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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 389316 |
Time | |
Date | 199712 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bos |
State Reference | MA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time total : 9000 |
ASRS Report | 389316 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : exited adverse environment other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Situations | |
Airport | other physical facility |
Narrative:
For several months now I have been very concerned about lahso and the very real potential for collision. I acknowledge the fact that we can stop our aircraft within the allotted distance under ideal conditions. My problem with lahso is that I cannot guarantee we will make it every time. Should I as captain place my crew, passenger and aircraft in jeopardy by accepting a lahso when I know that any combination of factors could result in an overshoot? A slight airspeed increase, a little float, delay in braking, gars, aborts, anti-skid failure, unstablized approachs, slam dunks and a host of other variables makes lahso a risky operation at best. It won't take much to blow a lahso and rip through an intersecting runway with disastrous results. Now my story. Boston on a clear dark night. Cleared to land runway 22L hold short of runway 27. Landing traffic on final runway 27. Touchdown was normal and within 1000 ft. Deceleration was normal, however, we had no indication of how far down runway 27 was. We had not seen any taxi lights or high speed turnoffs. Did we overshoot? Where was the landing traffic? About the time we laid into the brakes taxiway P came into view. Air carrier Y comes to a halt in front of us on runway 27. If we had overrun runway 27 we would have collided. I can't justify this operation in order to pack more airplanes into the airport. The same holds true for takeoffs. Are we accepting the other aircraft's guarantee of stopping short while we takeoff? How about 2 aircraft landing on crossing runways with a lahso given to the other guy. Should we accept his guarantee that he will not overshoot as we land? I believe lahso is an accident waiting to happen and should be suspended. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that this was an agenda item to point out the danger of these types of clrncs, particularly at night at bos. He stated that there is a decided lack of guidance to inform the pilots as to where they are in relation to runway 27. His airline manual shows a distance of 6400 ft for landing on runway 22L with a lahso of runway 27. An additional problem mentioned was that the lahso was not received until on final approach, 5 mi out and on tower frequency. He added that taxiway P is the normal exit point off runway 22L and that is where he exited just as the other aircraft was going through runway 22L. No conflict occurred but could have had a malfunction of any sort arisen.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767 PIC'S COMPLAINT OF THE LAHSO OP IN BOS DURING A NIGHT OP. ACFT WAS TURNED OFF RWY 22L AT TXWY P JUST PRIOR TO RWY 27. ACR Y WAS JUST PASSING THROUGH RWY 22L ON RWY 27. RPTR'S COMPLAINT PERTAINS TO LACK OF AWARENESS OF HIS ACFT'S POS RELATIVE TO RWY 27.
Narrative: FOR SEVERAL MONTHS NOW I HAVE BEEN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT LAHSO AND THE VERY REAL POTENTIAL FOR COLLISION. I ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT WE CAN STOP OUR ACFT WITHIN THE ALLOTTED DISTANCE UNDER IDEAL CONDITIONS. MY PROB WITH LAHSO IS THAT I CANNOT GUARANTEE WE WILL MAKE IT EVERY TIME. SHOULD I AS CAPT PLACE MY CREW, PAX AND ACFT IN JEOPARDY BY ACCEPTING A LAHSO WHEN I KNOW THAT ANY COMBINATION OF FACTORS COULD RESULT IN AN OVERSHOOT? A SLIGHT AIRSPD INCREASE, A LITTLE FLOAT, DELAY IN BRAKING, GARS, ABORTS, ANTI-SKID FAILURE, UNSTABLIZED APCHS, SLAM DUNKS AND A HOST OF OTHER VARIABLES MAKES LAHSO A RISKY OP AT BEST. IT WON'T TAKE MUCH TO BLOW A LAHSO AND RIP THROUGH AN INTERSECTING RWY WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS. NOW MY STORY. BOSTON ON A CLR DARK NIGHT. CLRED TO LAND RWY 22L HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27. LNDG TFC ON FINAL RWY 27. TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL AND WITHIN 1000 FT. DECELERATION WAS NORMAL, HOWEVER, WE HAD NO INDICATION OF HOW FAR DOWN RWY 27 WAS. WE HAD NOT SEEN ANY TAXI LIGHTS OR HIGH SPD TURNOFFS. DID WE OVERSHOOT? WHERE WAS THE LNDG TFC? ABOUT THE TIME WE LAID INTO THE BRAKES TXWY P CAME INTO VIEW. ACR Y COMES TO A HALT IN FRONT OF US ON RWY 27. IF WE HAD OVERRUN RWY 27 WE WOULD HAVE COLLIDED. I CAN'T JUSTIFY THIS OP IN ORDER TO PACK MORE AIRPLANES INTO THE ARPT. THE SAME HOLDS TRUE FOR TKOFS. ARE WE ACCEPTING THE OTHER ACFT'S GUARANTEE OF STOPPING SHORT WHILE WE TKOF? HOW ABOUT 2 ACFT LNDG ON XING RWYS WITH A LAHSO GIVEN TO THE OTHER GUY. SHOULD WE ACCEPT HIS GUARANTEE THAT HE WILL NOT OVERSHOOT AS WE LAND? I BELIEVE LAHSO IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN AND SHOULD BE SUSPENDED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS WAS AN AGENDA ITEM TO POINT OUT THE DANGER OF THESE TYPES OF CLRNCS, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT AT BOS. HE STATED THAT THERE IS A DECIDED LACK OF GUIDANCE TO INFORM THE PLTS AS TO WHERE THEY ARE IN RELATION TO RWY 27. HIS AIRLINE MANUAL SHOWS A DISTANCE OF 6400 FT FOR LNDG ON RWY 22L WITH A LAHSO OF RWY 27. AN ADDITIONAL PROB MENTIONED WAS THAT THE LAHSO WAS NOT RECEIVED UNTIL ON FINAL APCH, 5 MI OUT AND ON TWR FREQ. HE ADDED THAT TXWY P IS THE NORMAL EXIT POINT OFF RWY 22L AND THAT IS WHERE HE EXITED JUST AS THE OTHER ACFT WAS GOING THROUGH RWY 22L. NO CONFLICT OCCURRED BUT COULD HAVE HAD A MALFUNCTION OF ANY SORT ARISEN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.