Narrative:

I arrived at the hangar at XA35 am local for a planned XB00 am departure in the aircraft. It was raining. The plane was in the hangar when I arrived, and the captain was in the flight planning room preparing for the flight. I noticed that line service had arrived and I decided I would do the preflight inspection in the aft bay before they pulled the plane out, which I did. With the plane chocked outside on the ramp, I finished the deferred items on the exterior checklist. At about this time the captain came out of the plane to tell me the fuel order and I then moved inside the aircraft to start the interior checklist items. When I read the item pertaining to checking the landing gear was down I remember looking at the gear handle, perceiving it to be down, and I then continued with the checklist. Line service arrived back within mins to fuel the airplane, and I paused to configure the refuel panel. I stepped out to tell line service that I had the plane ready for single-point refueling and then sat back down to resume the checklist...at that time noticing that along with 3 green lights on the landing gear annunciators I saw 3 red lights as well. This airplane has an auxiliary set of green 'gear down' annunciators for the main gear and a mechanical indicator for the nose gear in the cockpit for redundancy, and I immediately looked at these, being very puzzled. They were normal. I looked through the checklist for an explanation, and being unsuccessful in finding one, fixated on the red lights and made a mental note to ask the captain about this. Fueling was finished, and line service informed me that we finished just in time because their company had radioed them to stop operations due to thunderstorms at the airport. I finished the section of checklist I was working on, copied the ATIS and became preoccupied with the WX. Lightning was all around, and rain was getting heavier. I turned everything off, checked that line service had secured the fuel door and all was clear around the plane, and went inside to look at the radar with the captain and ask him when he wanted to start the APU. After some mins I went out to start the APU, finish the checklist sections leading up to engine start, and get our clearance, still thinking about the WX. Upon starting the APU, I briefly heard what I thought to be the gear warning horn, I wasn't completely sure. The captain then came back out to discuss a few things and I asked him at that time about the gear annunciation. He paused for a few seconds and then said it was due to low hydraulic pressure not allowing the gear doors to be fully closed. He left again. I sat there for a few seconds, contemplating the aircraft's system and for the moment accepted the captain's analysis, remembering from my preflight inspection that the gear doors were open slightly. I then finished the checklist leading up to engine start. The captain arrived with the passenger, closed the door and prepared to start. When the captain applied power to the start bus the warning horn I heard earlier sounded again. After a few seconds he turned start bus power off. The horn stopped. I asked him if it was the gear warning horn and if this had anything to do with the red annunciators. He paused, said it had to be the hydraulic pressure issue and turned start bus power back on again. The horn came back on. He then engaged a starter and an engine began to spool up. A few seconds into the start the nose began to move. 'The gear's not down!,' I blurted out, having to force the words out of my mouth as I noticed the handle was in the 'up' position. The captain reached for the gear handle quickly and moved it down, but it was too late. The plane settled onto its nose. We shut down the APU, turned everything off and deplaned the passenger. The time was approximately XB00 am. I do not know why the gear handle was in the 'up' position or who put it there. Although I've never tried it, I know that first a solenoid-actuated mechanical balk tied to the squat switch must be moved away, an operation for which most people would use 2 hands, one on the balk, and one on the handle. The point being that it had to have been done consciously bysomeone. There was no maintenance entry or any other indication anyone had been in the cockpit since the plane flew last, had there been, we would probably have been more careful to check things were configured correctly. The problem was one of perception and expectations, as I had never seen the gear handle in the 'up' position on the ground before and therefore did not expect it to be anywhere but 'down.' as pilots it is normal for us to see the gear handle in both position, depending on whether the plane is in flight or not. In other words it's not strictly abnormal to see the gear handle in the 'up' position. Other factors include the distrs caused by the WX as well as my feeling tired. I also valued the captain's opinion and respected his experience as considerable in this type. I trusted him. We both 'looked' at the gear handle several times I suppose, but did not fully process the information our eyes gave us. I will now make it a point to physically touch the gear handle and say it's position as I look at what I am touching. This would work well with other items as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HS125 FO DID NOT DETECT THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE WAS IN THE UP POS UNTIL THE NOSE GEAR RETRACTED WITH THE ACFT ON THE GND DURING ENG START.

Narrative: I ARRIVED AT THE HANGAR AT XA35 AM LCL FOR A PLANNED XB00 AM DEP IN THE ACFT. IT WAS RAINING. THE PLANE WAS IN THE HANGAR WHEN I ARRIVED, AND THE CAPT WAS IN THE FLT PLANNING ROOM PREPARING FOR THE FLT. I NOTICED THAT LINE SVC HAD ARRIVED AND I DECIDED I WOULD DO THE PREFLT INSPECTION IN THE AFT BAY BEFORE THEY PULLED THE PLANE OUT, WHICH I DID. WITH THE PLANE CHOCKED OUTSIDE ON THE RAMP, I FINISHED THE DEFERRED ITEMS ON THE EXTERIOR CHKLIST. AT ABOUT THIS TIME THE CAPT CAME OUT OF THE PLANE TO TELL ME THE FUEL ORDER AND I THEN MOVED INSIDE THE ACFT TO START THE INTERIOR CHKLIST ITEMS. WHEN I READ THE ITEM PERTAINING TO CHKING THE LNDG GEAR WAS DOWN I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE GEAR HANDLE, PERCEIVING IT TO BE DOWN, AND I THEN CONTINUED WITH THE CHKLIST. LINE SVC ARRIVED BACK WITHIN MINS TO FUEL THE AIRPLANE, AND I PAUSED TO CONFIGURE THE REFUEL PANEL. I STEPPED OUT TO TELL LINE SVC THAT I HAD THE PLANE READY FOR SINGLE-POINT REFUELING AND THEN SAT BACK DOWN TO RESUME THE CHKLIST...AT THAT TIME NOTICING THAT ALONG WITH 3 GREEN LIGHTS ON THE LNDG GEAR ANNUNCIATORS I SAW 3 RED LIGHTS AS WELL. THIS AIRPLANE HAS AN AUX SET OF GREEN 'GEAR DOWN' ANNUNCIATORS FOR THE MAIN GEAR AND A MECHANICAL INDICATOR FOR THE NOSE GEAR IN THE COCKPIT FOR REDUNDANCY, AND I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED AT THESE, BEING VERY PUZZLED. THEY WERE NORMAL. I LOOKED THROUGH THE CHKLIST FOR AN EXPLANATION, AND BEING UNSUCCESSFUL IN FINDING ONE, FIXATED ON THE RED LIGHTS AND MADE A MENTAL NOTE TO ASK THE CAPT ABOUT THIS. FUELING WAS FINISHED, AND LINE SVC INFORMED ME THAT WE FINISHED JUST IN TIME BECAUSE THEIR COMPANY HAD RADIOED THEM TO STOP OPS DUE TO TSTMS AT THE ARPT. I FINISHED THE SECTION OF CHKLIST I WAS WORKING ON, COPIED THE ATIS AND BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH THE WX. LIGHTNING WAS ALL AROUND, AND RAIN WAS GETTING HEAVIER. I TURNED EVERYTHING OFF, CHKED THAT LINE SVC HAD SECURED THE FUEL DOOR AND ALL WAS CLR AROUND THE PLANE, AND WENT INSIDE TO LOOK AT THE RADAR WITH THE CAPT AND ASK HIM WHEN HE WANTED TO START THE APU. AFTER SOME MINS I WENT OUT TO START THE APU, FINISH THE CHKLIST SECTIONS LEADING UP TO ENG START, AND GET OUR CLRNC, STILL THINKING ABOUT THE WX. UPON STARTING THE APU, I BRIEFLY HEARD WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE THE GEAR WARNING HORN, I WASN'T COMPLETELY SURE. THE CAPT THEN CAME BACK OUT TO DISCUSS A FEW THINGS AND I ASKED HIM AT THAT TIME ABOUT THE GEAR ANNUNCIATION. HE PAUSED FOR A FEW SECONDS AND THEN SAID IT WAS DUE TO LOW HYD PRESSURE NOT ALLOWING THE GEAR DOORS TO BE FULLY CLOSED. HE LEFT AGAIN. I SAT THERE FOR A FEW SECONDS, CONTEMPLATING THE ACFT'S SYS AND FOR THE MOMENT ACCEPTED THE CAPT'S ANALYSIS, REMEMBERING FROM MY PREFLT INSPECTION THAT THE GEAR DOORS WERE OPEN SLIGHTLY. I THEN FINISHED THE CHKLIST LEADING UP TO ENG START. THE CAPT ARRIVED WITH THE PAX, CLOSED THE DOOR AND PREPARED TO START. WHEN THE CAPT APPLIED PWR TO THE START BUS THE WARNING HORN I HEARD EARLIER SOUNDED AGAIN. AFTER A FEW SECONDS HE TURNED START BUS PWR OFF. THE HORN STOPPED. I ASKED HIM IF IT WAS THE GEAR WARNING HORN AND IF THIS HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE RED ANNUNCIATORS. HE PAUSED, SAID IT HAD TO BE THE HYD PRESSURE ISSUE AND TURNED START BUS PWR BACK ON AGAIN. THE HORN CAME BACK ON. HE THEN ENGAGED A STARTER AND AN ENG BEGAN TO SPOOL UP. A FEW SECONDS INTO THE START THE NOSE BEGAN TO MOVE. 'THE GEAR'S NOT DOWN!,' I BLURTED OUT, HAVING TO FORCE THE WORDS OUT OF MY MOUTH AS I NOTICED THE HANDLE WAS IN THE 'UP' POS. THE CAPT REACHED FOR THE GEAR HANDLE QUICKLY AND MOVED IT DOWN, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. THE PLANE SETTLED ONTO ITS NOSE. WE SHUT DOWN THE APU, TURNED EVERYTHING OFF AND DEPLANED THE PAX. THE TIME WAS APPROX XB00 AM. I DO NOT KNOW WHY THE GEAR HANDLE WAS IN THE 'UP' POS OR WHO PUT IT THERE. ALTHOUGH I'VE NEVER TRIED IT, I KNOW THAT FIRST A SOLENOID-ACTUATED MECHANICAL BALK TIED TO THE SQUAT SWITCH MUST BE MOVED AWAY, AN OP FOR WHICH MOST PEOPLE WOULD USE 2 HANDS, ONE ON THE BALK, AND ONE ON THE HANDLE. THE POINT BEING THAT IT HAD TO HAVE BEEN DONE CONSCIOUSLY BYSOMEONE. THERE WAS NO MAINT ENTRY OR ANY OTHER INDICATION ANYONE HAD BEEN IN THE COCKPIT SINCE THE PLANE FLEW LAST, HAD THERE BEEN, WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN MORE CAREFUL TO CHK THINGS WERE CONFIGURED CORRECTLY. THE PROB WAS ONE OF PERCEPTION AND EXPECTATIONS, AS I HAD NEVER SEEN THE GEAR HANDLE IN THE 'UP' POS ON THE GND BEFORE AND THEREFORE DID NOT EXPECT IT TO BE ANYWHERE BUT 'DOWN.' AS PLTS IT IS NORMAL FOR US TO SEE THE GEAR HANDLE IN BOTH POS, DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE PLANE IS IN FLT OR NOT. IN OTHER WORDS IT'S NOT STRICTLY ABNORMAL TO SEE THE GEAR HANDLE IN THE 'UP' POS. OTHER FACTORS INCLUDE THE DISTRS CAUSED BY THE WX AS WELL AS MY FEELING TIRED. I ALSO VALUED THE CAPT'S OPINION AND RESPECTED HIS EXPERIENCE AS CONSIDERABLE IN THIS TYPE. I TRUSTED HIM. WE BOTH 'LOOKED' AT THE GEAR HANDLE SEVERAL TIMES I SUPPOSE, BUT DID NOT FULLY PROCESS THE INFO OUR EYES GAVE US. I WILL NOW MAKE IT A POINT TO PHYSICALLY TOUCH THE GEAR HANDLE AND SAY IT'S POS AS I LOOK AT WHAT I AM TOUCHING. THIS WOULD WORK WELL WITH OTHER ITEMS AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.