Narrative:

I was hired to fly a PA28R from apl to bfi. The 2 co- owners were to come along for the 'maiden voyage' of their new aircraft. We had a front that had just passed through the lower half of california and a new front entering the northwest. I did not take the direct route but instead chose to head to the coast since the meas along the route were lower. The WX along the entire route was marginal VFR to IFR. The aircraft is not equipped for flight into known icing. I decided to depart to oak. The flight from apl to oak was uneventful but we arrived weary and decided to spend the night. Only a few minor glitches were noted in the aircraft and it appeared airworthy. The next day it was raining at oak with 1000 ft ceilings and layered clouds up to FL280. By this time I felt comfortable in the aircraft and decided to go into solid IFR. There were airmets for icing at the freezing level up to 18000 ft. In talking with the FSS briefer, I mentally painted the picture of being able to fly just under the freezing level at the meas along my route. My highest MEA was 8000 ft which was definitely in the freezing level. However, that was in the later part of my flight and I could survey the conditions before climbing to that altitude. The information you read about icing also says it is most likely to occur at -10 to -20 degrees C. Hence flying at 0 degrees C did not seem to guarantee icing and all the PIREPS noted icing at 9000 ft and above. Note, I never got to the 8000 ft MEA segment. The meas before and after this segment were in the 6000 ft range which were below the freezing level. I departed from oak en route to hio and noted heavy rain about 30 mins into the flight. While on V-27 between eni and fot we encountered light rime icing which promptly melted when I descended to 6000 ft (between fot and cec). However, once I passed the cec VOR at 8000 ft the icing was light but continually building. I asked for a lower altitude which was refused. I believe I said 'ice' in my initial requests but I do not recall with certainty. Since aircraft all around me were reporting ice, the reason for my request seemed obvious. The MEA was 6400 ft along this route. No MOCA was published. The ice was reaching at least 1/4 inch on the leading edge (the stall strips had vanished) and the windshield was now opaque. I felt we were flyable, but if I continued along the route and simply allowed the ice to build, I would have a true emergency with a potentially uncontrollable aircraft. In addition, if I passed through one of the heavy rain showers we would be in immediate danger. I estimate I had about 20-30 mins before the ice would overwhelm the aircraft in the current conditions. However, I would only have a few mins of controled flight if I flew through a rain shower. By now I know I was using the word 'ice' in my communications with ATC and queried them about the MOCA. I was considering descending along the airway to an altitude that would allow for terrain clearance and let the ice melt. I could see it was not published but believed ATC would tell you the absolute minimum altitude you could fly without bumping into something. ATC simply declared there was none and I was to maintain 8000 ft. After a while, I really did not care if ATC was mandating we hold altitude and started a descent. ATC queried me and asked if I was having difficulty holding altitude and I said yes, although I really had not tried too hard. It seemed ridiculous to 'try' to stay at 8000 ft and put the aircraft in further danger. ATC then said that 6400 ft was as low as I could go (the published MEA). I felt that was a stupid thing to say since I had asked for lower earlier. ATC seemed more worried about losing me on radar than offering any useful information. The ice was not melting at 6400 ft so I decided to turn left to the ocean and begin another descent. I had spotty visual contact with the ground during this time and asked one of my passenger (a private pilot) to pull out a WAC and determine the ht of the terrain in the local area. My plan in a worse case scenario was to fly out over the ocean and descend to a warmer altitude. ATC simply gave me a vector to the nearest airport (5s6) without offering any terrain guidance. He also stated the MEA offshore was 5000 ft. Again I was irritated that he did not offer me a vector to sidestep earlier. I descended into a broken layer at around 4000 ft and canceled IFR once I had the airport in sight. The ice finally melted and I proceeded VFR to oth. (The winds at 5s6 were 20-30 KT crosswind and I had to abort the approach.) what I did wrong: 1) I should have taken the forecast icing levels and subtracted 2000 ft. 2) I assumed I could get the MEA which was not the case. The reality is a pilot should predict the lowest northeast odd southwest even compliant altitude that is above the MEA. If this altitude is less than 2000 ft below the freezing altitude, you simply cannot go IFR. 3) I was inexperienced in icing and should have rejected the flight. Oddly enough, I was expecting (and wanting) to 'touch' icing for experience but be able to descend to a lower for safety. 4) I did not get assertive with ATC soon enough. I guess I felt I had intentionally flown into 'known icing conditions' and would get myself in trouble with the FAA. 5) I could have done a 180 degree turn and immediately gotten authority/authorized to 7000 ft (northeast odd) and the broken cloud area behind me. However, the WX was changing quickly and my rear safety valve may have closed. I also did not feel 7000 ft was warm enough to melt the ice. My passenger were very quiet during this episode. I thought they were upset I had put them in danger. After we landed at oth, and again at bfi, they praised my skill and calmness under pressure. 'I have the greatest respect for you as a pilot. All others will be compared to you and this flight.' 'the best decision we made was to hire you for this flight.' 'you are going to be going with us on a lot of trips.' callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: analyst called to counsel reporter regarding the responsibility of ATC. He believed that one could fly at the MEA because it exists. He feels the odd/even rule should not apply when on an IFR flight plan and in such WX conditions as he was. He feels when he mentioned icing that he should have gotten better assistance. He did ultimately state that maybe if he had declared an emergency he would have gotten more help. This reporter has a very negative attitude about the FAA and does not want to get involved in any way.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF PA28R FLIES INTO ICING CONDITIONS ON IFR FLT PLAN. MENTIONS ICE TO ATC AND REQUESTS LOWER BUT IS REFUSED. ACFT IS NOT EQUIPPED FOR FLT INTO ICING CONDITIONS. PLT CONTINUES AND BUILDS UP MORE ICE. FINALLY DEVIATES FROM FLT PLAN AND TURNS W OUT TO SEA TO DSND.

Narrative: I WAS HIRED TO FLY A PA28R FROM APL TO BFI. THE 2 CO- OWNERS WERE TO COME ALONG FOR THE 'MAIDEN VOYAGE' OF THEIR NEW ACFT. WE HAD A FRONT THAT HAD JUST PASSED THROUGH THE LOWER HALF OF CALIFORNIA AND A NEW FRONT ENTERING THE NW. I DID NOT TAKE THE DIRECT RTE BUT INSTEAD CHOSE TO HEAD TO THE COAST SINCE THE MEAS ALONG THE RTE WERE LOWER. THE WX ALONG THE ENTIRE RTE WAS MARGINAL VFR TO IFR. THE ACFT IS NOT EQUIPPED FOR FLT INTO KNOWN ICING. I DECIDED TO DEPART TO OAK. THE FLT FROM APL TO OAK WAS UNEVENTFUL BUT WE ARRIVED WEARY AND DECIDED TO SPEND THE NIGHT. ONLY A FEW MINOR GLITCHES WERE NOTED IN THE ACFT AND IT APPEARED AIRWORTHY. THE NEXT DAY IT WAS RAINING AT OAK WITH 1000 FT CEILINGS AND LAYERED CLOUDS UP TO FL280. BY THIS TIME I FELT COMFORTABLE IN THE ACFT AND DECIDED TO GO INTO SOLID IFR. THERE WERE AIRMETS FOR ICING AT THE FREEZING LEVEL UP TO 18000 FT. IN TALKING WITH THE FSS BRIEFER, I MENTALLY PAINTED THE PICTURE OF BEING ABLE TO FLY JUST UNDER THE FREEZING LEVEL AT THE MEAS ALONG MY RTE. MY HIGHEST MEA WAS 8000 FT WHICH WAS DEFINITELY IN THE FREEZING LEVEL. HOWEVER, THAT WAS IN THE LATER PART OF MY FLT AND I COULD SURVEY THE CONDITIONS BEFORE CLBING TO THAT ALT. THE INFO YOU READ ABOUT ICING ALSO SAYS IT IS MOST LIKELY TO OCCUR AT -10 TO -20 DEGS C. HENCE FLYING AT 0 DEGS C DID NOT SEEM TO GUARANTEE ICING AND ALL THE PIREPS NOTED ICING AT 9000 FT AND ABOVE. NOTE, I NEVER GOT TO THE 8000 FT MEA SEGMENT. THE MEAS BEFORE AND AFTER THIS SEGMENT WERE IN THE 6000 FT RANGE WHICH WERE BELOW THE FREEZING LEVEL. I DEPARTED FROM OAK ENRTE TO HIO AND NOTED HVY RAIN ABOUT 30 MINS INTO THE FLT. WHILE ON V-27 BTWN ENI AND FOT WE ENCOUNTERED LIGHT RIME ICING WHICH PROMPTLY MELTED WHEN I DSNDED TO 6000 FT (BTWN FOT AND CEC). HOWEVER, ONCE I PASSED THE CEC VOR AT 8000 FT THE ICING WAS LIGHT BUT CONTINUALLY BUILDING. I ASKED FOR A LOWER ALT WHICH WAS REFUSED. I BELIEVE I SAID 'ICE' IN MY INITIAL REQUESTS BUT I DO NOT RECALL WITH CERTAINTY. SINCE ACFT ALL AROUND ME WERE RPTING ICE, THE REASON FOR MY REQUEST SEEMED OBVIOUS. THE MEA WAS 6400 FT ALONG THIS RTE. NO MOCA WAS PUBLISHED. THE ICE WAS REACHING AT LEAST 1/4 INCH ON THE LEADING EDGE (THE STALL STRIPS HAD VANISHED) AND THE WINDSHIELD WAS NOW OPAQUE. I FELT WE WERE FLYABLE, BUT IF I CONTINUED ALONG THE RTE AND SIMPLY ALLOWED THE ICE TO BUILD, I WOULD HAVE A TRUE EMER WITH A POTENTIALLY UNCONTROLLABLE ACFT. IN ADDITION, IF I PASSED THROUGH ONE OF THE HVY RAIN SHOWERS WE WOULD BE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER. I ESTIMATE I HAD ABOUT 20-30 MINS BEFORE THE ICE WOULD OVERWHELM THE ACFT IN THE CURRENT CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, I WOULD ONLY HAVE A FEW MINS OF CTLED FLT IF I FLEW THROUGH A RAIN SHOWER. BY NOW I KNOW I WAS USING THE WORD 'ICE' IN MY COMS WITH ATC AND QUERIED THEM ABOUT THE MOCA. I WAS CONSIDERING DSNDING ALONG THE AIRWAY TO AN ALT THAT WOULD ALLOW FOR TERRAIN CLRNC AND LET THE ICE MELT. I COULD SEE IT WAS NOT PUBLISHED BUT BELIEVED ATC WOULD TELL YOU THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM ALT YOU COULD FLY WITHOUT BUMPING INTO SOMETHING. ATC SIMPLY DECLARED THERE WAS NONE AND I WAS TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT. AFTER A WHILE, I REALLY DID NOT CARE IF ATC WAS MANDATING WE HOLD ALT AND STARTED A DSCNT. ATC QUERIED ME AND ASKED IF I WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY HOLDING ALT AND I SAID YES, ALTHOUGH I REALLY HAD NOT TRIED TOO HARD. IT SEEMED RIDICULOUS TO 'TRY' TO STAY AT 8000 FT AND PUT THE ACFT IN FURTHER DANGER. ATC THEN SAID THAT 6400 FT WAS AS LOW AS I COULD GO (THE PUBLISHED MEA). I FELT THAT WAS A STUPID THING TO SAY SINCE I HAD ASKED FOR LOWER EARLIER. ATC SEEMED MORE WORRIED ABOUT LOSING ME ON RADAR THAN OFFERING ANY USEFUL INFO. THE ICE WAS NOT MELTING AT 6400 FT SO I DECIDED TO TURN L TO THE OCEAN AND BEGIN ANOTHER DSCNT. I HAD SPOTTY VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE GND DURING THIS TIME AND ASKED ONE OF MY PAX (A PVT PLT) TO PULL OUT A WAC AND DETERMINE THE HT OF THE TERRAIN IN THE LCL AREA. MY PLAN IN A WORSE CASE SCENARIO WAS TO FLY OUT OVER THE OCEAN AND DSND TO A WARMER ALT. ATC SIMPLY GAVE ME A VECTOR TO THE NEAREST ARPT (5S6) WITHOUT OFFERING ANY TERRAIN GUIDANCE. HE ALSO STATED THE MEA OFFSHORE WAS 5000 FT. AGAIN I WAS IRRITATED THAT HE DID NOT OFFER ME A VECTOR TO SIDESTEP EARLIER. I DSNDED INTO A BROKEN LAYER AT AROUND 4000 FT AND CANCELED IFR ONCE I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE ICE FINALLY MELTED AND I PROCEEDED VFR TO OTH. (THE WINDS AT 5S6 WERE 20-30 KT XWIND AND I HAD TO ABORT THE APCH.) WHAT I DID WRONG: 1) I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE FORECAST ICING LEVELS AND SUBTRACTED 2000 FT. 2) I ASSUMED I COULD GET THE MEA WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. THE REALITY IS A PLT SHOULD PREDICT THE LOWEST NE ODD SW EVEN COMPLIANT ALT THAT IS ABOVE THE MEA. IF THIS ALT IS LESS THAN 2000 FT BELOW THE FREEZING ALT, YOU SIMPLY CANNOT GO IFR. 3) I WAS INEXPERIENCED IN ICING AND SHOULD HAVE REJECTED THE FLT. ODDLY ENOUGH, I WAS EXPECTING (AND WANTING) TO 'TOUCH' ICING FOR EXPERIENCE BUT BE ABLE TO DSND TO A LOWER FOR SAFETY. 4) I DID NOT GET ASSERTIVE WITH ATC SOON ENOUGH. I GUESS I FELT I HAD INTENTIONALLY FLOWN INTO 'KNOWN ICING CONDITIONS' AND WOULD GET MYSELF IN TROUBLE WITH THE FAA. 5) I COULD HAVE DONE A 180 DEG TURN AND IMMEDIATELY GOTTEN AUTH TO 7000 FT (NE ODD) AND THE BROKEN CLOUD AREA BEHIND ME. HOWEVER, THE WX WAS CHANGING QUICKLY AND MY REAR SAFETY VALVE MAY HAVE CLOSED. I ALSO DID NOT FEEL 7000 FT WAS WARM ENOUGH TO MELT THE ICE. MY PAX WERE VERY QUIET DURING THIS EPISODE. I THOUGHT THEY WERE UPSET I HAD PUT THEM IN DANGER. AFTER WE LANDED AT OTH, AND AGAIN AT BFI, THEY PRAISED MY SKILL AND CALMNESS UNDER PRESSURE. 'I HAVE THE GREATEST RESPECT FOR YOU AS A PLT. ALL OTHERS WILL BE COMPARED TO YOU AND THIS FLT.' 'THE BEST DECISION WE MADE WAS TO HIRE YOU FOR THIS FLT.' 'YOU ARE GOING TO BE GOING WITH US ON A LOT OF TRIPS.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ANALYST CALLED TO COUNSEL RPTR REGARDING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ATC. HE BELIEVED THAT ONE COULD FLY AT THE MEA BECAUSE IT EXISTS. HE FEELS THE ODD/EVEN RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY WHEN ON AN IFR FLT PLAN AND IN SUCH WX CONDITIONS AS HE WAS. HE FEELS WHEN HE MENTIONED ICING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN BETTER ASSISTANCE. HE DID ULTIMATELY STATE THAT MAYBE IF HE HAD DECLARED AN EMER HE WOULD HAVE GOTTEN MORE HELP. THIS RPTR HAS A VERY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ABOUT THE FAA AND DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.