Narrative:

At approximately XX55 UTC gulfstream unintentionally penetrated the airspace of P-56. The following facts are the best recollection of the events that led up to this. The first officer was the PF and I was PNF. Clearance was received from clearance delivery at approximately XX05 UTC. Clearance was cpr cleared to burbank via the noise abatement procedures, maintain 5000 ft. The crew discussed the departure requirements, making sure both pilots knew the required track and aircraft configns, and altitudes, plus review the need to stay over the potomac river for noise abatement and to maintain outside of P-56. After departure, he, first officer, turned the aircraft approximately 330 degrees to stay over the river. After passing 1500 ft he then changed the bendix EFIS flight director from go around mode to heading to make the turn to approximately heading 270 degrees when passing the memorial bridge. At this time the flight director command bars stowed from sight. Not being his primary aircraft he took several seconds (10-15 seconds) to find the heading selection button and select it back to heading. This time of this distraction plus a wind from the west at approximately 30-40 KTS delayed the turn of the aircraft to the heading necessary to follow the potomac river course. Then had to relocate the river and by this time the aircraft has moved into the airspace p- 56. ATC issued a left turn of 20 degrees as the aircraft was already beginning its turn back to the west. ATC then requested the pilot to call TRACON and inform them as to the unintentional penetration of P-56. The call was made and he talked to a controller and provided him with the details of the event. Later in the flight he was instructed to contact an official of the united states government as to the event. Arrangements were made to meet the agents at burbank when the aircraft arrived. He provided the agents the required information at the FBO hangar. The main reasons for this incident are believed to be the following. 1) the design of the flight director switching requirements. 2) the crew's distraction while solving the flight director malfunction. 3) the crew's difficulty in seeing the river while climbing out at a very nose high attitude needed for noise abatement. 4) the crew's reliance on the flight instrumentation instead of visual pilotage. The crew knew of the requirements of P-56 and was flying the aircraft as to comply with that requirement until they became distracted with a simple flight navigation problem. The time spent solving that problem coupled with the above contributing factors resulted in the unintentional penetration of P-56.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A GULFSTREAM CPR JET A PENETRATED A PROHIBITED AIRSPACE DURING CLB AFTER DEP RESULTING IN ATC INTERVENTION AND UNITED STATES GOV OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION. THE RPTR STATES THAT THE ERROR WAS DUE TO THE DELAY IN PROPER MODE SETTING OF THE FMC SYS WHEN ATTEMPTING TO TURN THE ACFT TO THE REQUIRED HEADING.

Narrative: AT APPROX XX55 UTC GULFSTREAM UNINTENTIONALLY PENETRATED THE AIRSPACE OF P-56. THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE THE BEST RECOLLECTION OF THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THIS. THE FO WAS THE PF AND I WAS PNF. CLRNC WAS RECEIVED FROM CLRNC DELIVERY AT APPROX XX05 UTC. CLRNC WAS CPR CLRED TO BURBANK VIA THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS, MAINTAIN 5000 FT. THE CREW DISCUSSED THE DEP REQUIREMENTS, MAKING SURE BOTH PLTS KNEW THE REQUIRED TRACK AND ACFT CONFIGNS, AND ALTS, PLUS REVIEW THE NEED TO STAY OVER THE POTOMAC RIVER FOR NOISE ABATEMENT AND TO MAINTAIN OUTSIDE OF P-56. AFTER DEP, HE, FO, TURNED THE ACFT APPROX 330 DEGS TO STAY OVER THE RIVER. AFTER PASSING 1500 FT HE THEN CHANGED THE BENDIX EFIS FLT DIRECTOR FROM GAR MODE TO HEADING TO MAKE THE TURN TO APPROX HDG 270 DEGS WHEN PASSING THE MEMORIAL BRIDGE. AT THIS TIME THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND BARS STOWED FROM SIGHT. NOT BEING HIS PRIMARY ACFT HE TOOK SEVERAL SECONDS (10-15 SECONDS) TO FIND THE HEADING SELECTION BUTTON AND SELECT IT BACK TO HEADING. THIS TIME OF THIS DISTR PLUS A WIND FROM THE W AT APPROX 30-40 KTS DELAYED THE TURN OF THE ACFT TO THE HEADING NECESSARY TO FOLLOW THE POTOMAC RIVER COURSE. THEN HAD TO RELOCATE THE RIVER AND BY THIS TIME THE ACFT HAS MOVED INTO THE AIRSPACE P- 56. ATC ISSUED A L TURN OF 20 DEGS AS THE ACFT WAS ALREADY BEGINNING ITS TURN BACK TO THE W. ATC THEN REQUESTED THE PLT TO CALL TRACON AND INFORM THEM AS TO THE UNINTENTIONAL PENETRATION OF P-56. THE CALL WAS MADE AND HE TALKED TO A CTLR AND PROVIDED HIM WITH THE DETAILS OF THE EVENT. LATER IN THE FLT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT AN OFFICIAL OF THE UNITED STATES GOV AS TO THE EVENT. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO MEET THE AGENTS AT BURBANK WHEN THE ACFT ARRIVED. HE PROVIDED THE AGENTS THE REQUIRED INFO AT THE FBO HANGAR. THE MAIN REASONS FOR THIS INCIDENT ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE FOLLOWING. 1) THE DESIGN OF THE FLT DIRECTOR SWITCHING REQUIREMENTS. 2) THE CREW'S DISTR WHILE SOLVING THE FLT DIRECTOR MALFUNCTION. 3) THE CREW'S DIFFICULTY IN SEEING THE RIVER WHILE CLBING OUT AT A VERY NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE NEEDED FOR NOISE ABATEMENT. 4) THE CREW'S RELIANCE ON THE FLT INSTRUMENTATION INSTEAD OF VISUAL PILOTAGE. THE CREW KNEW OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF P-56 AND WAS FLYING THE ACFT AS TO COMPLY WITH THAT REQUIREMENT UNTIL THEY BECAME DISTRACTED WITH A SIMPLE FLT NAV PROB. THE TIME SPENT SOLVING THAT PROB COUPLED WITH THE ABOVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS RESULTED IN THE UNINTENTIONAL PENETRATION OF P-56.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.