Narrative:

Arrival ATIS stated visibility 1 1/2 mi in snow, then new ATIS stated visibility as 1 mi in snow. Captain naturally planned to use the precision approach with the lowest WX/visibility minimums. So both pilots grabbed rno commercial chart page 11-1, ILS runway 16R (next page was localizer runway 16R). Commercial chart page 11-1 for rno ILS runway 16R shows decision ht as 5512 ft with runway 16R touchdown zone as 4412 ft. 'Crew coordination' command requires the PNF to respond by verbalizing only 2 numbers: touchdown zone and decision ht, and then to also state the page number and page date. So after the official crew briefing, each pilot had set his altimeter's barometric decision ht bug (circular altitude/rotational pointer) slightly above the '500' on his altimeter's dial. Unfortunately, neither of us grasped the unusual visibility requirement listed as 4 mi. And, later during the final approach segment, both pilots misperceived the decision ht as being after the required callout of 'speed and sink' at 500 ft RA. (The customary sequence of callouts during a typical CAT I ILS is: speed and sink at 500 ft RA, then '100 ft to go,' then 'minimums,' then '100 ft' called from RA AGL.) the first perception of abnormality was that the 'minimums' callout happened coincident with the 100 ft RA tone. Problems: commercial chart page 11-7 for rno is 'ILS DME runway 16R' and shows decision as 5012 ft and visibility as 1 1/2 mi. That commercial chart page with the lowest minimums seems located unusually after other precision and non precision approachs. Poor dispatcher and pilot monitoring of rno WX versus forecast: pilots should expect nothing from dispatch, and pilots should utilize ACARS to check rno WX at each hour's observation (pilots must ignore/disregard pressure to avoid ACARS costs). 'Crew briefing' is almost too minimalist: both pilots failed to note the required visibility (for the rno ILS runway 16R) is an unusually high 4 mi. Vertical scale barometer/altimeter, with decision ht bug, might be an improvement over the too-simple round- dial altimeter, with merely a decision ht bug set at 'hundreds-tens' (1000 ft off).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD82 ACFT ON ILS APCH TO RNO, FLC DIDN'T SEE THE VISIBILITY MINIMUM IS 4 MI AND THE ARPT WX WAS BELOW THAT. RPTR FO QUESTIONS WHY THE VISIBILITY MINIMUMS ON THE ILS ARE HIGHER THAN THE OTHER APCHS TO THE SAME RWY (LOC DME).

Narrative: ARR ATIS STATED VISIBILITY 1 1/2 MI IN SNOW, THEN NEW ATIS STATED VISIBILITY AS 1 MI IN SNOW. CAPT NATURALLY PLANNED TO USE THE PRECISION APCH WITH THE LOWEST WX/VISIBILITY MINIMUMS. SO BOTH PLTS GRABBED RNO COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE 11-1, ILS RWY 16R (NEXT PAGE WAS LOC RWY 16R). COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE 11-1 FOR RNO ILS RWY 16R SHOWS DECISION HT AS 5512 FT WITH RWY 16R TOUCHDOWN ZONE AS 4412 FT. 'CREW COORD' COMMAND REQUIRES THE PNF TO RESPOND BY VERBALIZING ONLY 2 NUMBERS: TOUCHDOWN ZONE AND DECISION HT, AND THEN TO ALSO STATE THE PAGE NUMBER AND PAGE DATE. SO AFTER THE OFFICIAL CREW BRIEFING, EACH PLT HAD SET HIS ALTIMETER'S BAROMETRIC DECISION HT BUG (CIRCULAR ALT/ROTATIONAL POINTER) SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE '500' ON HIS ALTIMETER'S DIAL. UNFORTUNATELY, NEITHER OF US GRASPED THE UNUSUAL VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT LISTED AS 4 MI. AND, LATER DURING THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT, BOTH PLTS MISPERCEIVED THE DECISION HT AS BEING AFTER THE REQUIRED CALLOUT OF 'SPD AND SINK' AT 500 FT RA. (THE CUSTOMARY SEQUENCE OF CALLOUTS DURING A TYPICAL CAT I ILS IS: SPD AND SINK AT 500 FT RA, THEN '100 FT TO GO,' THEN 'MINIMUMS,' THEN '100 FT' CALLED FROM RA AGL.) THE FIRST PERCEPTION OF ABNORMALITY WAS THAT THE 'MINIMUMS' CALLOUT HAPPENED COINCIDENT WITH THE 100 FT RA TONE. PROBS: COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE 11-7 FOR RNO IS 'ILS DME RWY 16R' AND SHOWS DECISION AS 5012 FT AND VISIBILITY AS 1 1/2 MI. THAT COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE WITH THE LOWEST MINIMUMS SEEMS LOCATED UNUSUALLY AFTER OTHER PRECISION AND NON PRECISION APCHS. POOR DISPATCHER AND PLT MONITORING OF RNO WX VERSUS FORECAST: PLTS SHOULD EXPECT NOTHING FROM DISPATCH, AND PLTS SHOULD UTILIZE ACARS TO CHK RNO WX AT EACH HR'S OBSERVATION (PLTS MUST IGNORE/DISREGARD PRESSURE TO AVOID ACARS COSTS). 'CREW BRIEFING' IS ALMOST TOO MINIMALIST: BOTH PLTS FAILED TO NOTE THE REQUIRED VISIBILITY (FOR THE RNO ILS RWY 16R) IS AN UNUSUALLY HIGH 4 MI. VERT SCALE BAROMETER/ALTIMETER, WITH DECISION HT BUG, MIGHT BE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE TOO-SIMPLE ROUND- DIAL ALTIMETER, WITH MERELY A DECISION HT BUG SET AT 'HUNDREDS-TENS' (1000 FT OFF).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.