Narrative:

While working oceanic position OC9 this morning, pacots traffic dictated that the sector be configured in a way which required pacots #3 to traverse my airspace from 165E to 180E, without working the actual traffic on the route. This is a daily occurrence at ZOA. Thus, I was receiving numerous PIREPS which did not pertain to the aircraft I was working. This affects service to the airlines as well as being a safety issue. The service issue is that the oceanic controller has to take time to cognitively acknowledge each message to insure that he/she is not working the received PIREP. The safety issue is that after receiving several of these erroneous messages, the controller could inadvertently pass over a PIREP from an aircraft in his/her control, thinking that it does not belong to him/her. This is a recurring situation which may cause/contribute to an accident/incident. It has been written up several times before in the ucr forum, never being properly addressed. Contrary to popular belief, there are no local procedures which fix the above described condition for every traffic flow. Callback conversation with facility operations specialist revealed the following information: analyst called facility operations specialist to obtain clarification of reporter's issue. Specialist is aware of problem and has recently received management documentation for correction. Sector OC9 is the last oceanic control sector to have software adaptations allowing the sector to be further divided into subdirected fix posting areas (fpa's). These changes will also ensure controllers assigned additional subdirected fpa's receive all necessary PIREP strips, and the controller from which fpa's were taken, do not. Adaptation software changes for OC9 are expected to be implemented next month.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ARTCC OCEANIC CTLR STATES THAT THERE IS DAILY, INCORRECT SECTOR STRIP POSTING FOR ACFT NOT UNDER HIS CTL AT SECTOR OC9, CAUSING ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD TO DETERMINE WHERE THE CORRECT STRIP POSTING SHOULD OCCUR. THE RPTR BELIEVES THIS IS A POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE.

Narrative: WHILE WORKING OCEANIC POS OC9 THIS MORNING, PACOTS TFC DICTATED THAT THE SECTOR BE CONFIGURED IN A WAY WHICH REQUIRED PACOTS #3 TO TRAVERSE MY AIRSPACE FROM 165E TO 180E, WITHOUT WORKING THE ACTUAL TFC ON THE RTE. THIS IS A DAILY OCCURRENCE AT ZOA. THUS, I WAS RECEIVING NUMEROUS PIREPS WHICH DID NOT PERTAIN TO THE ACFT I WAS WORKING. THIS AFFECTS SVC TO THE AIRLINES AS WELL AS BEING A SAFETY ISSUE. THE SVC ISSUE IS THAT THE OCEANIC CTLR HAS TO TAKE TIME TO COGNITIVELY ACKNOWLEDGE EACH MESSAGE TO INSURE THAT HE/SHE IS NOT WORKING THE RECEIVED PIREP. THE SAFETY ISSUE IS THAT AFTER RECEIVING SEVERAL OF THESE ERRONEOUS MESSAGES, THE CTLR COULD INADVERTENTLY PASS OVER A PIREP FROM AN ACFT IN HIS/HER CTL, THINKING THAT IT DOES NOT BELONG TO HIM/HER. THIS IS A RECURRING SIT WHICH MAY CAUSE/CONTRIBUTE TO AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. IT HAS BEEN WRITTEN UP SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE IN THE UCR FORUM, NEVER BEING PROPERLY ADDRESSED. CONTRARY TO POPULAR BELIEF, THERE ARE NO LCL PROCS WHICH FIX THE ABOVE DESCRIBED CONDITION FOR EVERY TFC FLOW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH FACILITY OPS SPECIALIST REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ANALYST CALLED FACILITY OPS SPECIALIST TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF RPTR'S ISSUE. SPECIALIST IS AWARE OF PROB AND HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED MGMNT DOCUMENTATION FOR CORRECTION. SECTOR OC9 IS THE LAST OCEANIC CTL SECTOR TO HAVE SOFTWARE ADAPTATIONS ALLOWING THE SECTOR TO BE FURTHER DIVIDED INTO SUBDIRECTED FIX POSTING AREAS (FPA'S). THESE CHANGES WILL ALSO ENSURE CTLRS ASSIGNED ADDITIONAL SUBDIRECTED FPA'S RECEIVE ALL NECESSARY PIREP STRIPS, AND THE CTLR FROM WHICH FPA'S WERE TAKEN, DO NOT. ADAPTATION SOFTWARE CHANGES FOR OC9 ARE EXPECTED TO BE IMPLEMENTED NEXT MONTH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.