Narrative:

At XA14 EDT on sep/mon/97, we pushed back from the gate. After pushback, we called for taxi clearance. At this time, it was my understanding that cle ground control cleared us to taxi to runway 23R via taxiway U and runway 28. I acknowledged the clearance as stated above. The airport lighting environment was dark, clear sky below 12000 ft, visibility 5 mi with haze. We taxied following the cle airport commercial chart. As we approached runway 23L, the first officer called to me very loudly to hold short. I then learned that the first officer had understood the taxi instructions to be: taxi to runway 23R via taxiway U and runway 28, hold short of runway 23L. I stopped the aircraft, however, the nose of the aircraft remained protruding onto runway 23L. The first officer stated he saw an aircraft on final to runway 23L. I then applied sufficient power to expedite crossing runway 23L. Ground control instructed us to cross runway 23L, stating 'go ahead and cross runway 23L, contact tower.' tower cleared us to 'back taxi' on runway 23R if we wanted. We then back taxied to the end of runway 23R into the takeoff position. Tower control cleared us for takeoff. At no time did ground control or tower state a runway incursion had occurred. Additionally, there was no interruption in arrival or departure separation that resulted in a traffic conflict. The aircraft on final to runway 23L landed uneventfully and we took off uneventfully on runway 23R. In the future I will always question clrncs to taxi to a runway with intervening runways and confirm 'cleared to cross' as well as always checking final approach. (This is something I usually always do and I'm not sure why I didn't this time...it only takes once.) callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was the captain of an air carrier MD88 flight who crossed the hold line of runway 23L without authority/authorized. He said that he, apparently, missed the 'hold short' portion of the clearance and although the first officer was aware of the requirement he was so busy with the before takeoff preparation that he did not notice the error until the captain had crossed the hold line. Additionally, the captain said that he never saw the line itself. The captain said that the FAA had contacted his company and that he was scheduled for a joint company, union, and FAA discussion concerning this event. The company had already required the captain to fly with a check pilot who observed his performance and gave him a passing grade on his line operation. He also said that, prior to the event, he and the first officer reviewed the airport page of their charts together. After a review of the event by the company, they have placed a briefing page concerning the intxns and the hold short lines for this airport in their approach chart manual. Supplemental information from acn 380554: in an effort to save fuel, airlines today delay final engine starts until the last min. On 2 man aircraft this means one pilot is busy starting the engine with his eyes inside most of the time accomplishing this task. I believe engines (all) should be operating early enough to provide a less hurried atmosphere.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD88 FLC CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 23L AT CLE WHEN THE CAPT MISUNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC AND THE FO WAS DISTRACTED BY THE CHKLIST AND OTHER FLT PREPARATION DUTIES.

Narrative: AT XA14 EDT ON SEP/MON/97, WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE. AFTER PUSHBACK, WE CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC. AT THIS TIME, IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT CLE GND CTL CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 23R VIA TXWY U AND RWY 28. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AS STATED ABOVE. THE ARPT LIGHTING ENVIRONMENT WAS DARK, CLR SKY BELOW 12000 FT, VISIBILITY 5 MI WITH HAZE. WE TAXIED FOLLOWING THE CLE ARPT COMMERCIAL CHART. AS WE APCHED RWY 23L, THE FO CALLED TO ME VERY LOUDLY TO HOLD SHORT. I THEN LEARNED THAT THE FO HAD UNDERSTOOD THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO BE: TAXI TO RWY 23R VIA TXWY U AND RWY 28, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23L. I STOPPED THE ACFT, HOWEVER, THE NOSE OF THE ACFT REMAINED PROTRUDING ONTO RWY 23L. THE FO STATED HE SAW AN ACFT ON FINAL TO RWY 23L. I THEN APPLIED SUFFICIENT PWR TO EXPEDITE XING RWY 23L. GND CTL INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS RWY 23L, STATING 'GO AHEAD AND CROSS RWY 23L, CONTACT TWR.' TWR CLRED US TO 'BACK TAXI' ON RWY 23R IF WE WANTED. WE THEN BACK TAXIED TO THE END OF RWY 23R INTO THE TKOF POS. TWR CTL CLRED US FOR TKOF. AT NO TIME DID GND CTL OR TWR STATE A RWY INCURSION HAD OCCURRED. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS NO INTERRUPTION IN ARR OR DEP SEPARATION THAT RESULTED IN A TFC CONFLICT. THE ACFT ON FINAL TO RWY 23L LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND WE TOOK OFF UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY 23R. IN THE FUTURE I WILL ALWAYS QUESTION CLRNCS TO TAXI TO A RWY WITH INTERVENING RWYS AND CONFIRM 'CLRED TO CROSS' AS WELL AS ALWAYS CHKING FINAL APCH. (THIS IS SOMETHING I USUALLY ALWAYS DO AND I'M NOT SURE WHY I DIDN'T THIS TIME...IT ONLY TAKES ONCE.) CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS THE CAPT OF AN ACR MD88 FLT WHO CROSSED THE HOLD LINE OF RWY 23L WITHOUT AUTH. HE SAID THAT HE, APPARENTLY, MISSED THE 'HOLD SHORT' PORTION OF THE CLRNC AND ALTHOUGH THE FO WAS AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT HE WAS SO BUSY WITH THE BEFORE TKOF PREPARATION THAT HE DID NOT NOTICE THE ERROR UNTIL THE CAPT HAD CROSSED THE HOLD LINE. ADDITIONALLY, THE CAPT SAID THAT HE NEVER SAW THE LINE ITSELF. THE CAPT SAID THAT THE FAA HAD CONTACTED HIS COMPANY AND THAT HE WAS SCHEDULED FOR A JOINT COMPANY, UNION, AND FAA DISCUSSION CONCERNING THIS EVENT. THE COMPANY HAD ALREADY REQUIRED THE CAPT TO FLY WITH A CHK PLT WHO OBSERVED HIS PERFORMANCE AND GAVE HIM A PASSING GRADE ON HIS LINE OP. HE ALSO SAID THAT, PRIOR TO THE EVENT, HE AND THE FO REVIEWED THE ARPT PAGE OF THEIR CHARTS TOGETHER. AFTER A REVIEW OF THE EVENT BY THE COMPANY, THEY HAVE PLACED A BRIEFING PAGE CONCERNING THE INTXNS AND THE HOLD SHORT LINES FOR THIS ARPT IN THEIR APCH CHART MANUAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 380554: IN AN EFFORT TO SAVE FUEL, AIRLINES TODAY DELAY FINAL ENG STARTS UNTIL THE LAST MIN. ON 2 MAN ACFT THIS MEANS ONE PLT IS BUSY STARTING THE ENG WITH HIS EYES INSIDE MOST OF THE TIME ACCOMPLISHING THIS TASK. I BELIEVE ENGS (ALL) SHOULD BE OPERATING EARLY ENOUGH TO PROVIDE A LESS HURRIED ATMOSPHERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.