Narrative:

After takeoff the inboard flaps did not retract. This was not noticed by the flight crew until FL250 and 300 KIAS, which exceeded the flap limit speed and altitude. We descended and reduced the airspeed to within flap limits. We then completed the abnormal flap checklist, however, we lowered the flaps to 30 degrees for landing which violated a 'caution' in the checklist. Missing the caution was unintentional. The aircraft landed normally without incident. Taking off into the sunset contributed to us not noticing the inboard flap needles not moving. We completed the abnormal flap checklist down to the approach and when we returned to the checklist on approach missed the 'caution' regarding 'not moving the abnormal flaps with the alternate flaps switch because of a lack of asymmetry protection.' the flaps were lowered to 30 degrees and a normal landing followed. When briefing the abnormal situation, I should include a reminder to note all 'warnings and cautions.' supplemental information from acn 393616: I remember checking 'flaps...up' by verifying flap handle position, leading edge flaps out of position lights extinguished, and outboard trailing edge flap gauge at zero degrees. I do not remember checking the inboard flap position gauge, which is located below the outboard on the forward panel. Climbing through 10000 ft the captain and myself noted the 'windshear fail' light illuminated. After resetting the circuit breakers we decided the system was inoperative and entered it in the maintenance logbook. We did not make the connection between a flap position problem and the windshear computer because there were not enough clues at this point since we thought all else was normal. At about FL250, in the climb, the captain said 'the inboard flaps are showing flaps 15 degrees.' the limits for flaps 15 degrees are maximum altitude FL200 and 205 KTS, so we slowed and descended. We consulted the company 'trailing edge abnormal checklist' (which seemed to be written more for an asymmetrical situation than a symmetrical failure like what we had) and decided to proceed to our destination and attempt a normal flap extension and normallndg. We also decided that we would discontinue the abnormal checklist unless it became necessary to complete it on final. The rest of the arrival was normal until we began configuring for landing. The outboard and leading edge flaps extended normally but the inboard flaps remained at 15 degrees, so the captain told the copilot to extend the flaps using the alternate flap system and told me to continue the abnormal checklist. Instead of picking up the checklist where I had left off, I proceeded directly to the action in the checklist that we were already doing (which was extending inboard flaps with an alternate system). By leaving out a section of the checklist, I inadvertently missed an important note that stated, 'do not attempt to move faulty flaps because the alternate flap system has no asymmetry protection.' the company has found fault with us for not complying with the abnormals checklist and for not noticing the flap malfunction until after we had exceeded the limitations of the aircraft. The inboard flap hydraulic motor was found to have failed so it was replaced and a flap overspd inspection on the aircraft has been accomplished at the captain's request. The crew will probably have some sort of additional training. I had not been through training using the new abnormal checklist that we consulted, which may have affected my performance. The abnormal checklist did not seem to apply to our particular situation even though it was the proper checklist, so we found ourselves disregarding a lot of the actions, which may have contributed to us missing the cautionary note. Putting cautionary notes at the beginning of a checklist would have helped, and a better use of the normal checklist by the crew would have helped. Supplemental information from acn 393691: on takeoff we were looking right into the evening sun which may have been a factor in missing the lack of movement of the trailing edge flap needles. Also the outboard flap gauge is the top gauge next to the leading edge flap light. The outboard and inboard flap needles usually move insynch on different gauges. The possibility exists that over the yrs the lower inboard flap gauge has dropped out of my scan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FLC CLBS TO FL250 BEFORE THEY REALIZE THAT THE INBOARD FLAPS HAVE NOT RETRACTED FROM THEIR 15 DEG POS. DURING DSCNT THE CREW FAILS TO NOTE THE CAUTION NOTE ABOUT 'NOT LOWERING THE ABNORMAL FLAPS WITH THE ALTERNATE FLAP SWITCH.' THE ACFT HAD A DEFECTIVE INBOARD FLAP MOTOR.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF THE INBOARD FLAPS DID NOT RETRACT. THIS WAS NOT NOTICED BY THE FLC UNTIL FL250 AND 300 KIAS, WHICH EXCEEDED THE FLAP LIMIT SPD AND ALT. WE DSNDED AND REDUCED THE AIRSPD TO WITHIN FLAP LIMITS. WE THEN COMPLETED THE ABNORMAL FLAP CHKLIST, HOWEVER, WE LOWERED THE FLAPS TO 30 DEGS FOR LNDG WHICH VIOLATED A 'CAUTION' IN THE CHKLIST. MISSING THE CAUTION WAS UNINTENTIONAL. THE ACFT LANDED NORMALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT. TAKING OFF INTO THE SUNSET CONTRIBUTED TO US NOT NOTICING THE INBOARD FLAP NEEDLES NOT MOVING. WE COMPLETED THE ABNORMAL FLAP CHKLIST DOWN TO THE APCH AND WHEN WE RETURNED TO THE CHKLIST ON APCH MISSED THE 'CAUTION' REGARDING 'NOT MOVING THE ABNORMAL FLAPS WITH THE ALTERNATE FLAPS SWITCH BECAUSE OF A LACK OF ASYMMETRY PROTECTION.' THE FLAPS WERE LOWERED TO 30 DEGS AND A NORMAL LNDG FOLLOWED. WHEN BRIEFING THE ABNORMAL SIT, I SHOULD INCLUDE A REMINDER TO NOTE ALL 'WARNINGS AND CAUTIONS.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 393616: I REMEMBER CHKING 'FLAPS...UP' BY VERIFYING FLAP HANDLE POS, LEADING EDGE FLAPS OUT OF POS LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED, AND OUTBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAP GAUGE AT ZERO DEGS. I DO NOT REMEMBER CHKING THE INBOARD FLAP POS GAUGE, WHICH IS LOCATED BELOW THE OUTBOARD ON THE FORWARD PANEL. CLBING THROUGH 10000 FT THE CAPT AND MYSELF NOTED THE 'WINDSHEAR FAIL' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. AFTER RESETTING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WE DECIDED THE SYS WAS INOP AND ENTERED IT IN THE MAINT LOGBOOK. WE DID NOT MAKE THE CONNECTION BTWN A FLAP POS PROB AND THE WINDSHEAR COMPUTER BECAUSE THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH CLUES AT THIS POINT SINCE WE THOUGHT ALL ELSE WAS NORMAL. AT ABOUT FL250, IN THE CLB, THE CAPT SAID 'THE INBOARD FLAPS ARE SHOWING FLAPS 15 DEGS.' THE LIMITS FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS ARE MAX ALT FL200 AND 205 KTS, SO WE SLOWED AND DSNDED. WE CONSULTED THE COMPANY 'TRAILING EDGE ABNORMAL CHKLIST' (WHICH SEEMED TO BE WRITTEN MORE FOR AN ASYMMETRICAL SIT THAN A SYMMETRICAL FAILURE LIKE WHAT WE HAD) AND DECIDED TO PROCEED TO OUR DEST AND ATTEMPT A NORMAL FLAP EXTENSION AND NORMALLNDG. WE ALSO DECIDED THAT WE WOULD DISCONTINUE THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST UNLESS IT BECAME NECESSARY TO COMPLETE IT ON FINAL. THE REST OF THE ARR WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE BEGAN CONFIGURING FOR LNDG. THE OUTBOARD AND LEADING EDGE FLAPS EXTENDED NORMALLY BUT THE INBOARD FLAPS REMAINED AT 15 DEGS, SO THE CAPT TOLD THE COPLT TO EXTEND THE FLAPS USING THE ALTERNATE FLAP SYS AND TOLD ME TO CONTINUE THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST. INSTEAD OF PICKING UP THE CHKLIST WHERE I HAD LEFT OFF, I PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TO THE ACTION IN THE CHKLIST THAT WE WERE ALREADY DOING (WHICH WAS EXTENDING INBOARD FLAPS WITH AN ALTERNATE SYS). BY LEAVING OUT A SECTION OF THE CHKLIST, I INADVERTENTLY MISSED AN IMPORTANT NOTE THAT STATED, 'DO NOT ATTEMPT TO MOVE FAULTY FLAPS BECAUSE THE ALTERNATE FLAP SYS HAS NO ASYMMETRY PROTECTION.' THE COMPANY HAS FOUND FAULT WITH US FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH THE ABNORMALS CHKLIST AND FOR NOT NOTICING THE FLAP MALFUNCTION UNTIL AFTER WE HAD EXCEEDED THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ACFT. THE INBOARD FLAP HYD MOTOR WAS FOUND TO HAVE FAILED SO IT WAS REPLACED AND A FLAP OVERSPD INSPECTION ON THE ACFT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT THE CAPT'S REQUEST. THE CREW WILL PROBABLY HAVE SOME SORT OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING. I HAD NOT BEEN THROUGH TRAINING USING THE NEW ABNORMAL CHKLIST THAT WE CONSULTED, WHICH MAY HAVE AFFECTED MY PERFORMANCE. THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST DID NOT SEEM TO APPLY TO OUR PARTICULAR SIT EVEN THOUGH IT WAS THE PROPER CHKLIST, SO WE FOUND OURSELVES DISREGARDING A LOT OF THE ACTIONS, WHICH MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO US MISSING THE CAUTIONARY NOTE. PUTTING CAUTIONARY NOTES AT THE BEGINNING OF A CHKLIST WOULD HAVE HELPED, AND A BETTER USE OF THE NORMAL CHKLIST BY THE CREW WOULD HAVE HELPED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 393691: ON TKOF WE WERE LOOKING RIGHT INTO THE EVENING SUN WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN MISSING THE LACK OF MOVEMENT OF THE TRAILING EDGE FLAP NEEDLES. ALSO THE OUTBOARD FLAP GAUGE IS THE TOP GAUGE NEXT TO THE LEADING EDGE FLAP LIGHT. THE OUTBOARD AND INBOARD FLAP NEEDLES USUALLY MOVE INSYNCH ON DIFFERENT GAUGES. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT OVER THE YRS THE LOWER INBOARD FLAP GAUGE HAS DROPPED OUT OF MY SCAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.