Narrative:

Traffic flow for the day was running about 2 hours behind schedule due to snow removal and deicing. 2 of 4 runways were unusable, due to snow and snow removal in progress. We had 3 atcs on shift and 1 atcs due to go home at XX00. 1 atcs was on local control #1 working all outbounds, 2 atcs on ground control with full deice in progress (ie, both were needed, unable to combine to one position). That left the other atcs to work local #2 with a steady stream of inbounds, clearance delivery, flight data, tower cabin attendant supervisor, and coordinator on the walkie-talkie for snow removal. To add to the complexity, we had a wind shift requiring a runway change, and about half of the departures were timing out, which required them to be updated. This situation did not develop at the last moment. It had been building for the better part of the shift. There were no air traffic controllers from the shift held over on overtime. There was no supervisor or dedicated controller in charge (in the tower). This left a totally unacceptable staffing level for the workload. Evidently our facilities overtime budget does not allow for a staffing level that promotes safety. In the future all controllers involved with a similar situation will invoke article 65 as soon as possible. I feel that with 50-60 vehicles on the field for snow removal and no one person in the tower controling them, a runway incursion is imminent. Proposed solution: make more overtime money available so a situation like this does not have to happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR ALLEGES STAFFING WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE VOLUME OF TFC AND VEHICLES WITH A 3 PERSON SHIFT.

Narrative: TFC FLOW FOR THE DAY WAS RUNNING ABOUT 2 HRS BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO SNOW REMOVAL AND DEICING. 2 OF 4 RWYS WERE UNUSABLE, DUE TO SNOW AND SNOW REMOVAL IN PROGRESS. WE HAD 3 ATCS ON SHIFT AND 1 ATCS DUE TO GO HOME AT XX00. 1 ATCS WAS ON LCL CTL #1 WORKING ALL OUTBOUNDS, 2 ATCS ON GND CTL WITH FULL DEICE IN PROGRESS (IE, BOTH WERE NEEDED, UNABLE TO COMBINE TO ONE POS). THAT LEFT THE OTHER ATCS TO WORK LCL #2 WITH A STEADY STREAM OF INBOUNDS, CLRNC DELIVERY, FLT DATA, TWR CAB SUPVR, AND COORDINATOR ON THE WALKIE-TALKIE FOR SNOW REMOVAL. TO ADD TO THE COMPLEXITY, WE HAD A WIND SHIFT REQUIRING A RWY CHANGE, AND ABOUT HALF OF THE DEPS WERE TIMING OUT, WHICH REQUIRED THEM TO BE UPDATED. THIS SIT DID NOT DEVELOP AT THE LAST MOMENT. IT HAD BEEN BUILDING FOR THE BETTER PART OF THE SHIFT. THERE WERE NO AIR TFC CTLRS FROM THE SHIFT HELD OVER ON OVERTIME. THERE WAS NO SUPVR OR DEDICATED CIC (IN THE TWR). THIS LEFT A TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE STAFFING LEVEL FOR THE WORKLOAD. EVIDENTLY OUR FACILITIES OVERTIME BUDGET DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A STAFFING LEVEL THAT PROMOTES SAFETY. IN THE FUTURE ALL CTLRS INVOLVED WITH A SIMILAR SIT WILL INVOKE ARTICLE 65 ASAP. I FEEL THAT WITH 50-60 VEHICLES ON THE FIELD FOR SNOW REMOVAL AND NO ONE PERSON IN THE TWR CTLING THEM, A RWY INCURSION IS IMMINENT. PROPOSED SOLUTION: MAKE MORE OVERTIME MONEY AVAILABLE SO A SIT LIKE THIS DOES NOT HAVE TO HAPPEN AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.