Narrative:

Requested many times for a lower altitude from cruise to joining localizer, ATC kept us high even on localizer with full fly down of GS. Finally ATC asked if we could get down ok? Captain hesitated and replied 'yes.' trying to frantically fly down to GS at 260 KTS I advised captain I should ask for 1 turn in hold on localizer at fap (FAF of np) 4.5 DME if not capturing GS and being slowed and stable as it looks like we won't make it and that would be a good xchk of correct GS as we would capture from above. Captain did not reply. ATC again asked if we could make it and I told captain 'I'll tell him we need 1 turn,' to which captain replied ok. As I informed ATC captain reached over and threw out landing gear at 220 KTS (maximum gear cycle speed is 190 KTS). I stopped transmitting to observe and challenge captain when he called for slats at 215 KTS when I responded 'maximum speed is 200 KTS,' to which he responded 'give me slats, now.' I advised him 'ATC had issued a turn' as ATC was now informing us something about 'a small aircraft on low downwind, are we turning?' I asked captain, what he was doing as we were now approximately 3400 ft at about 3.7 mi (GS intercept altitude is 1620 ft at 4.5 DME for ILS DME 5 at teeside). We were now about 195-200 KTS, gear down, 20 degree flap (captain selected), 6000+ FPM descent GPWS was yelling 'sink rate pull-up' and 'terrain, terrain, pull-up.' to add to the chaos, I told ATC we were continuing and told captain to go around, as I monitored altitude, RA and vertical speed. We suddenly broke out, high, close-in, to which the captain continued to land while I did checklists to touchdown. We touched down about 140 KTS with a vref of about 117 KTS. Landing was without further incident until approach called, I responded, ATC said contact tower. We had landed without ever talking to the tower. I attempted to discuss this with captain but he seemed unconcerned. I expressed my displeasure with continuing a non stable approach inside the GS intercept point to which he replied, it was ok and we didn't get a handoff so he won't be filing a NASA report. Background: we have both been instructor/examiners for a training organization on the falcon. This is not acceptable performance for someone on a check ride and we both know it. This is not a good attitude by captain and not good CRM. What CRM? This was a one-man show. Had we not broken out I would have taken control and executed a missed approach. I have worked for this company part-time for 3 yrs but was passed over for a full-time position in favor of this captain because I had mostly airline background and he had more corporate experience. I guess I am lucky in more ways than I realize. I have not yet adjusted the priorities of 'the boss's schedule versus safety.' I'll always choose safety -- the boss can arrive late, at least he'll arrive alive, always if one chooses safety. Flying with many corporate operators seems to produce the unsafe pilot opting for a boss's schedule over common sense and safety. Many act completely different than they do in the simulator when the boss is on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FALCON 900 CPR ACFT ON APCH WAS KEPT HIGH AND THEN BECAME VERY UNSTABLE TRYING TO SALVAGE THE APCH. CONFLICT EVIDENT BTWN CAPT AND FO AND ACFT LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: REQUESTED MANY TIMES FOR A LOWER ALT FROM CRUISE TO JOINING LOC, ATC KEPT US HIGH EVEN ON LOC WITH FULL FLY DOWN OF GS. FINALLY ATC ASKED IF WE COULD GET DOWN OK? CAPT HESITATED AND REPLIED 'YES.' TRYING TO FRANTICALLY FLY DOWN TO GS AT 260 KTS I ADVISED CAPT I SHOULD ASK FOR 1 TURN IN HOLD ON LOC AT FAP (FAF OF NP) 4.5 DME IF NOT CAPTURING GS AND BEING SLOWED AND STABLE AS IT LOOKS LIKE WE WON'T MAKE IT AND THAT WOULD BE A GOOD XCHK OF CORRECT GS AS WE WOULD CAPTURE FROM ABOVE. CAPT DID NOT REPLY. ATC AGAIN ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE IT AND I TOLD CAPT 'I'LL TELL HIM WE NEED 1 TURN,' TO WHICH CAPT REPLIED OK. AS I INFORMED ATC CAPT REACHED OVER AND THREW OUT LNDG GEAR AT 220 KTS (MAX GEAR CYCLE SPD IS 190 KTS). I STOPPED XMITTING TO OBSERVE AND CHALLENGE CAPT WHEN HE CALLED FOR SLATS AT 215 KTS WHEN I RESPONDED 'MAX SPD IS 200 KTS,' TO WHICH HE RESPONDED 'GIVE ME SLATS, NOW.' I ADVISED HIM 'ATC HAD ISSUED A TURN' AS ATC WAS NOW INFORMING US SOMETHING ABOUT 'A SMALL ACFT ON LOW DOWNWIND, ARE WE TURNING?' I ASKED CAPT, WHAT HE WAS DOING AS WE WERE NOW APPROX 3400 FT AT ABOUT 3.7 MI (GS INTERCEPT ALT IS 1620 FT AT 4.5 DME FOR ILS DME 5 AT TEESIDE). WE WERE NOW ABOUT 195-200 KTS, GEAR DOWN, 20 DEG FLAP (CAPT SELECTED), 6000+ FPM DSCNT GPWS WAS YELLING 'SINK RATE PULL-UP' AND 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL-UP.' TO ADD TO THE CHAOS, I TOLD ATC WE WERE CONTINUING AND TOLD CAPT TO GAR, AS I MONITORED ALT, RA AND VERT SPD. WE SUDDENLY BROKE OUT, HIGH, CLOSE-IN, TO WHICH THE CAPT CONTINUED TO LAND WHILE I DID CHKLISTS TO TOUCHDOWN. WE TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT 140 KTS WITH A VREF OF ABOUT 117 KTS. LNDG WAS WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT UNTIL APCH CALLED, I RESPONDED, ATC SAID CONTACT TWR. WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT EVER TALKING TO THE TWR. I ATTEMPTED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH CAPT BUT HE SEEMED UNCONCERNED. I EXPRESSED MY DISPLEASURE WITH CONTINUING A NON STABLE APCH INSIDE THE GS INTERCEPT POINT TO WHICH HE REPLIED, IT WAS OK AND WE DIDN'T GET A HDOF SO HE WON'T BE FILING A NASA RPT. BACKGROUND: WE HAVE BOTH BEEN INSTRUCTOR/EXAMINERS FOR A TRAINING ORGANIZATION ON THE FALCON. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE FOR SOMEONE ON A CHK RIDE AND WE BOTH KNOW IT. THIS IS NOT A GOOD ATTITUDE BY CAPT AND NOT GOOD CRM. WHAT CRM? THIS WAS A ONE-MAN SHOW. HAD WE NOT BROKEN OUT I WOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. I HAVE WORKED FOR THIS COMPANY PART-TIME FOR 3 YRS BUT WAS PASSED OVER FOR A FULL-TIME POS IN FAVOR OF THIS CAPT BECAUSE I HAD MOSTLY AIRLINE BACKGROUND AND HE HAD MORE CORPORATE EXPERIENCE. I GUESS I AM LUCKY IN MORE WAYS THAN I REALIZE. I HAVE NOT YET ADJUSTED THE PRIORITIES OF 'THE BOSS'S SCHEDULE VERSUS SAFETY.' I'LL ALWAYS CHOOSE SAFETY -- THE BOSS CAN ARRIVE LATE, AT LEAST HE'LL ARRIVE ALIVE, ALWAYS IF ONE CHOOSES SAFETY. FLYING WITH MANY CORPORATE OPERATORS SEEMS TO PRODUCE THE UNSAFE PLT OPTING FOR A BOSS'S SCHEDULE OVER COMMON SENSE AND SAFETY. MANY ACT COMPLETELY DIFFERENT THAN THEY DO IN THE SIMULATOR WHEN THE BOSS IS ON BOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.