Narrative:

On the morning of oct/xx/97, I was scheduled to depart the el paso airport at XA15 as PIC of flight. When I arrived at the airport, I found aircraft YYY waiting after being flown in from las vegas. A check of the logbook revealed the #1 cockpit fuel gauge was inoperative under MEL XXXX. With this in mind, I proceeded down to operations to get the required paperwork. Upon returning with the release and WX, I again reviewed the logbook. I made sure the MEL entered in the logbook matched the MEL on the release. Then I proceeded to research MEL XXXX. While I was doing this, one of the flight attendants came into the cockpit and indicated one of the emergency cabin flashlights was inoperative and asked if I could come back and take a look. I went to the back as she requested and noted one of the emergency flashlights was not working. Back to the cockpit to again read the MEL concerning the emergency flashlights. Noted there were 4 installed and only 3 required. Back downstairs with the logbook and MEL book to call maintenance. Went over the situation with them and entered a dpi into the logbook on the inoperative flashlight. Back up to the aircraft to find the passenger being boarded. Sat down and again proceeded to read MEL XXXX. As I interpreted this MEL, all items were in compliance. After all, this MEL had been put on the aircraft in ZZZ by maintenance control, dispatch had reviewed it, and then the plane was flown to elp by the previous crew. Since at least 3 prior people had contact with this MEL, I felt confident my interpretation was the same as theirs. We had previously dripped the tanks so I made the required logbook entry regarding the fuel, finished my preflight, accomplished all checklists, closed the door and departed for phx. We arrived in phx, again dripped the tanks, flew to ont, where the procedure was repeated. On both occasions the required logbook entry was made. Back to phx we came with only one tus turn remaining on our 19-leg 4-DAY pattern. As I pulled into the gate, I noticed xyz of the FAA was waiting. He indicated that I was getting a line check to tus. I told him I would get the release and be back to drip the tanks as we had an inoperative fuel gauge. He advised he wanted to watch the dripping procedure. After we had been fueled, xyz asked if I had carefully read the MEL regarding the inoperative fuel gauge. I replied that I had at which time he advised me that in his opinion, MEL YYYY was required by MEL XXXX. We pulled out the book and reread the MEL. Even though MEL XXXX had been previously reviewed and interpreted by maintenance control and dispatch, I decided a second opinion would be wise, so I requested a technician. He read the MEL and said that in his opinion MEL YYYY was not required. This coincided with the conclusion apparently reached earlier by dispatch and maintenance control. Nevertheless, the technician decided to consult with his superiors. He briefly disappeared and when he came back, he had added MEL YYYY to the logbook. At that time I called dispatch to add this new MEL to the release and then we departed for tus. The flight was uneventful and after we shut down at the gate, xyz advised that I would probably be getting a letter of investigation for not complying with MEL XXXX. In this situation, I was using CRM as intended since I used all available resources available to arrive at a decision. This included actions by maintenance technicians, dispatch, and maintenance control. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft had a wing tank fuel quantity indictor inoperative and everything was correct per the MEL, tank indicator placarded and tanks dripped to verify the fuel on board. The reporter said the only thing wrong was the omission of the placard on the vref/totalizer indicator which was not called out in the MEL to also placard as inoperative. The reporter states a hearing was held and the company admitted the MEL was incorrect and will be corrected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 WAS DISPATCHED AND FLOWN WITH THE VREF FUEL TOTALIZER INDICATION NOT PLACARDED INOP DUE TO A MEL ERROR.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF OCT/XX/97, I WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART THE EL PASO ARPT AT XA15 AS PIC OF FLT. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE ARPT, I FOUND ACFT YYY WAITING AFTER BEING FLOWN IN FROM LAS VEGAS. A CHK OF THE LOGBOOK REVEALED THE #1 COCKPIT FUEL GAUGE WAS INOP UNDER MEL XXXX. WITH THIS IN MIND, I PROCEEDED DOWN TO OPS TO GET THE REQUIRED PAPERWORK. UPON RETURNING WITH THE RELEASE AND WX, I AGAIN REVIEWED THE LOGBOOK. I MADE SURE THE MEL ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK MATCHED THE MEL ON THE RELEASE. THEN I PROCEEDED TO RESEARCH MEL XXXX. WHILE I WAS DOING THIS, ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS CAME INTO THE COCKPIT AND INDICATED ONE OF THE EMER CABIN FLASHLIGHTS WAS INOP AND ASKED IF I COULD COME BACK AND TAKE A LOOK. I WENT TO THE BACK AS SHE REQUESTED AND NOTED ONE OF THE EMER FLASHLIGHTS WAS NOT WORKING. BACK TO THE COCKPIT TO AGAIN READ THE MEL CONCERNING THE EMER FLASHLIGHTS. NOTED THERE WERE 4 INSTALLED AND ONLY 3 REQUIRED. BACK DOWNSTAIRS WITH THE LOGBOOK AND MEL BOOK TO CALL MAINT. WENT OVER THE SIT WITH THEM AND ENTERED A DPI INTO THE LOGBOOK ON THE INOP FLASHLIGHT. BACK UP TO THE ACFT TO FIND THE PAX BEING BOARDED. SAT DOWN AND AGAIN PROCEEDED TO READ MEL XXXX. AS I INTERPRETED THIS MEL, ALL ITEMS WERE IN COMPLIANCE. AFTER ALL, THIS MEL HAD BEEN PUT ON THE ACFT IN ZZZ BY MAINT CTL, DISPATCH HAD REVIEWED IT, AND THEN THE PLANE WAS FLOWN TO ELP BY THE PREVIOUS CREW. SINCE AT LEAST 3 PRIOR PEOPLE HAD CONTACT WITH THIS MEL, I FELT CONFIDENT MY INTERP WAS THE SAME AS THEIRS. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY DRIPPED THE TANKS SO I MADE THE REQUIRED LOGBOOK ENTRY REGARDING THE FUEL, FINISHED MY PREFLT, ACCOMPLISHED ALL CHKLISTS, CLOSED THE DOOR AND DEPARTED FOR PHX. WE ARRIVED IN PHX, AGAIN DRIPPED THE TANKS, FLEW TO ONT, WHERE THE PROC WAS REPEATED. ON BOTH OCCASIONS THE REQUIRED LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS MADE. BACK TO PHX WE CAME WITH ONLY ONE TUS TURN REMAINING ON OUR 19-LEG 4-DAY PATTERN. AS I PULLED INTO THE GATE, I NOTICED XYZ OF THE FAA WAS WAITING. HE INDICATED THAT I WAS GETTING A LINE CHK TO TUS. I TOLD HIM I WOULD GET THE RELEASE AND BE BACK TO DRIP THE TANKS AS WE HAD AN INOP FUEL GAUGE. HE ADVISED HE WANTED TO WATCH THE DRIPPING PROC. AFTER WE HAD BEEN FUELED, XYZ ASKED IF I HAD CAREFULLY READ THE MEL REGARDING THE INOP FUEL GAUGE. I REPLIED THAT I HAD AT WHICH TIME HE ADVISED ME THAT IN HIS OPINION, MEL YYYY WAS REQUIRED BY MEL XXXX. WE PULLED OUT THE BOOK AND REREAD THE MEL. EVEN THOUGH MEL XXXX HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED AND INTERPRETED BY MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH, I DECIDED A SECOND OPINION WOULD BE WISE, SO I REQUESTED A TECHNICIAN. HE READ THE MEL AND SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION MEL YYYY WAS NOT REQUIRED. THIS COINCIDED WITH THE CONCLUSION APPARENTLY REACHED EARLIER BY DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL. NEVERTHELESS, THE TECHNICIAN DECIDED TO CONSULT WITH HIS SUPERIORS. HE BRIEFLY DISAPPEARED AND WHEN HE CAME BACK, HE HAD ADDED MEL YYYY TO THE LOGBOOK. AT THAT TIME I CALLED DISPATCH TO ADD THIS NEW MEL TO THE RELEASE AND THEN WE DEPARTED FOR TUS. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND AFTER WE SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE, XYZ ADVISED THAT I WOULD PROBABLY BE GETTING A LETTER OF INVESTIGATION FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH MEL XXXX. IN THIS SIT, I WAS USING CRM AS INTENDED SINCE I USED ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION. THIS INCLUDED ACTIONS BY MAINT TECHNICIANS, DISPATCH, AND MAINT CTL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT HAD A WING TANK FUEL QUANTITY INDICTOR INOP AND EVERYTHING WAS CORRECT PER THE MEL, TANK INDICATOR PLACARDED AND TANKS DRIPPED TO VERIFY THE FUEL ON BOARD. THE RPTR SAID THE ONLY THING WRONG WAS THE OMISSION OF THE PLACARD ON THE VREF/TOTALIZER INDICATOR WHICH WAS NOT CALLED OUT IN THE MEL TO ALSO PLACARD AS INOP. THE RPTR STATES A HEARING WAS HELD AND THE COMPANY ADMITTED THE MEL WAS INCORRECT AND WILL BE CORRECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.