Narrative:

On ILS runway 3 approach (GS inoperative) at greer airport, at 2700 ft MSL (published and assigned altitude), about 1 mi prior to final approach fix (greer omb), captain stated 'station passage, starting time.' I began descent to MDA (1380 ft MSL). When I looked at my navigation display, I noticed the ADF needle pointing ahead of the aircraft indicating no station passage. I told the captain that my needle had not swung and we both began to try to figure out the problem. I then realized that the captain's needle had not swung either, and that he based station passage on the ACARS map, in error. We were already below 2700 ft. The needle then swung, and shortly after we came out of the clouds and could see that we could proceed to the runway with no possibility of hitting any obstructions, so I continued with the approach and landed normally. Contributing factors: 1) captain's use of FMS map at inappropriate time. 2) my reliance on captain's call without xchk. 3) our failure to immediately climb on realization that we were below prescribed altitude. 4) reliance on a single NAVAID at a critical point in a flight, such as the greer OM. Corrective actions: 1) train crews to turn off FMS map and use only appropriate navaids for this type of approach. 2) train crews to always xchk, question, and be spring-loaded for missed approach. 3) minimize ILS down time during construction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD88 FLC STARTED DSCNT TO THE MDA FOR A LOC APCH BEFORE XING THE FINAL APCH FIX. THE CAPT USED AN INAPPROPRIATE TECHNIQUE TO DETERMINE STATION PASSAGE.

Narrative: ON ILS RWY 3 APCH (GS INOP) AT GREER ARPT, AT 2700 FT MSL (PUBLISHED AND ASSIGNED ALT), ABOUT 1 MI PRIOR TO FINAL APCH FIX (GREER OMB), CAPT STATED 'STATION PASSAGE, STARTING TIME.' I BEGAN DSCNT TO MDA (1380 FT MSL). WHEN I LOOKED AT MY NAV DISPLAY, I NOTICED THE ADF NEEDLE POINTING AHEAD OF THE ACFT INDICATING NO STATION PASSAGE. I TOLD THE CAPT THAT MY NEEDLE HAD NOT SWUNG AND WE BOTH BEGAN TO TRY TO FIGURE OUT THE PROB. I THEN REALIZED THAT THE CAPT'S NEEDLE HAD NOT SWUNG EITHER, AND THAT HE BASED STATION PASSAGE ON THE ACARS MAP, IN ERROR. WE WERE ALREADY BELOW 2700 FT. THE NEEDLE THEN SWUNG, AND SHORTLY AFTER WE CAME OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND COULD SEE THAT WE COULD PROCEED TO THE RWY WITH NO POSSIBILITY OF HITTING ANY OBSTRUCTIONS, SO I CONTINUED WITH THE APCH AND LANDED NORMALLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) CAPT'S USE OF FMS MAP AT INAPPROPRIATE TIME. 2) MY RELIANCE ON CAPT'S CALL WITHOUT XCHK. 3) OUR FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY CLB ON REALIZATION THAT WE WERE BELOW PRESCRIBED ALT. 4) RELIANCE ON A SINGLE NAVAID AT A CRITICAL POINT IN A FLT, SUCH AS THE GREER OM. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) TRAIN CREWS TO TURN OFF FMS MAP AND USE ONLY APPROPRIATE NAVAIDS FOR THIS TYPE OF APCH. 2) TRAIN CREWS TO ALWAYS XCHK, QUESTION, AND BE SPRING-LOADED FOR MISSED APCH. 3) MINIMIZE ILS DOWN TIME DURING CONSTRUCTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.