Narrative:

I was returning a C421 from aby to sfb (home base) and conducting an aircraft familiarization with a commercial asmel instrument rated pilot in the left seat. Prior to this flight the aircraft had flown for 1 1/2 hours after having the tanks topped off, and I had 50 gals of AVGAS put on board. The left main took 19 gals and 6 gals was put in the left auxiliary tank, the right main took the 25 gals. This did not seem out of the ordinary as when this particular aircraft is operated on the auxiliary tanks the excess fuel pumped out of the auxiliary is returned to the main tanks and there is a difference in the amount returned on each side possibly due to different output of left and right pumps and 1 engine is low time and the other is high time and the right engine is usually started first. We were advised to watch the fuel gauges as one of the gauges had started to become erratic. The right main indicator was not indicating and I watched the 25 gals put on board so I knew it was there. In-flight the right main indicator did fluctuate. We were cruising at 13000 ft on an IFR clearance and was located approximately 25 NM northwest of gainesville, fl, when ZJX requested we change our flight planned (and cleared) routing to avoid restr areas near and west of sanford. I was checking our position on the charts while the other pilot was setting up the navigation radios to confirm location and as we were navigating direct by GPS. Without any hesitation the right engine quit, I advised the other pilot to maintain direction and altitude as best as he could as I felt sure this was a fuel problem that could be resolved quickly and at 13000 ft with a commercial airport close we had time and altitude allowing time to check out the system. We put the boost pumps to high position, changed the right engine fuel supply to right auxiliary and in less than a min both engines were running and we were attempting to regain the 600 ft of altitude that was lost. At that time the controller asked if we were all right. I thought that was very intuitive of him as I had not had time to pick up the microphone and advise him of our problem. I reported difficulty with the fuel and engine and advised everything was back and running. He then asked (in not too pleasant a tone of voice) did I understand his request to change routing. My reply was something like I was ready for the amended clearance and he replied I was to determine the route change. In 30 yrs of IFR flying I have always been issued changes in routing without any input from me, so this caught me a little off guard. Sensing some urgency on the controller's part while still orienting myself on the charts I requested would direct orl direct sfb work ok for him. His reply a somewhat indignant 'I don't think so,' after which he accepted direct ocf-orl- sfb and then proceeded to hand us off to another controller. This was an isolated experience for me with over 8000 hours flying time but this situation should have been avoidable, and outcome could have been different should the engine failure occur anywhere at a low altitude. The more complex and higher performance aircraft are more difficult to preflight. Many of the fuel tanks cannot be checked visually other than being able to confirm they have fuel. The other pilot indicated the aircraft seemed to have 1 wing heavier than the other but I did not take the controls and whenever I have flown this plane it has always felt like the left wing was heavier and I contributed it to rigging. Since I am not there full time and several pilots fly this aircraft it makes it more difficult to control the activities affecting this plane. Supplemental information from acn 385347: my personal opinion is, that in a situation that we were in, the last thing we needed was an obnoxious, rude, sarcastic, unprofessional controller making it harder for us. Again this was a fam flight for me and the IFR flight plan was filed under the PNF name.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR RPT REGARDING FUEL MISMGMNT CAUSING ENG TO QUIT. DURING RESTART HEADING AND ALTDEVS OCCURRED. RADAR CTLR BECAME UPSET AND HANDLED THE SIT WITH ABRASIVE ATTITUDE, NOT ASSISTING FLC WITH HEADINGS TO AVOID RESTR AREA.

Narrative: I WAS RETURNING A C421 FROM ABY TO SFB (HOME BASE) AND CONDUCTING AN ACFT FAMILIARIZATION WITH A COMMERCIAL ASMEL INST RATED PLT IN THE L SEAT. PRIOR TO THIS FLT THE ACFT HAD FLOWN FOR 1 1/2 HRS AFTER HAVING THE TANKS TOPPED OFF, AND I HAD 50 GALS OF AVGAS PUT ON BOARD. THE L MAIN TOOK 19 GALS AND 6 GALS WAS PUT IN THE L AUX TANK, THE R MAIN TOOK THE 25 GALS. THIS DID NOT SEEM OUT OF THE ORDINARY AS WHEN THIS PARTICULAR ACFT IS OPERATED ON THE AUX TANKS THE EXCESS FUEL PUMPED OUT OF THE AUX IS RETURNED TO THE MAIN TANKS AND THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN THE AMOUNT RETURNED ON EACH SIDE POSSIBLY DUE TO DIFFERENT OUTPUT OF L AND R PUMPS AND 1 ENG IS LOW TIME AND THE OTHER IS HIGH TIME AND THE R ENG IS USUALLY STARTED FIRST. WE WERE ADVISED TO WATCH THE FUEL GAUGES AS ONE OF THE GAUGES HAD STARTED TO BECOME ERRATIC. THE R MAIN INDICATOR WAS NOT INDICATING AND I WATCHED THE 25 GALS PUT ON BOARD SO I KNEW IT WAS THERE. INFLT THE R MAIN INDICATOR DID FLUCTUATE. WE WERE CRUISING AT 13000 FT ON AN IFR CLRNC AND WAS LOCATED APPROX 25 NM NW OF GAINESVILLE, FL, WHEN ZJX REQUESTED WE CHANGE OUR FLT PLANNED (AND CLRED) ROUTING TO AVOID RESTR AREAS NEAR AND W OF SANFORD. I WAS CHKING OUR POS ON THE CHARTS WHILE THE OTHER PLT WAS SETTING UP THE NAV RADIOS TO CONFIRM LOCATION AND AS WE WERE NAVING DIRECT BY GPS. WITHOUT ANY HESITATION THE R ENG QUIT, I ADVISED THE OTHER PLT TO MAINTAIN DIRECTION AND ALT AS BEST AS HE COULD AS I FELT SURE THIS WAS A FUEL PROB THAT COULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY AND AT 13000 FT WITH A COMMERCIAL ARPT CLOSE WE HAD TIME AND ALT ALLOWING TIME TO CHK OUT THE SYS. WE PUT THE BOOST PUMPS TO HIGH POS, CHANGED THE R ENG FUEL SUPPLY TO R AUX AND IN LESS THAN A MIN BOTH ENGS WERE RUNNING AND WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO REGAIN THE 600 FT OF ALT THAT WAS LOST. AT THAT TIME THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE ALL RIGHT. I THOUGHT THAT WAS VERY INTUITIVE OF HIM AS I HAD NOT HAD TIME TO PICK UP THE MIKE AND ADVISE HIM OF OUR PROB. I RPTED DIFFICULTY WITH THE FUEL AND ENG AND ADVISED EVERYTHING WAS BACK AND RUNNING. HE THEN ASKED (IN NOT TOO PLEASANT A TONE OF VOICE) DID I UNDERSTAND HIS REQUEST TO CHANGE ROUTING. MY REPLY WAS SOMETHING LIKE I WAS READY FOR THE AMENDED CLRNC AND HE REPLIED I WAS TO DETERMINE THE RTE CHANGE. IN 30 YRS OF IFR FLYING I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ISSUED CHANGES IN ROUTING WITHOUT ANY INPUT FROM ME, SO THIS CAUGHT ME A LITTLE OFF GUARD. SENSING SOME URGENCY ON THE CTLR'S PART WHILE STILL ORIENTING MYSELF ON THE CHARTS I REQUESTED WOULD DIRECT ORL DIRECT SFB WORK OK FOR HIM. HIS REPLY A SOMEWHAT INDIGNANT 'I DON'T THINK SO,' AFTER WHICH HE ACCEPTED DIRECT OCF-ORL- SFB AND THEN PROCEEDED TO HAND US OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR. THIS WAS AN ISOLATED EXPERIENCE FOR ME WITH OVER 8000 HRS FLYING TIME BUT THIS SIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDABLE, AND OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT SHOULD THE ENG FAILURE OCCUR ANYWHERE AT A LOW ALT. THE MORE COMPLEX AND HIGHER PERFORMANCE ACFT ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO PREFLT. MANY OF THE FUEL TANKS CANNOT BE CHKED VISUALLY OTHER THAN BEING ABLE TO CONFIRM THEY HAVE FUEL. THE OTHER PLT INDICATED THE ACFT SEEMED TO HAVE 1 WING HEAVIER THAN THE OTHER BUT I DID NOT TAKE THE CTLS AND WHENEVER I HAVE FLOWN THIS PLANE IT HAS ALWAYS FELT LIKE THE L WING WAS HEAVIER AND I CONTRIBUTED IT TO RIGGING. SINCE I AM NOT THERE FULL TIME AND SEVERAL PLTS FLY THIS ACFT IT MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CTL THE ACTIVITIES AFFECTING THIS PLANE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 385347: MY PERSONAL OPINION IS, THAT IN A SIT THAT WE WERE IN, THE LAST THING WE NEEDED WAS AN OBNOXIOUS, RUDE, SARCASTIC, UNPROFESSIONAL CTLR MAKING IT HARDER FOR US. AGAIN THIS WAS A FAM FLT FOR ME AND THE IFR FLT PLAN WAS FILED UNDER THE PNF NAME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.