Narrative:

I was a relief pilot and had just assumed my shift after being on break. Dispatch sent us a message via ACARS recommending a reroute to the west of cleared cus via 10 degrees south 160 degrees west to avoid cumulo nimbus activity associated with tropical cyclone 'osea.' the captain (just before leaving the cockpit for his break) said, that 'she (the dispatcher) was overly helpful and that most of the WX was behind us and we should have smooth sailing.' he could not have been more wrong. Going by what the captain said, I had the other (non-flying) first officer tell dispatch that our current flight plan looked ok. Within 15 mins of that, an intense, 100 NM wide return started to grow on our radar 200 mi ahead. I tried to convince the other first officer that we should ask for 10 degrees south 160 degrees west reroute as recommended. He thought it was too far off course and suggested that it looked better to the east. I agreed to that and we asked to deviate 40 NM left of cus. As soon as we started left (south) the line we were trying to go around appeared to grow on our CRT. I had him ask for 70 NM and soon for 99 NM (the most the software will allow, this was a 'fans' route). During this deviation it got increasingly turbulent to almost continuous moderate. The other first officer was involved in fans communications as I was flying the aircraft and we forgot to give a position report at 11 degrees south and 155 degrees west. We also didn't do a plot while deviating. As we cleared the end of the cumulo nimbus line and asked for direct to 14 degrees south 153 degrees west, or to continue our left offset for a while longer, tahiti responded 'unable.' we inquired as to which was unable, the direct or the offset, the next center, auckland asked for our position we were abeam 13 degrees 27 mins south 157 degrees west (our fir check point). So we gave an estimate to that point, and auckland cleared us to go direct to the succeeding point, south 27 degrees west 170 degrees. During this deviation the workload seemed high to me, because the other first officer (non-flying) was having some difficulty with the FMC and responding to ATC. On the FMC we made the mistake of not 'executing' the 99L offset (just using the dotted line) and that affected his ability to use the 'position report' screen to respond to ATC quickly. I thought about awakening the captain when I realized we had missed a position report and a plot, but it looked like since we were giving the present position to akl, this situation was solved. In hindsight, I should have advocated more strongly to follow dispatch's recommendation for a reroute request. I also should have been made aware of how the other first officer was keeping up on the position report and plotting chart.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747-400 ACFT ON OCEANIC RTE ENCOUNTERED AREA OF SEVERE WX AND HAD TO DIVERT AROUND WX. FLC HAD SOME DIFFICULTY PROGRAMMING THE FMC PROPERLY FOR OFFSET PLUS HIGH WORKLOAD. FLC FORGOT TO PLOT POS AND GIVE POS RPT. BOTH PLTS IN COCKPIT WERE FO'S AND THE CAPT WAS ON BREAK SLEEPING. FLT WAS FANS FLT.

Narrative: I WAS A RELIEF PLT AND HAD JUST ASSUMED MY SHIFT AFTER BEING ON BREAK. DISPATCH SENT US A MESSAGE VIA ACARS RECOMMENDING A REROUTE TO THE W OF CLRED CUS VIA 10 DEGS S 160 DEGS W TO AVOID CUMULO NIMBUS ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH TROPICAL CYCLONE 'OSEA.' THE CAPT (JUST BEFORE LEAVING THE COCKPIT FOR HIS BREAK) SAID, THAT 'SHE (THE DISPATCHER) WAS OVERLY HELPFUL AND THAT MOST OF THE WX WAS BEHIND US AND WE SHOULD HAVE SMOOTH SAILING.' HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE WRONG. GOING BY WHAT THE CAPT SAID, I HAD THE OTHER (NON-FLYING) FO TELL DISPATCH THAT OUR CURRENT FLT PLAN LOOKED OK. WITHIN 15 MINS OF THAT, AN INTENSE, 100 NM WIDE RETURN STARTED TO GROW ON OUR RADAR 200 MI AHEAD. I TRIED TO CONVINCE THE OTHER FO THAT WE SHOULD ASK FOR 10 DEGS S 160 DEGS W REROUTE AS RECOMMENDED. HE THOUGHT IT WAS TOO FAR OFF COURSE AND SUGGESTED THAT IT LOOKED BETTER TO THE E. I AGREED TO THAT AND WE ASKED TO DEVIATE 40 NM L OF CUS. AS SOON AS WE STARTED L (S) THE LINE WE WERE TRYING TO GO AROUND APPEARED TO GROW ON OUR CRT. I HAD HIM ASK FOR 70 NM AND SOON FOR 99 NM (THE MOST THE SOFTWARE WILL ALLOW, THIS WAS A 'FANS' RTE). DURING THIS DEV IT GOT INCREASINGLY TURBULENT TO ALMOST CONTINUOUS MODERATE. THE OTHER FO WAS INVOLVED IN FANS COMS AS I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND WE FORGOT TO GIVE A POS RPT AT 11 DEGS S AND 155 DEGS W. WE ALSO DIDN'T DO A PLOT WHILE DEVIATING. AS WE CLRED THE END OF THE CUMULO NIMBUS LINE AND ASKED FOR DIRECT TO 14 DEGS S 153 DEGS W, OR TO CONTINUE OUR L OFFSET FOR A WHILE LONGER, TAHITI RESPONDED 'UNABLE.' WE INQUIRED AS TO WHICH WAS UNABLE, THE DIRECT OR THE OFFSET, THE NEXT CTR, AUCKLAND ASKED FOR OUR POS WE WERE ABEAM 13 DEGS 27 MINS S 157 DEGS W (OUR FIR CHK POINT). SO WE GAVE AN ESTIMATE TO THAT POINT, AND AUCKLAND CLRED US TO GO DIRECT TO THE SUCCEEDING POINT, S 27 DEGS W 170 DEGS. DURING THIS DEV THE WORKLOAD SEEMED HIGH TO ME, BECAUSE THE OTHER FO (NON-FLYING) WAS HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE FMC AND RESPONDING TO ATC. ON THE FMC WE MADE THE MISTAKE OF NOT 'EXECUTING' THE 99L OFFSET (JUST USING THE DOTTED LINE) AND THAT AFFECTED HIS ABILITY TO USE THE 'POS RPT' SCREEN TO RESPOND TO ATC QUICKLY. I THOUGHT ABOUT AWAKENING THE CAPT WHEN I REALIZED WE HAD MISSED A POS RPT AND A PLOT, BUT IT LOOKED LIKE SINCE WE WERE GIVING THE PRESENT POS TO AKL, THIS SIT WAS SOLVED. IN HINDSIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE ADVOCATED MORE STRONGLY TO FOLLOW DISPATCH'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A REROUTE REQUEST. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE OF HOW THE OTHER FO WAS KEEPING UP ON THE POS RPT AND PLOTTING CHART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.