However, I noted no parachute warnings at ore. Approximately 3 NM from the airport, I radioed my position and intention to land at the field (prior to this, I had made 2 calls to the field requesting active runway, but received no response). In order to verify conditions at the field, I made a decision to overfly the airport at 2500 ft MSL (approximately 1000 ft above the pattern altitude of 1555 ft MSL). Approximately 1 NM from the airport, I announced my position and intention to overfly the airport. While over the field, I saw parachute traffic descending ahead. The traffic appeared to be approximately 1 NM away and 200 ft above my position. Relative motion of the traffic indicated that it would pass to my right. However, a turn was required to increase distance from the traffic. The fact that there was separation between my aircraft and the parachute traffic was a matter of chance, and a collision could have easily occurred if I had been at a different point while approaching the field. I believe that there were multiple factors involved. When I called for a flight briefing the morning of the flight, the briefer advised of parachute activity in the providence area. However, no jumping was noted at ore. Remedy: activities with parachute jumping ensure NOTAM is filed, also awareness on part of flight service to ensure all relevant NOTAMS are provided. I did not obtain an updated briefing immediately before departing for ore. Remedy: had a NOTAM been missed before, this could have provided another chance to receive it. Congestion from various airports on the CTAF at ore. Remedy: all pilots (including myself) exercise particular vigilance while communicating and listening on a crowded frequency. Know that there is a possibility for xmissions to be cut off in this environment. I did not note the symbol for parachute activity near ore on the sectional chart. Remedy: more careful review of charts, airport directories in the flight planning stage. Even without a NOTAM, a telephone call to the field could have provided me knowledge of parachute activity or other factors. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that he was flying his piper cherokee warrior to an airport that he had not visited before and he decided to call early and learn what he could of the traffic situation. He found that the CTAF frequency was very congested with traffic calls at several airports in the area that used the same frequency. He did hear one series of calls for a drop aircraft over a nearby university, but nothing for ore. In fact, one other aircraft using ore acknowledged his calls. He decided to overfly ore to visually check the traffic pattern and the airport. He saw the other aircraft using one runway and noted that a drag strip had been set up on a closed runway. As he flew over the airport, he was surprised when he saw parachutes opening ahead of him. He would have missed them on his heading, but he decided to turn away to give them more clearance. He said that the fact that he was clear was purely due to chance as there was still no radio contact with the drop aircraft. The pilot said that he looked for the drop aircraft, but did not see it. After landing he remained on the airport for quite a while and no drop aircraft landed so he assumed that it was based elsewhere. The reporter said that some solution should be found for the congestion on CTAF frequencys. He said that the FAA should use more frequencys including those that older radios may not be capable of using. He feels that requiring the radios to be upgraded and installed soon in all aircraft is a safety measure that is necessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28 PLT RPTS THAT HE CAME UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE TO PARACHUTISTS THAT DROPPED IN THE VICINITY OF AN ARPT THAT HE WAS USING. HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PRE-DROP RADIO CALLS ON THE CTAF FREQ FOR THAT ARPT. HE DID MONITOR RADIO CALLS ON THAT FREQ FOR OTHER ARPTS IN THE AREA, HOWEVER, SO HE KNEW THAT HIS RADIOS WERE WORKING.

Narrative: INCIDENT INVOLVED AN UNEXPECTED ENCOUNTER WITH PARACHUTE TFC AT ORANGE MUNICIPAL ARPT, ORANGE, MA. FLT WAS FROM RICHMOND ARPT (WEST KINGSTON, RI) TO ORANGE MUNICIPAL. APPROX 10 NM S OF ORE, I TURNED TO CTAF (122.8) TO LISTEN FOR TFC AT THE FIELD. THE FREQ WAS IN FAIRLY HVY USE FROM TFC AT MULTIPLE ARPTS IN THE VICINITY. HOWEVER, I NOTED NO PARACHUTE WARNINGS AT ORE. APPROX 3 NM FROM THE ARPT, I RADIOED MY POS AND INTENTION TO LAND AT THE FIELD (PRIOR TO THIS, I HAD MADE 2 CALLS TO THE FIELD REQUESTING ACTIVE RWY, BUT RECEIVED NO RESPONSE). IN ORDER TO VERIFY CONDITIONS AT THE FIELD, I MADE A DECISION TO OVERFLY THE ARPT AT 2500 FT MSL (APPROX 1000 FT ABOVE THE PATTERN ALT OF 1555 FT MSL). APPROX 1 NM FROM THE ARPT, I ANNOUNCED MY POS AND INTENTION TO OVERFLY THE ARPT. WHILE OVER THE FIELD, I SAW PARACHUTE TFC DSNDING AHEAD. THE TFC APPEARED TO BE APPROX 1 NM AWAY AND 200 FT ABOVE MY POS. RELATIVE MOTION OF THE TFC INDICATED THAT IT WOULD PASS TO MY R. HOWEVER, A TURN WAS REQUIRED TO INCREASE DISTANCE FROM THE TFC. THE FACT THAT THERE WAS SEPARATION BTWN MY ACFT AND THE PARACHUTE TFC WAS A MATTER OF CHANCE, AND A COLLISION COULD HAVE EASILY OCCURRED IF I HAD BEEN AT A DIFFERENT POINT WHILE APCHING THE FIELD. I BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE MULTIPLE FACTORS INVOLVED. WHEN I CALLED FOR A FLT BRIEFING THE MORNING OF THE FLT, THE BRIEFER ADVISED OF PARACHUTE ACTIVITY IN THE PROVIDENCE AREA. HOWEVER, NO JUMPING WAS NOTED AT ORE. REMEDY: ACTIVITIES WITH PARACHUTE JUMPING ENSURE NOTAM IS FILED, ALSO AWARENESS ON PART OF FLT SVC TO ENSURE ALL RELEVANT NOTAMS ARE PROVIDED. I DID NOT OBTAIN AN UPDATED BRIEFING IMMEDIATELY BEFORE DEPARTING FOR ORE. REMEDY: HAD A NOTAM BEEN MISSED BEFORE, THIS COULD HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER CHANCE TO RECEIVE IT. CONGESTION FROM VARIOUS ARPTS ON THE CTAF AT ORE. REMEDY: ALL PLTS (INCLUDING MYSELF) EXERCISE PARTICULAR VIGILANCE WHILE COMMUNICATING AND LISTENING ON A CROWDED FREQ. KNOW THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY FOR XMISSIONS TO BE CUT OFF IN THIS ENVIRONMENT. I DID NOT NOTE THE SYMBOL FOR PARACHUTE ACTIVITY NEAR ORE ON THE SECTIONAL CHART. REMEDY: MORE CAREFUL REVIEW OF CHARTS, ARPT DIRECTORIES IN THE FLT PLANNING STAGE. EVEN WITHOUT A NOTAM, A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE FIELD COULD HAVE PROVIDED ME KNOWLEDGE OF PARACHUTE ACTIVITY OR OTHER FACTORS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT HE WAS FLYING HIS PIPER CHEROKEE WARRIOR TO AN ARPT THAT HE HAD NOT VISITED BEFORE AND HE DECIDED TO CALL EARLY AND LEARN WHAT HE COULD OF THE TFC SIT. HE FOUND THAT THE CTAF FREQ WAS VERY CONGESTED WITH TFC CALLS AT SEVERAL ARPTS IN THE AREA THAT USED THE SAME FREQ. HE DID HEAR ONE SERIES OF CALLS FOR A DROP ACFT OVER A NEARBY UNIVERSITY, BUT NOTHING FOR ORE. IN FACT, ONE OTHER ACFT USING ORE ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CALLS. HE DECIDED TO OVERFLY ORE TO VISUALLY CHK THE TFC PATTERN AND THE ARPT. HE SAW THE OTHER ACFT USING ONE RWY AND NOTED THAT A DRAG STRIP HAD BEEN SET UP ON A CLOSED RWY. AS HE FLEW OVER THE ARPT, HE WAS SURPRISED WHEN HE SAW PARACHUTES OPENING AHEAD OF HIM. HE WOULD HAVE MISSED THEM ON HIS HEADING, BUT HE DECIDED TO TURN AWAY TO GIVE THEM MORE CLRNC. HE SAID THAT THE FACT THAT HE WAS CLR WAS PURELY DUE TO CHANCE AS THERE WAS STILL NO RADIO CONTACT WITH THE DROP ACFT. THE PLT SAID THAT HE LOOKED FOR THE DROP ACFT, BUT DID NOT SEE IT. AFTER LNDG HE REMAINED ON THE ARPT FOR QUITE A WHILE AND NO DROP ACFT LANDED SO HE ASSUMED THAT IT WAS BASED ELSEWHERE. THE RPTR SAID THAT SOME SOLUTION SHOULD BE FOUND FOR THE CONGESTION ON CTAF FREQS. HE SAID THAT THE FAA SHOULD USE MORE FREQS INCLUDING THOSE THAT OLDER RADIOS MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF USING. HE FEELS THAT REQUIRING THE RADIOS TO BE UPGRADED AND INSTALLED SOON IN ALL ACFT IS A SAFETY MEASURE THAT IS NECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.