Narrative:

Aircraft type: BE02/B1900 turboprop fluctuating right fuel quantity gauge. Notified maintenance control and was given the wrong MEL number xy-Z (static wick) versus xx-Z fuel quantity indicator. Human factors: should have made an entry into the aircraft logbook and let maintenance clear and release the aircraft in accordance with MEL xx-Z, instead of doing it myself. I didn't have time to verify the MEL number given due to entering a critical phase of flight (below 10000 ft and talking to miami approach control). Being ramp checked upon arrival at miami international airport, I saw the FAA inspector or one who appeared to be one, looking at another aircraft. I told the first officer to monitor the refueling while I went into flight operations to talk with maintenance control about the write-up and to get WX and dispatch release for our next flight. When I returned about 10 mins later, I was informed by the first officer and the mechanic that an FAA inspector had discovered that the aircraft was released under the wrong MEL number and the right fuel quantity gauge didn't have an 'inoperative' sticker on it. The aircraft wasn't being turned over to another crew. There were only 2 aircraft on the ramp at that time. If the FAA inspector felt so strongly about the issue, why didn't he wait for my return? I feel that maintenance problems occurring in-flight should not penalize the flight crew without having the proper time to correct the situation through repair or aircraft maintenance deferment in accordance with the company's MEL.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE1900 ON DSCNT HAD THE R FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR FAIL AND WAS DEFERRED PER THE MEL PRIOR TO LNDG BUT FAA GND CHK FOUND THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR NOT PLACARDED PER THE MEL.

Narrative: ACFT TYPE: BE02/B1900 TURBOPROP FLUCTUATING R FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE. NOTIFIED MAINT CTL AND WAS GIVEN THE WRONG MEL NUMBER XY-Z (STATIC WICK) VERSUS XX-Z FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR. HUMAN FACTORS: SHOULD HAVE MADE AN ENTRY INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK AND LET MAINT CLR AND RELEASE THE ACFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MEL XX-Z, INSTEAD OF DOING IT MYSELF. I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO VERIFY THE MEL NUMBER GIVEN DUE TO ENTERING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT (BELOW 10000 FT AND TALKING TO MIAMI APCH CTL). BEING RAMP CHKED UPON ARR AT MIAMI INTL ARPT, I SAW THE FAA INSPECTOR OR ONE WHO APPEARED TO BE ONE, LOOKING AT ANOTHER ACFT. I TOLD THE FO TO MONITOR THE REFUELING WHILE I WENT INTO FLT OPS TO TALK WITH MAINT CTL ABOUT THE WRITE-UP AND TO GET WX AND DISPATCH RELEASE FOR OUR NEXT FLT. WHEN I RETURNED ABOUT 10 MINS LATER, I WAS INFORMED BY THE FO AND THE MECH THAT AN FAA INSPECTOR HAD DISCOVERED THAT THE ACFT WAS RELEASED UNDER THE WRONG MEL NUMBER AND THE R FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE DIDN'T HAVE AN 'INOP' STICKER ON IT. THE ACFT WASN'T BEING TURNED OVER TO ANOTHER CREW. THERE WERE ONLY 2 ACFT ON THE RAMP AT THAT TIME. IF THE FAA INSPECTOR FELT SO STRONGLY ABOUT THE ISSUE, WHY DIDN'T HE WAIT FOR MY RETURN? I FEEL THAT MAINT PROBS OCCURRING INFLT SHOULD NOT PENALIZE THE FLC WITHOUT HAVING THE PROPER TIME TO CORRECT THE SIT THROUGH REPAIR OR ACFT MAINT DEFERMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMPANY'S MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.