Narrative:

My first officer and I took off from cmh without an alternate airport listed on our dispatch release. This problem arose when I failed to notice the WX in ind was below 2000 ft 3 mi on the WX release. Contributing factors being a quick turn, late arriving WX and dispatch listing alternate as 'na' on the release. Also, since we had just returned from ind, the WX was not too bad there, I assumed (incorrectly) that the WX had improved. Our situation was discovered during descent check into ind listening to ATIS. This situation could have been avoided if I had been more diligent in studying the WX instead of just glancing at it. My mind told me the WX was well above minimums for an alternate. This was influenced by the comment on the release that no alternate was required. Ie: I saw what the release told me to see and not what was actually there. Fortunately we had more than enough fuel to fly to our destination and back with enough fuel to hold if we could not get into ind. So, fuel was not the concern. My first officer should have been involved, but because of our tight turn and his duties to board the passenger, the first officer was not able to input his thoughts on the release. In the future, I will be more diligent and receive input from my crew regardless of how tight time may be and I will take the time to study the WX.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BA31 PIC FAILS TO ADD AN ALTERNATE ARPT TO HIS DISPATCH RELEASE OUT OF CMH WHEN HIS DEST ARPT, IND, IS LESS THAN 2000 FT AND 3 MI. HE NOTES THE DEV WHEN OBTAINING THE IND WX ON THE ATIS.

Narrative: MY FO AND I TOOK OFF FROM CMH WITHOUT AN ALTERNATE ARPT LISTED ON OUR DISPATCH RELEASE. THIS PROB AROSE WHEN I FAILED TO NOTICE THE WX IN IND WAS BELOW 2000 FT 3 MI ON THE WX RELEASE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS BEING A QUICK TURN, LATE ARRIVING WX AND DISPATCH LISTING ALTERNATE AS 'NA' ON THE RELEASE. ALSO, SINCE WE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM IND, THE WX WAS NOT TOO BAD THERE, I ASSUMED (INCORRECTLY) THAT THE WX HAD IMPROVED. OUR SIT WAS DISCOVERED DURING DSCNT CHK INTO IND LISTENING TO ATIS. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I HAD BEEN MORE DILIGENT IN STUDYING THE WX INSTEAD OF JUST GLANCING AT IT. MY MIND TOLD ME THE WX WAS WELL ABOVE MINIMUMS FOR AN ALTERNATE. THIS WAS INFLUENCED BY THE COMMENT ON THE RELEASE THAT NO ALTERNATE WAS REQUIRED. IE: I SAW WHAT THE RELEASE TOLD ME TO SEE AND NOT WHAT WAS ACTUALLY THERE. FORTUNATELY WE HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH FUEL TO FLY TO OUR DEST AND BACK WITH ENOUGH FUEL TO HOLD IF WE COULD NOT GET INTO IND. SO, FUEL WAS NOT THE CONCERN. MY FO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, BUT BECAUSE OF OUR TIGHT TURN AND HIS DUTIES TO BOARD THE PAX, THE FO WAS NOT ABLE TO INPUT HIS THOUGHTS ON THE RELEASE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BE MORE DILIGENT AND RECEIVE INPUT FROM MY CREW REGARDLESS OF HOW TIGHT TIME MAY BE AND I WILL TAKE THE TIME TO STUDY THE WX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.