Narrative:

I received an aircraft for routine overnight maintenance. There was a logbook write-up stating that the #2 engine electronic control (eec) reverted to manual. We, the supervisor and I (the lead), decided to change the hmu (hydro mechanical unit) and fuel pump. I assigned a mechanic to the job that had done it before, and to help him, a mechanic's helper. The job was completed and signed off. The inspectors looked at the installation and signed it off. I ran the aircraft up to check engine parameters and to check the operation of the hmu and fuel pump. Everything was satisfactory. The hmu and fuel pump were leak checked by the mechanic and the inspector and signed off in the logbook. I positioned the aircraft on the gate and signed off the maintenance release. 2 days later I found out that the pilot found the #2 power lever was stiff on approach to dca airport. Line maintenance was called and they found that the hardware on one of the control rods was installed incorrectly. They installed the hardware correctly and released the aircraft. No delay was taken. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated all work is done with a work card and not the maintenance manual and the work card does not have any visual aids to show the bolt installation. The reporter said this bolt problem is a repetitive item and is made worse by the large turnover in mechanics at this facility. The reporter also said a request for a correction to the work card has been made to tech services.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC8-100 EXPERIENCED SLIGHT BINDING ON #2 THROTTLE AT 1 PWR SETTING CAUSED BY INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF THE CTL ROD BOLTS.

Narrative: I RECEIVED AN ACFT FOR ROUTINE OVERNIGHT MAINT. THERE WAS A LOGBOOK WRITE-UP STATING THAT THE #2 ENG ELECTRONIC CTL (EEC) REVERTED TO MANUAL. WE, THE SUPVR AND I (THE LEAD), DECIDED TO CHANGE THE HMU (HYDRO MECHANICAL UNIT) AND FUEL PUMP. I ASSIGNED A MECH TO THE JOB THAT HAD DONE IT BEFORE, AND TO HELP HIM, A MECH'S HELPER. THE JOB WAS COMPLETED AND SIGNED OFF. THE INSPECTORS LOOKED AT THE INSTALLATION AND SIGNED IT OFF. I RAN THE ACFT UP TO CHK ENG PARAMETERS AND TO CHK THE OP OF THE HMU AND FUEL PUMP. EVERYTHING WAS SATISFACTORY. THE HMU AND FUEL PUMP WERE LEAK CHKED BY THE MECH AND THE INSPECTOR AND SIGNED OFF IN THE LOGBOOK. I POSITIONED THE ACFT ON THE GATE AND SIGNED OFF THE MAINT RELEASE. 2 DAYS LATER I FOUND OUT THAT THE PLT FOUND THE #2 PWR LEVER WAS STIFF ON APCH TO DCA ARPT. LINE MAINT WAS CALLED AND THEY FOUND THAT THE HARDWARE ON ONE OF THE CTL RODS WAS INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. THEY INSTALLED THE HARDWARE CORRECTLY AND RELEASED THE ACFT. NO DELAY WAS TAKEN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED ALL WORK IS DONE WITH A WORK CARD AND NOT THE MAINT MANUAL AND THE WORK CARD DOES NOT HAVE ANY VISUAL AIDS TO SHOW THE BOLT INSTALLATION. THE RPTR SAID THIS BOLT PROB IS A REPETITIVE ITEM AND IS MADE WORSE BY THE LARGE TURNOVER IN MECHS AT THIS FACILITY. THE RPTR ALSO SAID A REQUEST FOR A CORRECTION TO THE WORK CARD HAS BEEN MADE TO TECH SVCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.