Narrative:

Upon initial contact with the tower at 12 NM east of the airfield, I was issued instructions to enter a left base for runway 21L and report a 2 NM base. Gear and flaps were extended at 6 NM (LORAN) on base and all landing lights were illuminated. At 2.5 NM (LORAN) I made the designated position report and turned onto final. The tower responded with 'continue' followed by 'cleared to land runway 21L.' I read back the landing clearance. WX and traffic volume were not a factor. At 85 KIAS, 1.42 NM per min, my distance from the runway threshold was less than 1 mi. At that time, and after issuing my landing clearance, the tower controller cleared a cessna at the runway 21L 'hold short' bar to 'taxi into position on runway 21L and hold.' if the tower had my aircraft visually, as required, to issue my landing clearance, the obviously impending conflict would have precluded clearing the cessna onto the runway. It did not. When the conflict required immediate action, logic would dictate instructing me to go around or have the cessna taxi clear of the runway. The tower controller did neither. Instead, he cleared the cessna for immediate takeoff and said traffic is 1 mi on final. That was a false statement. I chose to continue the approach and see if the cessna would become airborne prior to my touchdown. The cessna lifted off. I made the decision to land. With the power off, airspeed decreasing, and in the flare -- I was committed to land. As my aircraft touched down, prescott tower said 'go around.' my main gear was on the ground, I had landing clearance. There were no obstructions on the runway that would interfere with my rollout. I refused what was, ostensibly, an order for me to takeoff, and continued my landing roll. If I had elected to takeoff, I was confronted with an imminent airborne conflict that I would rapidly overtake. A normal departure from the runway environment would not have been possible. Remaining on the ground was the only reasonable alternative. I attempted to discuss the incident with the tower operator. He was arrogantly defensive and cavalier about the matter. I asked to speak to the supervisor. There was no supervisor on duty. I contacted the tower chief on sep/mon/97. He responded in a similar manner to the tower controller and went on to say that I caused the situation to occur. He did not elaborate or explain how that was possible. The conversation was not civil and I terminated it. The prescott control tower has operated in this manner for quite some time. Although, I must say that after operating at the prescott airport for over 23 yrs, this is the worst incident I have been exposed to. In a conversation with the airport manager, he confirmed that there was a problem, but he was not specific. Other pilots had reported incidents. Mine was not a singular, one time, isolated event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR CLRED A CESSNA FOR TKOF WITH AN SMA ON SHORT FINAL APCH WITH CLRNC TO LAND. AFTER THE LNDG ACFT TOUCHED DOWN, THE CTLR ISSUED A GAR. THE SMA PLT DECLINED THE GAR DUE TO THE PROX OF THE CESSNA.

Narrative: UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE TWR AT 12 NM E OF THE AIRFIELD, I WAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER A L BASE FOR RWY 21L AND RPT A 2 NM BASE. GEAR AND FLAPS WERE EXTENDED AT 6 NM (LORAN) ON BASE AND ALL LNDG LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED. AT 2.5 NM (LORAN) I MADE THE DESIGNATED POS RPT AND TURNED ONTO FINAL. THE TWR RESPONDED WITH 'CONTINUE' FOLLOWED BY 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 21L.' I READ BACK THE LNDG CLRNC. WX AND TFC VOLUME WERE NOT A FACTOR. AT 85 KIAS, 1.42 NM PER MIN, MY DISTANCE FROM THE RWY THRESHOLD WAS LESS THAN 1 MI. AT THAT TIME, AND AFTER ISSUING MY LNDG CLRNC, THE TWR CTLR CLRED A CESSNA AT THE RWY 21L 'HOLD SHORT' BAR TO 'TAXI INTO POS ON RWY 21L AND HOLD.' IF THE TWR HAD MY ACFT VISUALLY, AS REQUIRED, TO ISSUE MY LNDG CLRNC, THE OBVIOUSLY IMPENDING CONFLICT WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED CLRING THE CESSNA ONTO THE RWY. IT DID NOT. WHEN THE CONFLICT REQUIRED IMMEDIATE ACTION, LOGIC WOULD DICTATE INSTRUCTING ME TO GAR OR HAVE THE CESSNA TAXI CLR OF THE RWY. THE TWR CTLR DID NEITHER. INSTEAD, HE CLRED THE CESSNA FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF AND SAID TFC IS 1 MI ON FINAL. THAT WAS A FALSE STATEMENT. I CHOSE TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND SEE IF THE CESSNA WOULD BECOME AIRBORNE PRIOR TO MY TOUCHDOWN. THE CESSNA LIFTED OFF. I MADE THE DECISION TO LAND. WITH THE PWR OFF, AIRSPD DECREASING, AND IN THE FLARE -- I WAS COMMITTED TO LAND. AS MY ACFT TOUCHED DOWN, PRESCOTT TWR SAID 'GAR.' MY MAIN GEAR WAS ON THE GND, I HAD LNDG CLRNC. THERE WERE NO OBSTRUCTIONS ON THE RWY THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH MY ROLLOUT. I REFUSED WHAT WAS, OSTENSIBLY, AN ORDER FOR ME TO TKOF, AND CONTINUED MY LNDG ROLL. IF I HAD ELECTED TO TKOF, I WAS CONFRONTED WITH AN IMMINENT AIRBORNE CONFLICT THAT I WOULD RAPIDLY OVERTAKE. A NORMAL DEP FROM THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. REMAINING ON THE GND WAS THE ONLY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE. I ATTEMPTED TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH THE TWR OPERATOR. HE WAS ARROGANTLY DEFENSIVE AND CAVALIER ABOUT THE MATTER. I ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE SUPVR. THERE WAS NO SUPVR ON DUTY. I CONTACTED THE TWR CHIEF ON SEP/MON/97. HE RESPONDED IN A SIMILAR MANNER TO THE TWR CTLR AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT I CAUSED THE SIT TO OCCUR. HE DID NOT ELABORATE OR EXPLAIN HOW THAT WAS POSSIBLE. THE CONVERSATION WAS NOT CIVIL AND I TERMINATED IT. THE PRESCOTT CTL TWR HAS OPERATED IN THIS MANNER FOR QUITE SOME TIME. ALTHOUGH, I MUST SAY THAT AFTER OPERATING AT THE PRESCOTT ARPT FOR OVER 23 YRS, THIS IS THE WORST INCIDENT I HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO. IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE ARPT MGR, HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS A PROB, BUT HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC. OTHER PLTS HAD RPTED INCIDENTS. MINE WAS NOT A SINGULAR, ONE TIME, ISOLATED EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.