Narrative:

A PA28 was inbound VOR runway 13 approach in communication with the control tower. Radar approach control had an SW4, established on the runway 18 ILS final approach course. When it reached the FAF, radar approach control called asking if I could provide visual separation between the SW4 and the PA28. I declined as visibility to the north was reduced with snow and haze and I was unable to visually identify the PA28. Approach asked if they could hold onto the SW4 to ensure that this would work. I responded in the affirmative. Myself and the ground controller, aided by binoculars, were continually searching for both affected aircraft. Realizing the sequence was not working due to a 50-60 KT overtake, and that separation was continuing to diminish, I assumed that approach control would break the SW4 off the approach and resequence it. To my surprise, the SW4 continued inbound to a point well below the minimum required for IFR separation between itself and the preceding PA28 arrival. Approximately 2 mi on final approach, the SW4 verbally checked in with me indicating 'inbound ILS runway 18 approach.' I informed the pilot '#2, traffic is an arrow inside a mi final runway 13.' turning to visually locate the aircraft, I observed the PA28 about to cross the threshold to runway 13. I informed the SW4, 'traffic is just crossing the threshold, runway 18 cleared to land.' the SW4 replied 'traffic in sight.' d- BRITE radar indicated the SW4's position to be just inside the 1 mi range mark. I immediately notified the controller-in- charge (controller in charge), that I observed a loss of IFR separation that I became directly involved with. I was relieved of my duties and summoned for an initial investigation of a possible operational error. Audio tapes were pulled and reviewed by the air traffic manager (atm) and the quality assurance training specialist (qats). I was provided with union representation and informed that written statements would be required. I was asked to give in detail, the occurrence as I recalled. It was synonymous with that above. The other controller was interviewed and claimed that standard separation was maintained to threshold. My main concern is as follows: the air traffic manager, after interviewing both parties, indicated that this was a 'non incident.' when questioning this 'non incident,' the air traffic manager advised me that because the controllers stories completely negate one another, they cancel each other. I find this to be quite unsettling as now I question the safety of the flying public. If this is a non incident because 2 controllers tales contradict one another, where does the accountability lie for the times that the minima is not met? I am a professional and I'm willing to accept responsibility for the errors I make. I seek accountability for the inappropriate action that has occurred here. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: analyst learned from the reporter that the facility investigated the incident again and determined that this was an operational error by the approach controller. The facility used an ntap from the center to assist in determining the separation between the 2 aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR CLAIMS A LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED BTWN A PA28 ON APCH TO RWY 13 AND AN SW4 ON APCH TO RWY 18 AND ALLEGES THE FACILITY AIR TFC MGR INDICATED THE SIT WAS A 'NON INCIDENT' AS THE RPTR'S AND APCH CTLRS' STORIES CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER.

Narrative: A PA28 WAS INBOUND VOR RWY 13 APCH IN COM WITH THE CTL TWR. RADAR APCH CTL HAD AN SW4, ESTABLISHED ON THE RWY 18 ILS FINAL APCH COURSE. WHEN IT REACHED THE FAF, RADAR APCH CTL CALLED ASKING IF I COULD PROVIDE VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN THE SW4 AND THE PA28. I DECLINED AS VISIBILITY TO THE N WAS REDUCED WITH SNOW AND HAZE AND I WAS UNABLE TO VISUALLY IDENT THE PA28. APCH ASKED IF THEY COULD HOLD ONTO THE SW4 TO ENSURE THAT THIS WOULD WORK. I RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. MYSELF AND THE GND CTLR, AIDED BY BINOCULARS, WERE CONTINUALLY SEARCHING FOR BOTH AFFECTED ACFT. REALIZING THE SEQUENCE WAS NOT WORKING DUE TO A 50-60 KT OVERTAKE, AND THAT SEPARATION WAS CONTINUING TO DIMINISH, I ASSUMED THAT APCH CTL WOULD BREAK THE SW4 OFF THE APCH AND RESEQUENCE IT. TO MY SURPRISE, THE SW4 CONTINUED INBOUND TO A POINT WELL BELOW THE MINIMUM REQUIRED FOR IFR SEPARATION BTWN ITSELF AND THE PRECEDING PA28 ARR. APPROX 2 MI ON FINAL APCH, THE SW4 VERBALLY CHKED IN WITH ME INDICATING 'INBOUND ILS RWY 18 APCH.' I INFORMED THE PLT '#2, TFC IS AN ARROW INSIDE A MI FINAL RWY 13.' TURNING TO VISUALLY LOCATE THE ACFT, I OBSERVED THE PA28 ABOUT TO CROSS THE THRESHOLD TO RWY 13. I INFORMED THE SW4, 'TFC IS JUST XING THE THRESHOLD, RWY 18 CLRED TO LAND.' THE SW4 REPLIED 'TFC IN SIGHT.' D- BRITE RADAR INDICATED THE SW4'S POS TO BE JUST INSIDE THE 1 MI RANGE MARK. I IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE CTLR-IN- CHARGE (CIC), THAT I OBSERVED A LOSS OF IFR SEPARATION THAT I BECAME DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH. I WAS RELIEVED OF MY DUTIES AND SUMMONED FOR AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF A POSSIBLE OPERROR. AUDIO TAPES WERE PULLED AND REVIEWED BY THE AIR TFC MGR (ATM) AND THE QUALITY ASSURANCE TRAINING SPECIALIST (QATS). I WAS PROVIDED WITH UNION REPRESENTATION AND INFORMED THAT WRITTEN STATEMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED. I WAS ASKED TO GIVE IN DETAIL, THE OCCURRENCE AS I RECALLED. IT WAS SYNONYMOUS WITH THAT ABOVE. THE OTHER CTLR WAS INTERVIEWED AND CLAIMED THAT STANDARD SEPARATION WAS MAINTAINED TO THRESHOLD. MY MAIN CONCERN IS AS FOLLOWS: THE AIR TFC MGR, AFTER INTERVIEWING BOTH PARTIES, INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A 'NON INCIDENT.' WHEN QUESTIONING THIS 'NON INCIDENT,' THE AIR TFC MGR ADVISED ME THAT BECAUSE THE CTLRS STORIES COMPLETELY NEGATE ONE ANOTHER, THEY CANCEL EACH OTHER. I FIND THIS TO BE QUITE UNSETTLING AS NOW I QUESTION THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC. IF THIS IS A NON INCIDENT BECAUSE 2 CTLRS TALES CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER, WHERE DOES THE ACCOUNTABILITY LIE FOR THE TIMES THAT THE MINIMA IS NOT MET? I AM A PROFESSIONAL AND I'M WILLING TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ERRORS I MAKE. I SEEK ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE INAPPROPRIATE ACTION THAT HAS OCCURRED HERE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ANALYST LEARNED FROM THE RPTR THAT THE FACILITY INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT AGAIN AND DETERMINED THAT THIS WAS AN OPERROR BY THE APCH CTLR. THE FACILITY USED AN NTAP FROM THE CTR TO ASSIST IN DETERMINING THE SEPARATION BTWN THE 2 ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.