Narrative:

During flight for my air carrier on sep/sat/97, from milwaukee, wi, to st louis, mo, I was the first officer of the DC9 which was involved in an incident. We were cleared to taxi to runway 19R to hold short of runway 13 via taxiway G. I believed the captain was aware of the hold short instruction. As I was completing the takeoff data with the final load numbers (normal for taxi operations), I looked up and noticed we were approaching a runway and I said to the captain 'you know you have to hold short.' the captain stopped the aircraft and said 'I did not hear the hold short instruction.' the aircraft came to a stop a few ft past the hold short line. The captain then asked 'which runway?' I informed the captain it was for runway 13. Since we were past the hold short line, we both looked to the sides to make sure the runway was clear and it was. The captain asked which runway (since there are 2 runways which you must cross to get to runway 19R on taxiway G from the gates), while being past the hold short line, in my haste I looked at the runway diagram and noted the number 13 north of runway 7L and said to the captain 'it is the next one.' as the aircraft was moving over the runway on taxiway G I looked at the airport diagram again and realized that runways 13 and 7L cross prior to runway 19R and that runway 13 was the runway that we were crossing. As I realized this, the ground controller informed us that we were to hold short of runway 13. We acknowledged the transmission. The ground controller then cleared us to taxi to runway 19R. I believe that the following contributed to this incident: the difference of the 2 pilots understanding two different taxi clrncs and not confirming the instructions during the high workload phase with the starting of the engines, reading the after start checklist, moving in close quarters at the gate, the interphone communications with ramp personnel and the clearance with ground control. The first officer's duty of finishing the takeoff data worksheet while the aircraft taxies with only 2 crew members. The complexity of the milwaukee airport layout with multiple runways crossing at various places. Supplemental information from acn 381275: while taxiing to runway 19 for takeoff, we were given the clearance to runway 19, hold short of runway 13. I originally missed the hold short portion and the first officer reminded me just short of the runway 13 and taxiway intersection. While holding short of the runway, the first officer said that runway 13 was the next runway along our taxi route. (It was runway 7/25 that he was actually looking at, thinking it was runway 13/31). Without checking my chart, I taxied across runway 13/31 since I didn't see any traffic associated with that runway. The ground controller informed us that we were to hold short of runway 13/31. I acknowledged that and switched to tower frequency. The tower controller said there was no conflict. The flight continued to stl with no further incidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DC9 FLC CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT AUTH WHEN THEY MISUNDERSTAND THE CLRNC AND FINALLY MISREAD THE ARPT MAP. NO APPARENT CONFLICT.

Narrative: DURING FLT FOR MY ACR ON SEP/SAT/97, FROM MILWAUKEE, WI, TO ST LOUIS, MO, I WAS THE FO OF THE DC9 WHICH WAS INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 19R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13 VIA TXWY G. I BELIEVED THE CAPT WAS AWARE OF THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION. AS I WAS COMPLETING THE TKOF DATA WITH THE FINAL LOAD NUMBERS (NORMAL FOR TAXI OPS), I LOOKED UP AND NOTICED WE WERE APCHING A RWY AND I SAID TO THE CAPT 'YOU KNOW YOU HAVE TO HOLD SHORT.' THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT AND SAID 'I DID NOT HEAR THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION.' THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP A FEW FT PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE CAPT THEN ASKED 'WHICH RWY?' I INFORMED THE CAPT IT WAS FOR RWY 13. SINCE WE WERE PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE, WE BOTH LOOKED TO THE SIDES TO MAKE SURE THE RWY WAS CLR AND IT WAS. THE CAPT ASKED WHICH RWY (SINCE THERE ARE 2 RWYS WHICH YOU MUST CROSS TO GET TO RWY 19R ON TXWY G FROM THE GATES), WHILE BEING PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE, IN MY HASTE I LOOKED AT THE RWY DIAGRAM AND NOTED THE NUMBER 13 N OF RWY 7L AND SAID TO THE CAPT 'IT IS THE NEXT ONE.' AS THE ACFT WAS MOVING OVER THE RWY ON TXWY G I LOOKED AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM AGAIN AND REALIZED THAT RWYS 13 AND 7L CROSS PRIOR TO RWY 19R AND THAT RWY 13 WAS THE RWY THAT WE WERE XING. AS I REALIZED THIS, THE GND CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE XMISSION. THE GND CTLR THEN CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 19R. I BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT: THE DIFFERENCE OF THE 2 PLTS UNDERSTANDING TWO DIFFERENT TAXI CLRNCS AND NOT CONFIRMING THE INSTRUCTIONS DURING THE HIGH WORKLOAD PHASE WITH THE STARTING OF THE ENGS, READING THE AFTER START CHKLIST, MOVING IN CLOSE QUARTERS AT THE GATE, THE INTERPHONE COMS WITH RAMP PERSONNEL AND THE CLRNC WITH GND CTL. THE FO'S DUTY OF FINISHING THE TKOF DATA WORKSHEET WHILE THE ACFT TAXIES WITH ONLY 2 CREW MEMBERS. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MILWAUKEE ARPT LAYOUT WITH MULTIPLE RWYS XING AT VARIOUS PLACES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 381275: WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 19 FOR TKOF, WE WERE GIVEN THE CLRNC TO RWY 19, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13. I ORIGINALLY MISSED THE HOLD SHORT PORTION AND THE FO REMINDED ME JUST SHORT OF THE RWY 13 AND TXWY INTXN. WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY, THE FO SAID THAT RWY 13 WAS THE NEXT RWY ALONG OUR TAXI RTE. (IT WAS RWY 7/25 THAT HE WAS ACTUALLY LOOKING AT, THINKING IT WAS RWY 13/31). WITHOUT CHKING MY CHART, I TAXIED ACROSS RWY 13/31 SINCE I DIDN'T SEE ANY TFC ASSOCIATED WITH THAT RWY. THE GND CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13/31. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AND SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. THE TWR CTLR SAID THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. THE FLT CONTINUED TO STL WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.