Narrative:

The problem arose out of a breakdown in cockpit management and communication. The clearance given was for a 'DKR1Y' departure, runway 30 and this was confirmed by my copilot many times. He confirmed the departure to ATC once and to me at least twice. He also confirmed our assigned altitude of 4000 ft initially and the squawk code. I asked him if he had idented the locator and he answered 'yes, idented.' I also noticed him setting his transponder. On takeoff and after becoming airborne I noticed suddenly that the ADF needle was pointing backwards (it transpired that the copilot had dialed in the 'DKR1U' departure and consequently locator ou had been chosen - - he was saying 'DKR1Y' but set up 'DKR1U'), but as we were in the clouds already I was busy flying the airplane at the same time. At about that time and climbing the tower said that they did not have a transponder reading and why we had not switched to the next frequency. I had to instruct my copilot twice, maybe 3 times to switch to the new frequency and only then did he finally do that and fiddled the transponder on-off switch and did ground get a reading. He had also given me the wrong radial (082 degrees) to dkr, but I did not notice it at the time because it came so close to the required 062 degrees. When all this went on I started a left turn, because I knew that the DKR1Y departure required this, although he was still instructing me to turn right. Due to all this I overshot my altitude by 500-600 ft and the course was erratic, so ATC gave us a heading for dkr. I corrected my altitude as soon as possible. The reasons for things to go wrong were in my opinion: 1) a complete 'black-out' of a relatively experienced copilot, for which I have no explanation. 2) insufficient supervision and double checking by the PIC, relying on verbal confirmations of a general nature. 3) insufficient experience of PIC to correct all these mistakes without busting an altitude and due to this (insufficient experience) a too slow corrective action. Supplemental information from acn 384914: the PF had confidence in me so he relied on me without reading the SID himself. I was setting up the navigation equipment and at the same time, briefing the PF. While he was flying he had to pay too much attention on my activities. I didn't also switch over to departure frequency, there was no altitude reading given to radar. While correcting my mistakes I noticed that we were above assigned altitude and in a steep turn. I admit that I've made a mistake. I didn't xchk the set-up according to the approach/departure plate and the copied clearance. There was no CRM.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A PVT SMT TWIN TURBO PROP, FAILED TO FOLLOW THE SID DEP TRACK AND OVERSHOT THE INITIAL ALT RESTR DUE TO THE WRONG INFO GIVEN THE FLYING CAPT BY THE ASSISTING FO. ATC INTERVENED AND PROVIDED A VECTOR HEADING TO THE NEXT FIX.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE OUT OF A BREAKDOWN IN COCKPIT MGMNT AND COM. THE CLRNC GIVEN WAS FOR A 'DKR1Y' DEP, RWY 30 AND THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY MY COPLT MANY TIMES. HE CONFIRMED THE DEP TO ATC ONCE AND TO ME AT LEAST TWICE. HE ALSO CONFIRMED OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 4000 FT INITIALLY AND THE SQUAWK CODE. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD IDENTED THE LOCATOR AND HE ANSWERED 'YES, IDENTED.' I ALSO NOTICED HIM SETTING HIS XPONDER. ON TKOF AND AFTER BECOMING AIRBORNE I NOTICED SUDDENLY THAT THE ADF NEEDLE WAS POINTING BACKWARDS (IT TRANSPIRED THAT THE COPLT HAD DIALED IN THE 'DKR1U' DEP AND CONSEQUENTLY LOCATOR OU HAD BEEN CHOSEN - - HE WAS SAYING 'DKR1Y' BUT SET UP 'DKR1U'), BUT AS WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS ALREADY I WAS BUSY FLYING THE AIRPLANE AT THE SAME TIME. AT ABOUT THAT TIME AND CLBING THE TWR SAID THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE A XPONDER READING AND WHY WE HAD NOT SWITCHED TO THE NEXT FREQ. I HAD TO INSTRUCT MY COPLT TWICE, MAYBE 3 TIMES TO SWITCH TO THE NEW FREQ AND ONLY THEN DID HE FINALLY DO THAT AND FIDDLED THE XPONDER ON-OFF SWITCH AND DID GND GET A READING. HE HAD ALSO GIVEN ME THE WRONG RADIAL (082 DEGS) TO DKR, BUT I DID NOT NOTICE IT AT THE TIME BECAUSE IT CAME SO CLOSE TO THE REQUIRED 062 DEGS. WHEN ALL THIS WENT ON I STARTED A L TURN, BECAUSE I KNEW THAT THE DKR1Y DEP REQUIRED THIS, ALTHOUGH HE WAS STILL INSTRUCTING ME TO TURN R. DUE TO ALL THIS I OVERSHOT MY ALT BY 500-600 FT AND THE COURSE WAS ERRATIC, SO ATC GAVE US A HEADING FOR DKR. I CORRECTED MY ALT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE REASONS FOR THINGS TO GO WRONG WERE IN MY OPINION: 1) A COMPLETE 'BLACK-OUT' OF A RELATIVELY EXPERIENCED COPLT, FOR WHICH I HAVE NO EXPLANATION. 2) INSUFFICIENT SUPERVISION AND DOUBLE CHKING BY THE PIC, RELYING ON VERBAL CONFIRMATIONS OF A GENERAL NATURE. 3) INSUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE OF PIC TO CORRECT ALL THESE MISTAKES WITHOUT BUSTING AN ALT AND DUE TO THIS (INSUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE) A TOO SLOW CORRECTIVE ACTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 384914: THE PF HAD CONFIDENCE IN ME SO HE RELIED ON ME WITHOUT READING THE SID HIMSELF. I WAS SETTING UP THE NAV EQUIP AND AT THE SAME TIME, BRIEFING THE PF. WHILE HE WAS FLYING HE HAD TO PAY TOO MUCH ATTN ON MY ACTIVITIES. I DIDN'T ALSO SWITCH OVER TO DEP FREQ, THERE WAS NO ALT READING GIVEN TO RADAR. WHILE CORRECTING MY MISTAKES I NOTICED THAT WE WERE ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT AND IN A STEEP TURN. I ADMIT THAT I'VE MADE A MISTAKE. I DIDN'T XCHK THE SET-UP ACCORDING TO THE APCH/DEP PLATE AND THE COPIED CLRNC. THERE WAS NO CRM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.