Narrative:

On oct/xx/97 at approximately XA58 I was forced to land my beechcraft BE58 baron gear up at agc after both normal and emergency gear extension procedures failed to produce a gear down and locked condition. It was the first leg of my part 135 freight route originating out of phl with a planned destination of agc. The departure out of phl, en route portion, and initial approach into agc were all uneventful. Pittsburgh approach cleared me for the ILS runway 28 at agc. I broke out at approximately 3500 ft MSL, and intercepted the GS at 3000 ft. Somewhere in this vicinity of time I was told to contact agc tower. After doing so, I was cleared to land on runway 28. At GS intercept, I selected gear down and got no response. I did not hear the gear motor, nor did I observe a gear down indication which in this particular baron is 1 green light for the main gear and a mechanical pointer that indicates nose gear position. My first action was to recycle the gear selector handle. I still was unable to get a gear down indication. I then checked the circuit breaker panel and found that the landing gear motor breaker was in the 'out' position. I reset the breaker and attempted again to extend the gear in the normal fashion. Still no gear down indication was obtained, and the landing gear motor breaker popped in the attempt. My attention now shifted towards an emergency manual extension of the landing gear, but first I notified agc tower of my situation. I advised them that I had the field in sight and was, so far, unable to get the gear down. I told them that my intentions were to discontinue the approach, maintain 2000 ft MSL, and to enter the pattern while I manually cranked the gear down. Very soon afterwards, I decided that 2500 ft MSL was a more suitable altitude. It gave me a comfortable amount of terrain clearance while still allowing me to remain out of the clouds in VMC. I pulled out my company issued beech 58 emergency procedures checklist and followed the steps for 'landing gear manual extension.' when it came time to turn the handcrank, I noticed immediately that it didn't feel right. As I turnedthe crank counterclockwise, I felt nearly no resistance through the handle except for a 'clicking' at the rate of approximately once per revolution. After following and completing the 'landing gear manual extension' checklist, exactly as it appeared in the beech 58 emergency procedures checklist, I still was unable to get the landing gear extended. As I continued circling, agc tower began to relay messages between myself and my company maintenance department. Together, we discussed the situation and further attempted to solve it. We confirmed that all checklist items and procedures were correctly followed and that all circuit breakers, selectors, handcranks, etc were in the appropriate position. Somewhere in this time frame, it was suggested by the maintenance department that perhaps my gear was in fact down without my knowing. To verify, I made a low approach on runway 28. While doing so, I observed the gear warning horn as the throttles were retarded to approximately 15 inches. This would be appropriate for a gear up condition. Tower confirmed that my gear was in fact up as it appeared to him. I climbed back to 2500 ft MSL while remaining in the pattern. The message I next interpreted through tower was that maintenance could think of no further suggestions. I agreed that I too could think of nothing further to try. 48 mins, I later learned from one of the tower controllers, elapsed between the time I first announced my gear problem and the time I ultimately touched down. During this period, I made every attempt to troubleshoot and remedy the problem. I followed procedures and checklists exactly as trained. I felt that I did all I could under the circumstances and that all options were exhausted. It was at this time that I made the decision to go ahead and land on runway 31 at agc. The touchdown and rollout were relatively uneventful, in the sense that I had more than adequate control of the aircraft to keep it safely upright and tracking down the center of the runway. Towards the very end of the skid, the aircraft nose did begin to veer right slightly, but by this time the aircraft had already come to a near full stopon the runway. Looking at the plane afterwards, it's my guess that the passenger step by the cargo door was dragging on the right side and causing the veering in that direction. Nevertheless, I observed no smoke, signs of fire, or leaking fuel or other fluids, during or after the landing. I evacuate/evacuationed the aircraft promptly after it came to rest.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX PLT OF A BEECH BARON BE58 LANDED GEAR UP AFTER ALL EFFORTS FAILED TO PUT THE GEAR DOWN PRIOR TO LNDG. ONLY MINOR DAMAGE TO ACFT AND THE SOLO OCCUPANT, THE PLT RPTR, WAS NOT INJURED.

Narrative: ON OCT/XX/97 AT APPROX XA58 I WAS FORCED TO LAND MY BEECHCRAFT BE58 BARON GEAR UP AT AGC AFTER BOTH NORMAL AND EMER GEAR EXTENSION PROCS FAILED TO PRODUCE A GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED CONDITION. IT WAS THE FIRST LEG OF MY PART 135 FREIGHT RTE ORIGINATING OUT OF PHL WITH A PLANNED DEST OF AGC. THE DEP OUT OF PHL, ENRTE PORTION, AND INITIAL APCH INTO AGC WERE ALL UNEVENTFUL. PITTSBURGH APCH CLRED ME FOR THE ILS RWY 28 AT AGC. I BROKE OUT AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL, AND INTERCEPTED THE GS AT 3000 FT. SOMEWHERE IN THIS VICINITY OF TIME I WAS TOLD TO CONTACT AGC TWR. AFTER DOING SO, I WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 28. AT GS INTERCEPT, I SELECTED GEAR DOWN AND GOT NO RESPONSE. I DID NOT HEAR THE GEAR MOTOR, NOR DID I OBSERVE A GEAR DOWN INDICATION WHICH IN THIS PARTICULAR BARON IS 1 GREEN LIGHT FOR THE MAIN GEAR AND A MECHANICAL POINTER THAT INDICATES NOSE GEAR POS. MY FIRST ACTION WAS TO RECYCLE THE GEAR SELECTOR HANDLE. I STILL WAS UNABLE TO GET A GEAR DOWN INDICATION. I THEN CHKED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND FOUND THAT THE LNDG GEAR MOTOR BREAKER WAS IN THE 'OUT' POS. I RESET THE BREAKER AND ATTEMPTED AGAIN TO EXTEND THE GEAR IN THE NORMAL FASHION. STILL NO GEAR DOWN INDICATION WAS OBTAINED, AND THE LNDG GEAR MOTOR BREAKER POPPED IN THE ATTEMPT. MY ATTN NOW SHIFTED TOWARDS AN EMER MANUAL EXTENSION OF THE LNDG GEAR, BUT FIRST I NOTIFIED AGC TWR OF MY SIT. I ADVISED THEM THAT I HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND WAS, SO FAR, UNABLE TO GET THE GEAR DOWN. I TOLD THEM THAT MY INTENTIONS WERE TO DISCONTINUE THE APCH, MAINTAIN 2000 FT MSL, AND TO ENTER THE PATTERN WHILE I MANUALLY CRANKED THE GEAR DOWN. VERY SOON AFTERWARDS, I DECIDED THAT 2500 FT MSL WAS A MORE SUITABLE ALT. IT GAVE ME A COMFORTABLE AMOUNT OF TERRAIN CLRNC WHILE STILL ALLOWING ME TO REMAIN OUT OF THE CLOUDS IN VMC. I PULLED OUT MY COMPANY ISSUED BEECH 58 EMER PROCS CHKLIST AND FOLLOWED THE STEPS FOR 'LNDG GEAR MANUAL EXTENSION.' WHEN IT CAME TIME TO TURN THE HANDCRANK, I NOTICED IMMEDIATELY THAT IT DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT. AS I TURNEDTHE CRANK COUNTERCLOCKWISE, I FELT NEARLY NO RESISTANCE THROUGH THE HANDLE EXCEPT FOR A 'CLICKING' AT THE RATE OF APPROX ONCE PER REVOLUTION. AFTER FOLLOWING AND COMPLETING THE 'LNDG GEAR MANUAL EXTENSION' CHKLIST, EXACTLY AS IT APPEARED IN THE BEECH 58 EMER PROCS CHKLIST, I STILL WAS UNABLE TO GET THE LNDG GEAR EXTENDED. AS I CONTINUED CIRCLING, AGC TWR BEGAN TO RELAY MESSAGES BTWN MYSELF AND MY COMPANY MAINT DEPT. TOGETHER, WE DISCUSSED THE SIT AND FURTHER ATTEMPTED TO SOLVE IT. WE CONFIRMED THAT ALL CHKLIST ITEMS AND PROCS WERE CORRECTLY FOLLOWED AND THAT ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS, SELECTORS, HANDCRANKS, ETC WERE IN THE APPROPRIATE POS. SOMEWHERE IN THIS TIME FRAME, IT WAS SUGGESTED BY THE MAINT DEPT THAT PERHAPS MY GEAR WAS IN FACT DOWN WITHOUT MY KNOWING. TO VERIFY, I MADE A LOW APCH ON RWY 28. WHILE DOING SO, I OBSERVED THE GEAR WARNING HORN AS THE THROTTLES WERE RETARDED TO APPROX 15 INCHES. THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR A GEAR UP CONDITION. TWR CONFIRMED THAT MY GEAR WAS IN FACT UP AS IT APPEARED TO HIM. I CLBED BACK TO 2500 FT MSL WHILE REMAINING IN THE PATTERN. THE MESSAGE I NEXT INTERPED THROUGH TWR WAS THAT MAINT COULD THINK OF NO FURTHER SUGGESTIONS. I AGREED THAT I TOO COULD THINK OF NOTHING FURTHER TO TRY. 48 MINS, I LATER LEARNED FROM ONE OF THE TWR CTLRS, ELAPSED BTWN THE TIME I FIRST ANNOUNCED MY GEAR PROB AND THE TIME I ULTIMATELY TOUCHED DOWN. DURING THIS PERIOD, I MADE EVERY ATTEMPT TO TROUBLESHOOT AND REMEDY THE PROB. I FOLLOWED PROCS AND CHKLISTS EXACTLY AS TRAINED. I FELT THAT I DID ALL I COULD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT ALL OPTIONS WERE EXHAUSTED. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I MADE THE DECISION TO GO AHEAD AND LAND ON RWY 31 AT AGC. THE TOUCHDOWN AND ROLLOUT WERE RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL, IN THE SENSE THAT I HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE CTL OF THE ACFT TO KEEP IT SAFELY UPRIGHT AND TRACKING DOWN THE CTR OF THE RWY. TOWARDS THE VERY END OF THE SKID, THE ACFT NOSE DID BEGIN TO VEER R SLIGHTLY, BUT BY THIS TIME THE ACFT HAD ALREADY COME TO A NEAR FULL STOPON THE RWY. LOOKING AT THE PLANE AFTERWARDS, IT'S MY GUESS THAT THE PAX STEP BY THE CARGO DOOR WAS DRAGGING ON THE R SIDE AND CAUSING THE VEERING IN THAT DIRECTION. NEVERTHELESS, I OBSERVED NO SMOKE, SIGNS OF FIRE, OR LEAKING FUEL OR OTHER FLUIDS, DURING OR AFTER THE LNDG. I EVACED THE ACFT PROMPTLY AFTER IT CAME TO REST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.