Narrative:

Aircraft was brought in by previous crew and leading edge slat delamination was found. It was determined by our maintenance that the aircraft would be ferried to our maintenance base for repairs. A flaps 20 degrees, no slats takeoff and landing would be performed. This is an extremely unusual confign. We were left to figure most of situation out on our own. We had very little help from company or manufacturer. We had to sort out numerous paperwork errors, our clearance was not stored, etc. When we finally got underway we noticed our ferry permit had the statement 'FAA was not advised.' also, we realized that we had taken off without specific runway analysis data for our abnormal slat confign. There needs to be more guidance from the aircraft manufacturer and company on this type of ferry. Supplemental information from acn 381092: we hurried to the airport. The first thing I discovered was that the paperwork was incorrect. It listed the destination as phx, when our actual destination was to be pae. On the walkaround, the first officer discovered that both main gear struts were flat, so I coordinated with maintenance to correct that. We called for our ATC clearance 4 times, and each time it was not in the system, so we ended up filing it ourselves, and finally got our clearance. We were to ferry the airplane without leading edge slats, for which we have no published procedure. But the ferry permit did include a list of operating recommendations from manufacturer that had been faxed to us. This included using 20 degrees of flaps, minimum field length of 7000 ft, maximum takeoff weight of 220000 pounds. V1, vr, and V2 were to be determined from normal data sources. Then vr and V2 should then be increased by 15 KTS. We were to use alternate flap operation and not arm the leading edges. We were also to limit our cruise speed to 260 KTS, slowing to 240 KTS if there was buffet or roll. For landing we were to set flaps at 20 degrees, vref 30 plus 30 KTS. And the actual distance should be within the far field distance. We finally pushed back at XA58 local. We started both engines and carefully put the flaps to 20 degrees using the alternate system, using the QRH as guidance, which describes a landing condition, because there is no written procedure for leading edge up takeoff. The first officer went back and visually confirmed that the flaps were down and leading edge devices up. As per the QRH, we positioned the ground proximity flap ovrd switch in. (In my mind I was convinced this would take care of the takeoff confign horn. I didn't think anymore about it.) we taxied for takeoff on runway 31L. As we applied power we got the red confign and flap warning and horn. We taxied off at very low speed (brake energy was not a factor). I called phx maintenance and told them we had aborted and would try again, thinking we had pushed in the wrong confign override switch. After getting the second takeoff confign and warning we taxied back to the gate. I was task-saturated and just tired. At this point, I called our fleet manager, and discussed with him that I could not takeoff in good conscience with the takeoff warning horn sounding without some corroboration from maintenance and we obtained same after a lengthy delay. Line pilots should never be asked to fly these types of ferry flts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 DISPATCHED ON A MAINT FERRY WITH THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES INOP REJECTED TKOF TWICE DUE TO THE CONTINUOS TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDING CAUSED BY NO OPERATIONAL OR PERFORMANCE DATA GIVEN THE CREW.

Narrative: ACFT WAS BROUGHT IN BY PREVIOUS CREW AND LEADING EDGE SLAT DELAMINATION WAS FOUND. IT WAS DETERMINED BY OUR MAINT THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE FERRIED TO OUR MAINT BASE FOR REPAIRS. A FLAPS 20 DEGS, NO SLATS TKOF AND LNDG WOULD BE PERFORMED. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY UNUSUAL CONFIGN. WE WERE LEFT TO FIGURE MOST OF SIT OUT ON OUR OWN. WE HAD VERY LITTLE HELP FROM COMPANY OR MANUFACTURER. WE HAD TO SORT OUT NUMEROUS PAPERWORK ERRORS, OUR CLRNC WAS NOT STORED, ETC. WHEN WE FINALLY GOT UNDERWAY WE NOTICED OUR FERRY PERMIT HAD THE STATEMENT 'FAA WAS NOT ADVISED.' ALSO, WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD TAKEN OFF WITHOUT SPECIFIC RWY ANALYSIS DATA FOR OUR ABNORMAL SLAT CONFIGN. THERE NEEDS TO BE MORE GUIDANCE FROM THE ACFT MANUFACTURER AND COMPANY ON THIS TYPE OF FERRY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 381092: WE HURRIED TO THE ARPT. THE FIRST THING I DISCOVERED WAS THAT THE PAPERWORK WAS INCORRECT. IT LISTED THE DEST AS PHX, WHEN OUR ACTUAL DEST WAS TO BE PAE. ON THE WALKAROUND, THE FO DISCOVERED THAT BOTH MAIN GEAR STRUTS WERE FLAT, SO I COORDINATED WITH MAINT TO CORRECT THAT. WE CALLED FOR OUR ATC CLRNC 4 TIMES, AND EACH TIME IT WAS NOT IN THE SYS, SO WE ENDED UP FILING IT OURSELVES, AND FINALLY GOT OUR CLRNC. WE WERE TO FERRY THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT LEADING EDGE SLATS, FOR WHICH WE HAVE NO PUBLISHED PROC. BUT THE FERRY PERMIT DID INCLUDE A LIST OF OPERATING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MANUFACTURER THAT HAD BEEN FAXED TO US. THIS INCLUDED USING 20 DEGS OF FLAPS, MINIMUM FIELD LENGTH OF 7000 FT, MAX TKOF WT OF 220000 LBS. V1, VR, AND V2 WERE TO BE DETERMINED FROM NORMAL DATA SOURCES. THEN VR AND V2 SHOULD THEN BE INCREASED BY 15 KTS. WE WERE TO USE ALTERNATE FLAP OP AND NOT ARM THE LEADING EDGES. WE WERE ALSO TO LIMIT OUR CRUISE SPD TO 260 KTS, SLOWING TO 240 KTS IF THERE WAS BUFFET OR ROLL. FOR LNDG WE WERE TO SET FLAPS AT 20 DEGS, VREF 30 PLUS 30 KTS. AND THE ACTUAL DISTANCE SHOULD BE WITHIN THE FAR FIELD DISTANCE. WE FINALLY PUSHED BACK AT XA58 LCL. WE STARTED BOTH ENGS AND CAREFULLY PUT THE FLAPS TO 20 DEGS USING THE ALTERNATE SYS, USING THE QRH AS GUIDANCE, WHICH DESCRIBES A LNDG CONDITION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO WRITTEN PROC FOR LEADING EDGE UP TKOF. THE FO WENT BACK AND VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE FLAPS WERE DOWN AND LEADING EDGE DEVICES UP. AS PER THE QRH, WE POSITIONED THE GND PROX FLAP OVRD SWITCH IN. (IN MY MIND I WAS CONVINCED THIS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE TKOF CONFIGN HORN. I DIDN'T THINK ANYMORE ABOUT IT.) WE TAXIED FOR TKOF ON RWY 31L. AS WE APPLIED PWR WE GOT THE RED CONFIGN AND FLAP WARNING AND HORN. WE TAXIED OFF AT VERY LOW SPD (BRAKE ENERGY WAS NOT A FACTOR). I CALLED PHX MAINT AND TOLD THEM WE HAD ABORTED AND WOULD TRY AGAIN, THINKING WE HAD PUSHED IN THE WRONG CONFIGN OVERRIDE SWITCH. AFTER GETTING THE SECOND TKOF CONFIGN AND WARNING WE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE. I WAS TASK-SATURATED AND JUST TIRED. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED OUR FLEET MGR, AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM THAT I COULD NOT TKOF IN GOOD CONSCIENCE WITH THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDING WITHOUT SOME CORROBORATION FROM MAINT AND WE OBTAINED SAME AFTER A LENGTHY DELAY. LINE PLTS SHOULD NEVER BE ASKED TO FLY THESE TYPES OF FERRY FLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.