Narrative:

The aircraft was en route from oklahoma to colorado springs. We were at FL240 proceeding to hgo VORTAC then direct to cos VORTAC. About 20 mi prior to reaching hgo ZDV cleared us to 14000 ft, 30 mi east of the cos VORTAC. The captain told me that we would stay at FL240 until crossing hgo. I told him that would only give him about 20 mi to lose 10000 ft. (18 mi in reality, because the 2 fixes are only 48 mi apart.) he told me that he would start down after reaching hgo. Again, I told him that he would only have 15-20 mi to lose 10000 ft. The captain just nodded his head. At hgo I advised ZDV that we were out of FL240 for 10000 ft. During the descent I repeatedly told him how much altitude he needed to lose and how many mi he had left to do it in. At 30 mi east of cos we were at 16000 ft, 2000 ft above our assigned altitude. We did not reach 14000 ft until we were less than 25 mi east of cos. At this point we were handed to colorado springs approach and they cleared us to 11000 ft. The rest of the flight proceeded normally. I believe the captain lost his situational awareness and despite my repeated prompting, never increased his descent rate to more than 2500 FPM. Crossing the 30 mi DME point east of cos I said, 'damn, you missed your altitude restr by 2000 ft.' this remark only drew a blank look from him. He acted like it was no big deal. The captain obviously does not understand the FARS and the aim regarding adherence to ATC instructions and altitude variance parameters (+/-300 ft).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CPR FO RPTS THAT HIS CAPT CROSSED 30 NM OF COS TOO HIGH EVEN THOUGH THE FO PROMPTED HIM TO INCREASE HIS DSCNT RATE.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS ENRTE FROM OKLAHOMA TO COLORADO SPRINGS. WE WERE AT FL240 PROCEEDING TO HGO VORTAC THEN DIRECT TO COS VORTAC. ABOUT 20 MI PRIOR TO REACHING HGO ZDV CLRED US TO 14000 FT, 30 MI E OF THE COS VORTAC. THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT WE WOULD STAY AT FL240 UNTIL XING HGO. I TOLD HIM THAT WOULD ONLY GIVE HIM ABOUT 20 MI TO LOSE 10000 FT. (18 MI IN REALITY, BECAUSE THE 2 FIXES ARE ONLY 48 MI APART.) HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD START DOWN AFTER REACHING HGO. AGAIN, I TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD ONLY HAVE 15-20 MI TO LOSE 10000 FT. THE CAPT JUST NODDED HIS HEAD. AT HGO I ADVISED ZDV THAT WE WERE OUT OF FL240 FOR 10000 FT. DURING THE DSCNT I REPEATEDLY TOLD HIM HOW MUCH ALT HE NEEDED TO LOSE AND HOW MANY MI HE HAD LEFT TO DO IT IN. AT 30 MI E OF COS WE WERE AT 16000 FT, 2000 FT ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT. WE DID NOT REACH 14000 FT UNTIL WE WERE LESS THAN 25 MI E OF COS. AT THIS POINT WE WERE HANDED TO COLORADO SPRINGS APCH AND THEY CLRED US TO 11000 FT. THE REST OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY. I BELIEVE THE CAPT LOST HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND DESPITE MY REPEATED PROMPTING, NEVER INCREASED HIS DSCNT RATE TO MORE THAN 2500 FPM. XING THE 30 MI DME POINT E OF COS I SAID, 'DAMN, YOU MISSED YOUR ALT RESTR BY 2000 FT.' THIS REMARK ONLY DREW A BLANK LOOK FROM HIM. HE ACTED LIKE IT WAS NO BIG DEAL. THE CAPT OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE FARS AND THE AIM REGARDING ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS AND ALT VARIANCE PARAMETERS (+/-300 FT).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.