Narrative:

During my shift on oct/xx/97 at approximately XA40, I was called on the radio (as terminal coverage maintenance supervisor) by operations manager, AAA, to meet and talk to the inbound flight crew of flight BBB on aircraft XXXX that was pulling into gate xx. The operations manager had previously announced over the radio that flight BBB had to do a go around. Upon my arrival on the flight deck of aircraft XXXX, I immediately noticed a multitude of spattered bugs on the windshields and so commented to the flight crew. The captain replied that this had occurred on their final approach, and that it made visibility difficult, but that the reason I was called was to tell me of a 'momentary overspd condition that occurred on initial descent into ZZZ.' the captain went on to explain that 'they were flying in high windshear conditions -- not extreme, when he called for flap one.' at the time, they were decelerating on descent and he noticed at the moment of actuating the flap handle to flaps 1 degree position from the full up position that the aircraft's IAS was 246 KTS and rapidly decelerating and that the overspd condition was only momentary. He went on to say that the rest of the flight was normal. He also went on to say that the only reason he was making the write-up was for the technical fact of being 6 KTS over the maximum allowable IAS of 240 KTS and not because of any noticeable mechanical problem and that the flaps were in transit from full up and not at flaps 1 degree as indicated by the write-up. At this point it was agreed that maintenance would accomplish an overspd, high wind inspection to satisfy the write-up. As I was leaving the plane, I encountered the gate mechanic, xyz, and told him that we would have to do an overspd, high wind inspection based on the write-up and the information given to me by the flight crew. En route from the terminal to the hangar, I was called on the radio to call YYY. When I got to the hangar, I called YYY. He asked me if I knew how detailed and how deep the inspection process was. He was concerned as to how long it would take to do all of the procedures in the maintenance manual. I indicated that I did not have the specific material in front of me but that it was a step-by-step process. I was acquainted with the process of checking all leading edges of wings, horizontal stabilizers, vertical fin, radome, windshields, keel beam areas, wing top and bottom surfaces, wing root area and aft pressure bulkhead for any distortion, wrinkling or damage. If any discrepancies existed at any point, to proceed as directed by the maintenance maunal from there. I again reminded him of the conditions reported verbally by the crew, and he agreed. Later into the shift, approximately XB30, I returned to area Y to check on the work in progress and asked if the inspection on XXXX was going alright or if any problems had been found. YYY indicated that he had not heard of any problems but that xyz was still out on top of the wing. I proceeded outside to gate xx and indeed saw xyz on top of the right wing on his hands and knees near the leading edge. I asked him how the inspection was going and if he had found anything. He replied, 'we finished the inspection and found nothing.' I asked him what he was still doing on the wing to which he replied, 'just wiping off the bug juice to clear another write-up.' I then used my flashlight and proceeded to do my own walkaround on the ground, specifically checking both wing's leading edges, inboard and outboard flaps lower surfaces, keel beam area, engine cowls and pylons, radome and lower horizontal stabilizers for obvious distortions or damage. I then checked the cockpit windows from inside the airplane. I noted no defects. I decided to sign off the write-up since the mechanic was still up on the wing. This way I would also avoid having another airplane on status unnecessarily at the XX00 conference call. I told xyz that I would sign off the write-up and he voiced no objection from on top of the wing. I went into area Y and told my findings to the lead, YYY, that xyz had said he completed the inspection and found no discrepancies and that I had also done a walkaround inspection and found no discrepancies and that, based on all that, I would sign off the write-up. Again, no objection or even comment. I reviewed the maintenance manual in its entirety and signed the logbook slip, initialed the work control envelope, and signed off and cleared the computer of log item per the maintenance manual. The time was approximately XD45. At approximately XY15 I received a phone call at home from DDD stating that the captain of flight CCC was refusing the aircraft because 'he doesn't believe the overspd, high wind inspection to have been accomplished.' I am then put in direct phone conversation with the outbound captain and first officer by phone. I answered their questions and reaffirmed all of my conversation with the inbound crew upon their arrival the prior night, our instructions to the lead mechanic and gate mechanic, the procedures that were to be used, my observation of physical evidence, my witnessing of the mechanic in the process in relation to the inspection, my conversations with the lead and mechanic directly involved and of my own involvement and findings. At the conclusion of the conversation I asked both of them if they had any further questions of me. Both replied, 'no. Thank you.' the conversation was ended in a cordial manner. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the whole incident was caused by a disgruntled mechanic on another shift who objected to the supervisor signing off the inspection when the inspection was performed by a reporter's shift mechanic. The reporter said the inspection was accomplished per the maintenance manual but now regrets signing for the inspection but should have allowed the mechanic who made the inspection make the signoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 WAS DELAYED DUE TO THE OUTBOUND CREW REFUSING THE ACFT BELIEVING A REQUIRED INSPECTION WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED AS RPTED BY A DISGRUNTLED MECH.

Narrative: DURING MY SHIFT ON OCT/XX/97 AT APPROX XA40, I WAS CALLED ON THE RADIO (AS TERMINAL COVERAGE MAINT SUPVR) BY OPS MGR, AAA, TO MEET AND TALK TO THE INBOUND FLC OF FLT BBB ON ACFT XXXX THAT WAS PULLING INTO GATE XX. THE OPS MGR HAD PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED OVER THE RADIO THAT FLT BBB HAD TO DO A GAR. UPON MY ARR ON THE FLT DECK OF ACFT XXXX, I IMMEDIATELY NOTICED A MULTITUDE OF SPATTERED BUGS ON THE WINDSHIELDS AND SO COMMENTED TO THE FLC. THE CAPT REPLIED THAT THIS HAD OCCURRED ON THEIR FINAL APCH, AND THAT IT MADE VISIBILITY DIFFICULT, BUT THAT THE REASON I WAS CALLED WAS TO TELL ME OF A 'MOMENTARY OVERSPD CONDITION THAT OCCURRED ON INITIAL DSCNT INTO ZZZ.' THE CAPT WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT 'THEY WERE FLYING IN HIGH WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS -- NOT EXTREME, WHEN HE CALLED FOR FLAP ONE.' AT THE TIME, THEY WERE DECELERATING ON DSCNT AND HE NOTICED AT THE MOMENT OF ACTUATING THE FLAP HANDLE TO FLAPS 1 DEG POS FROM THE FULL UP POS THAT THE ACFT'S IAS WAS 246 KTS AND RAPIDLY DECELERATING AND THAT THE OVERSPD CONDITION WAS ONLY MOMENTARY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE REST OF THE FLT WAS NORMAL. HE ALSO WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ONLY REASON HE WAS MAKING THE WRITE-UP WAS FOR THE TECHNICAL FACT OF BEING 6 KTS OVER THE MAX ALLOWABLE IAS OF 240 KTS AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY NOTICEABLE MECHANICAL PROB AND THAT THE FLAPS WERE IN TRANSIT FROM FULL UP AND NOT AT FLAPS 1 DEG AS INDICATED BY THE WRITE-UP. AT THIS POINT IT WAS AGREED THAT MAINT WOULD ACCOMPLISH AN OVERSPD, HIGH WIND INSPECTION TO SATISFY THE WRITE-UP. AS I WAS LEAVING THE PLANE, I ENCOUNTERED THE GATE MECH, XYZ, AND TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DO AN OVERSPD, HIGH WIND INSPECTION BASED ON THE WRITE-UP AND THE INFO GIVEN TO ME BY THE FLC. ENRTE FROM THE TERMINAL TO THE HANGAR, I WAS CALLED ON THE RADIO TO CALL YYY. WHEN I GOT TO THE HANGAR, I CALLED YYY. HE ASKED ME IF I KNEW HOW DETAILED AND HOW DEEP THE INSPECTION PROCESS WAS. HE WAS CONCERNED AS TO HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO DO ALL OF THE PROCS IN THE MAINT MANUAL. I INDICATED THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE SPECIFIC MATERIAL IN FRONT OF ME BUT THAT IT WAS A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. I WAS ACQUAINTED WITH THE PROCESS OF CHKING ALL LEADING EDGES OF WINGS, HORIZ STABILIZERS, VERT FIN, RADOME, WINDSHIELDS, KEEL BEAM AREAS, WING TOP AND BOTTOM SURFACES, WING ROOT AREA AND AFT PRESSURE BULKHEAD FOR ANY DISTORTION, WRINKLING OR DAMAGE. IF ANY DISCREPANCIES EXISTED AT ANY POINT, TO PROCEED AS DIRECTED BY THE MAINT MAUNAL FROM THERE. I AGAIN REMINDED HIM OF THE CONDITIONS RPTED VERBALLY BY THE CREW, AND HE AGREED. LATER INTO THE SHIFT, APPROX XB30, I RETURNED TO AREA Y TO CHK ON THE WORK IN PROGRESS AND ASKED IF THE INSPECTION ON XXXX WAS GOING ALRIGHT OR IF ANY PROBS HAD BEEN FOUND. YYY INDICATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY PROBS BUT THAT XYZ WAS STILL OUT ON TOP OF THE WING. I PROCEEDED OUTSIDE TO GATE XX AND INDEED SAW XYZ ON TOP OF THE R WING ON HIS HANDS AND KNEES NEAR THE LEADING EDGE. I ASKED HIM HOW THE INSPECTION WAS GOING AND IF HE HAD FOUND ANYTHING. HE REPLIED, 'WE FINISHED THE INSPECTION AND FOUND NOTHING.' I ASKED HIM WHAT HE WAS STILL DOING ON THE WING TO WHICH HE REPLIED, 'JUST WIPING OFF THE BUG JUICE TO CLR ANOTHER WRITE-UP.' I THEN USED MY FLASHLIGHT AND PROCEEDED TO DO MY OWN WALKAROUND ON THE GND, SPECIFICALLY CHKING BOTH WING'S LEADING EDGES, INBOARD AND OUTBOARD FLAPS LOWER SURFACES, KEEL BEAM AREA, ENG COWLS AND PYLONS, RADOME AND LOWER HORIZ STABILIZERS FOR OBVIOUS DISTORTIONS OR DAMAGE. I THEN CHKED THE COCKPIT WINDOWS FROM INSIDE THE AIRPLANE. I NOTED NO DEFECTS. I DECIDED TO SIGN OFF THE WRITE-UP SINCE THE MECHANIC WAS STILL UP ON THE WING. THIS WAY I WOULD ALSO AVOID HAVING ANOTHER AIRPLANE ON STATUS UNNECESSARILY AT THE XX00 CONFERENCE CALL. I TOLD XYZ THAT I WOULD SIGN OFF THE WRITE-UP AND HE VOICED NO OBJECTION FROM ON TOP OF THE WING. I WENT INTO AREA Y AND TOLD MY FINDINGS TO THE LEAD, YYY, THAT XYZ HAD SAID HE COMPLETED THE INSPECTION AND FOUND NO DISCREPANCIES AND THAT I HAD ALSO DONE A WALKAROUND INSPECTION AND FOUND NO DISCREPANCIES AND THAT, BASED ON ALL THAT, I WOULD SIGN OFF THE WRITE-UP. AGAIN, NO OBJECTION OR EVEN COMMENT. I REVIEWED THE MAINT MANUAL IN ITS ENTIRETY AND SIGNED THE LOGBOOK SLIP, INITIALED THE WORK CTL ENVELOPE, AND SIGNED OFF AND CLRED THE COMPUTER OF LOG ITEM PER THE MAINT MANUAL. THE TIME WAS APPROX XD45. AT APPROX XY15 I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL AT HOME FROM DDD STATING THAT THE CAPT OF FLT CCC WAS REFUSING THE ACFT BECAUSE 'HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THE OVERSPD, HIGH WIND INSPECTION TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.' I AM THEN PUT IN DIRECT PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE OUTBOUND CAPT AND FO BY PHONE. I ANSWERED THEIR QUESTIONS AND REAFFIRMED ALL OF MY CONVERSATION WITH THE INBOUND CREW UPON THEIR ARR THE PRIOR NIGHT, OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LEAD MECH AND GATE MECH, THE PROCS THAT WERE TO BE USED, MY OBSERVATION OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, MY WITNESSING OF THE MECH IN THE PROCESS IN RELATION TO THE INSPECTION, MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEAD AND MECH DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND OF MY OWN INVOLVEMENT AND FINDINGS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONVERSATION I ASKED BOTH OF THEM IF THEY HAD ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OF ME. BOTH REPLIED, 'NO. THANK YOU.' THE CONVERSATION WAS ENDED IN A CORDIAL MANNER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE WHOLE INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A DISGRUNTLED MECH ON ANOTHER SHIFT WHO OBJECTED TO THE SUPVR SIGNING OFF THE INSPECTION WHEN THE INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BY A RPTR'S SHIFT MECH. THE RPTR SAID THE INSPECTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER THE MAINT MANUAL BUT NOW REGRETS SIGNING FOR THE INSPECTION BUT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE MECH WHO MADE THE INSPECTION MAKE THE SIGNOFF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.