Narrative:

Air carrier flight xyz departed on time at XX05 from hou for tul with 75 passenger and 1 jump seater sitting in the cabin. As we departed runway 12R, we started our turn to a 350 degree heading. As we began to clean the aircraft up, we noticed a #2 engine hydraulic low pressure light illuminate with the associated master caution light. As the flaps stabilized at position #1, the lights extinguished. As the flaps were brought all the way up, the same lights appeared. With the flaps up the lights extinguished, pressure was normal, but the hydraulic quantity gauge was reading zero gallons. I continued to fly the airplane. We referenced the QRH and found no such condition. The captain called dispatch and hou maintenance. We reset the hydraulic quantity circuit breaker with no change. As we leveled off at FL330, the decision to return to hou was made. As we started our descent to hou, we then experienced a complete 'a' system hydraulic failure. I continued to fly the aircraft as the captain ran the appropriate emergency checklist. Our company pilot jump seater was summoned to the cockpit for help in running the onboard performance computer for a flaps 15 degree landing called for by the checklist. As the final preparations and requests were made by the captain, we xferred control of the aircraft at around 6000 ft MSL. We requested a long (20 NM,) final. We ran the checklist, configured the aircraft according to the emergency checklist and landed the aircraft uneventfully. We had nosewheel steering, so we taxied clear, shut down, had maintenance install the gear pins and were towed back to the gate. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a B737-200 with P&west JT8D-15A engines. The reporter said the loss of fluid was caused by a broken flexible brake hose. Supplemental information from acn 388960: on climb out from hou we got an 'a' hydraulic system low pressure light for approximately 5 seconds followed by normal indications. Shortly thereafter, the 'a' hydraulic system qty indicator went to zero. The first officer continued to fly the aircraft while I conferred with dispatch. We decided to return to hou and notified hou center. We received clearance to return to hou. At that time system pressure indications were normal and we possibly had only a failed qty gauge -- hence no need for an emergency declaration. On return to hou, the 'a' system hydraulics showed complete failure. I recontacted dispatch and was told that they would declare emergency and have the airport ready for our return. Center was handling us as if we were a priority. When we were handed off to approach control, we still seemed to be getting priority, so I assumed that they had been advised of the diminished hydraulic capability. In accordance with the checklist, we landed with partial flaps and taxied clear of the runway and were then towed to the gate. I later learned that approach control was upset with us because they had not been informed of our changing aircraft status (ie, from initially a possible indicator failure, progressing to a real 'a' system hydraulic failure). I also learned later that apparently hou center had failed to advise approach control of our changed situation. While I realize we could have alleviated this problem by notifying every new ATC controller of our situation, we were pretty busy flying, running checklists, talking to dispatch, briefing the flight attendants, reassuring passenger, etc. Nevertheless, in the future, in any similiar situation, I hope to more fully advise ATC of any changes to aircraft status without relying on the 'system' to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 IN INITIAL CLB DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO COMPLETE LOSS OF 'A' SYS HYD PRESSURE AND QUANTITY CAUSED BY A BROKEN FLEXIBLE BRAKE LINE.

Narrative: ACR FLT XYZ DEPARTED ON TIME AT XX05 FROM HOU FOR TUL WITH 75 PAX AND 1 JUMP SEATER SITTING IN THE CABIN. AS WE DEPARTED RWY 12R, WE STARTED OUR TURN TO A 350 DEG HDG. AS WE BEGAN TO CLEAN THE ACFT UP, WE NOTICED A #2 ENG HYD LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATE WITH THE ASSOCIATED MASTER CAUTION LIGHT. AS THE FLAPS STABILIZED AT POS #1, THE LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED. AS THE FLAPS WERE BROUGHT ALL THE WAY UP, THE SAME LIGHTS APPEARED. WITH THE FLAPS UP THE LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED, PRESSURE WAS NORMAL, BUT THE HYD QUANTITY GAUGE WAS READING ZERO GALLONS. I CONTINUED TO FLY THE AIRPLANE. WE REFED THE QRH AND FOUND NO SUCH CONDITION. THE CAPT CALLED DISPATCH AND HOU MAINT. WE RESET THE HYD QUANTITY CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH NO CHANGE. AS WE LEVELED OFF AT FL330, THE DECISION TO RETURN TO HOU WAS MADE. AS WE STARTED OUR DSCNT TO HOU, WE THEN EXPERIENCED A COMPLETE 'A' SYS HYD FAILURE. I CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT AS THE CAPT RAN THE APPROPRIATE EMER CHKLIST. OUR COMPANY PLT JUMP SEATER WAS SUMMONED TO THE COCKPIT FOR HELP IN RUNNING THE ONBOARD PERFORMANCE COMPUTER FOR A FLAPS 15 DEG LNDG CALLED FOR BY THE CHKLIST. AS THE FINAL PREPARATIONS AND REQUESTS WERE MADE BY THE CAPT, WE XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT AT AROUND 6000 FT MSL. WE REQUESTED A LONG (20 NM,) FINAL. WE RAN THE CHKLIST, CONFIGURED THE ACFT ACCORDING TO THE EMER CHKLIST AND LANDED THE ACFT UNEVENTFULLY. WE HAD NOSEWHEEL STEERING, SO WE TAXIED CLR, SHUT DOWN, HAD MAINT INSTALL THE GEAR PINS AND WERE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A B737-200 WITH P&W JT8D-15A ENGS. THE RPTR SAID THE LOSS OF FLUID WAS CAUSED BY A BROKEN FLEXIBLE BRAKE HOSE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 388960: ON CLBOUT FROM HOU WE GOT AN 'A' HYD SYS LOW PRESSURE LIGHT FOR APPROX 5 SECONDS FOLLOWED BY NORMAL INDICATIONS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE 'A' HYD SYS QTY INDICATOR WENT TO ZERO. THE FO CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT WHILE I CONFERRED WITH DISPATCH. WE DECIDED TO RETURN TO HOU AND NOTIFIED HOU CENTER. WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO RETURN TO HOU. AT THAT TIME SYS PRESSURE INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AND WE POSSIBLY HAD ONLY A FAILED QTY GAUGE -- HENCE NO NEED FOR AN EMER DECLARATION. ON RETURN TO HOU, THE 'A' SYS HYDS SHOWED COMPLETE FAILURE. I RECONTACTED DISPATCH AND WAS TOLD THAT THEY WOULD DECLARE EMER AND HAVE THE ARPT READY FOR OUR RETURN. CENTER WAS HANDLING US AS IF WE WERE A PRIORITY. WHEN WE WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL, WE STILL SEEMED TO BE GETTING PRIORITY, SO I ASSUMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN ADVISED OF THE DIMINISHED HYD CAPABILITY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHKLIST, WE LANDED WITH PARTIAL FLAPS AND TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND WERE THEN TOWED TO THE GATE. I LATER LEARNED THAT APCH CTL WAS UPSET WITH US BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED OF OUR CHANGING ACFT STATUS (IE, FROM INITIALLY A POSSIBLE INDICATOR FAILURE, PROGRESSING TO A REAL 'A' SYS HYD FAILURE). I ALSO LEARNED LATER THAT APPARENTLY HOU CENTER HAD FAILED TO ADVISE APCH CTL OF OUR CHANGED SIT. WHILE I REALIZE WE COULD HAVE ALLEVIATED THIS PROB BY NOTIFYING EVERY NEW ATC CTLR OF OUR SIT, WE WERE PRETTY BUSY FLYING, RUNNING CHKLISTS, TALKING TO DISPATCH, BRIEFING THE FLT ATTENDANTS, REASSURING PAX, ETC. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE FUTURE, IN ANY SIMILIAR SIT, I HOPE TO MORE FULLY ADVISE ATC OF ANY CHANGES TO ACFT STATUS WITHOUT RELYING ON THE 'SYS' TO DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.