Narrative:

On jan/xa/98 while flying as a copilot on a learjet from apa to dsm, a landing was made by the captain which resulted in the airplane coming to a stop past the runway on the overrun area. Damage to the airplane included a cut in the tire, a scratch in the paint of the right gear door, and a small dent (about 2 inches by 1/4 inch deep) on the right flap. I was flying initially as we were vectored onto the ILS runway 31R at dsm. The captain asked the tower/approach controller for a 'turn at the marker.' shortly before being cleared for the approach, I descended to the initial altitude of 2400 ft and 200 KTS. We were given a vector of 330 degrees to intercept the localizer and shortly afterward, a turn back to the right 10 degrees to compensate for winds. While on the intercept heading, I noticed the OM begin to flash and the GS come off the upper peg. By the time the localizer began to come in and I turned to the inbound heading, the GS was about 1/2 - 2/3 below center. As I turned back to the right to correct for the wind that had blown us a little left of course, I pulled back the power and pushed the nose over to start the descent. We were now passing the OM and the GS was still low. I was correcting for both GS and localizer when the captain took over control of the airplane. I confirmed his taking over the controls by saying 'you have it, your airplane.' when within about 1000 ft of the ground, the captain hadn't called for gear down, I prompted him by asking, 'gear?' he indicated 'yes,' and I put the gear handle in the down position. I did not have the checklist in my hand as the captain had not given it to me when he took over control of the airplane. We were still high on the GS, too fast, and I didn't have time to find the checklist so I said, 'should we go around?' the captain did not respond and I said, 'we should go around.' he still made no response (later questioning revealed he had heard me). By now I was expecting the captain to execute a go around. He had not called for flaps and had in fact put his own hand on the flap lever. Since moving the flaps is the duty of the PNF, I wondered what he was doing. He seemed to hesitate and then removed his hand without selecting a flap setting beyond the up position. This reinforced my belief that the captain was going to apply power and make a go around, but he continued down with the spoilers extended, still trying to center the localizer and GS. I had no idea at this point what the captain's intentions were. He never spoke a word to me to explain himself, even at my prompting. He acted as if he was in a single pilot airplane and never attempted to use my services as a copilot. We were still traveling at vref (129 KTS) plus approximately 50 KTS at about 500 ft AGL. I began to think that the captain was going to land regardless of my trying to get him to go around. I decided I better do as much as I could to prepare for landing and checked to make sure we had a 3-GREEN gear indication. By now we had broken out of the clouds at about 200-400 ft AGL. Still with flaps retracted, we touched down within the first 3000 ft of the runway. We were traveling well in excess of vref speed. I would estimate it at approximately 145-160 KTS. The captain then re-extended the spoilers which he had only retracted for a second or 2 before touchdown. On the ice covered runway, the airplane braking was poor and we were not slowing down effectively. We were still going approximately 70-90 KTS when within about 1000-2000 ft of the end of the runway. Again without requesting my assistance as copilot, the captain pulled the drag shoot to try to stop the airplane. We went off the end of the runway onto the paved overrun doing about 30-50 KTS. After hitting 2 or 3 end identifier and approach lights, we stopped about 400-500 ft past the runway on the overrun. During this approach and landing, I felt like a passenger rather than a crew member because the captain didn't respond to, or even acknowledge my suggestions. He didn't' include me in the decision making process and didn't even communicate to me his intentions. I had no idea what he was planning to do until after the fact during the whole procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LR35 CARGO ACFT ON APCH. FLC WERE UNCOORD AND CAPT DIDN'T RESPOND TO FO'S INPUTS INCLUDING LOWERING FLAPS. CAPT ALSO IGNORED FO INPUT TO DO A GAR. EXCESSIVE SPD ON LNDG ROLL TOOK ACFT OFF THE END OF THE RWY IN SPITE OF DEPLOYING THE DRAG SHOOT AND HIT END IDENTIFIER AND APCH LIGHTS.

Narrative: ON JAN/XA/98 WHILE FLYING AS A COPLT ON A LEARJET FROM APA TO DSM, A LNDG WAS MADE BY THE CAPT WHICH RESULTED IN THE AIRPLANE COMING TO A STOP PAST THE RWY ON THE OVERRUN AREA. DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE INCLUDED A CUT IN THE TIRE, A SCRATCH IN THE PAINT OF THE R GEAR DOOR, AND A SMALL DENT (ABOUT 2 INCHES BY 1/4 INCH DEEP) ON THE R FLAP. I WAS FLYING INITIALLY AS WE WERE VECTORED ONTO THE ILS RWY 31R AT DSM. THE CAPT ASKED THE TWR/APCH CTLR FOR A 'TURN AT THE MARKER.' SHORTLY BEFORE BEING CLRED FOR THE APCH, I DSNDED TO THE INITIAL ALT OF 2400 FT AND 200 KTS. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR OF 330 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND SHORTLY AFTERWARD, A TURN BACK TO THE R 10 DEGS TO COMPENSATE FOR WINDS. WHILE ON THE INTERCEPT HDG, I NOTICED THE OM BEGIN TO FLASH AND THE GS COME OFF THE UPPER PEG. BY THE TIME THE LOC BEGAN TO COME IN AND I TURNED TO THE INBOUND HDG, THE GS WAS ABOUT 1/2 - 2/3 BELOW CTR. AS I TURNED BACK TO THE R TO CORRECT FOR THE WIND THAT HAD BLOWN US A LITTLE L OF COURSE, I PULLED BACK THE PWR AND PUSHED THE NOSE OVER TO START THE DSCNT. WE WERE NOW PASSING THE OM AND THE GS WAS STILL LOW. I WAS CORRECTING FOR BOTH GS AND LOC WHEN THE CAPT TOOK OVER CTL OF THE AIRPLANE. I CONFIRMED HIS TAKING OVER THE CTLS BY SAYING 'YOU HAVE IT, YOUR AIRPLANE.' WHEN WITHIN ABOUT 1000 FT OF THE GND, THE CAPT HADN'T CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, I PROMPTED HIM BY ASKING, 'GEAR?' HE INDICATED 'YES,' AND I PUT THE GEAR HANDLE IN THE DOWN POS. I DID NOT HAVE THE CHKLIST IN MY HAND AS THE CAPT HAD NOT GIVEN IT TO ME WHEN HE TOOK OVER CTL OF THE AIRPLANE. WE WERE STILL HIGH ON THE GS, TOO FAST, AND I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO FIND THE CHKLIST SO I SAID, 'SHOULD WE GO AROUND?' THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND AND I SAID, 'WE SHOULD GO AROUND.' HE STILL MADE NO RESPONSE (LATER QUESTIONING REVEALED HE HAD HEARD ME). BY NOW I WAS EXPECTING THE CAPT TO EXECUTE A GAR. HE HAD NOT CALLED FOR FLAPS AND HAD IN FACT PUT HIS OWN HAND ON THE FLAP LEVER. SINCE MOVING THE FLAPS IS THE DUTY OF THE PNF, I WONDERED WHAT HE WAS DOING. HE SEEMED TO HESITATE AND THEN REMOVED HIS HAND WITHOUT SELECTING A FLAP SETTING BEYOND THE UP POS. THIS REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT THE CAPT WAS GOING TO APPLY PWR AND MAKE A GAR, BUT HE CONTINUED DOWN WITH THE SPOILERS EXTENDED, STILL TRYING TO CTR THE LOC AND GS. I HAD NO IDEA AT THIS POINT WHAT THE CAPT'S INTENTIONS WERE. HE NEVER SPOKE A WORD TO ME TO EXPLAIN HIMSELF, EVEN AT MY PROMPTING. HE ACTED AS IF HE WAS IN A SINGLE PLT AIRPLANE AND NEVER ATTEMPTED TO USE MY SVCS AS A COPLT. WE WERE STILL TRAVELING AT VREF (129 KTS) PLUS APPROX 50 KTS AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL. I BEGAN TO THINK THAT THE CAPT WAS GOING TO LAND REGARDLESS OF MY TRYING TO GET HIM TO GAR. I DECIDED I BETTER DO AS MUCH AS I COULD TO PREPARE FOR LNDG AND CHKED TO MAKE SURE WE HAD A 3-GREEN GEAR INDICATION. BY NOW WE HAD BROKEN OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT ABOUT 200-400 FT AGL. STILL WITH FLAPS RETRACTED, WE TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN THE FIRST 3000 FT OF THE RWY. WE WERE TRAVELING WELL IN EXCESS OF VREF SPD. I WOULD ESTIMATE IT AT APPROX 145-160 KTS. THE CAPT THEN RE-EXTENDED THE SPOILERS WHICH HE HAD ONLY RETRACTED FOR A SECOND OR 2 BEFORE TOUCHDOWN. ON THE ICE COVERED RWY, THE AIRPLANE BRAKING WAS POOR AND WE WERE NOT SLOWING DOWN EFFECTIVELY. WE WERE STILL GOING APPROX 70-90 KTS WHEN WITHIN ABOUT 1000-2000 FT OF THE END OF THE RWY. AGAIN WITHOUT REQUESTING MY ASSISTANCE AS COPLT, THE CAPT PULLED THE DRAG SHOOT TO TRY TO STOP THE AIRPLANE. WE WENT OFF THE END OF THE RWY ONTO THE PAVED OVERRUN DOING ABOUT 30-50 KTS. AFTER HITTING 2 OR 3 END IDENTIFIER AND APCH LIGHTS, WE STOPPED ABOUT 400-500 FT PAST THE RWY ON THE OVERRUN. DURING THIS APCH AND LNDG, I FELT LIKE A PAX RATHER THAN A CREW MEMBER BECAUSE THE CAPT DIDN'T RESPOND TO, OR EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE MY SUGGESTIONS. HE DIDN'T' INCLUDE ME IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND DIDN'T EVEN COMMUNICATE TO ME HIS INTENTIONS. I HAD NO IDEA WHAT HE WAS PLANNING TO DO UNTIL AFTER THE FACT DURING THE WHOLE PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.