Narrative:

Air carrier airlines flight from portland to phoenix was route checked by phoenix based FAA safety inspector. Although no mention was made of any problems affecting the safety of flight during the 2 hours 13 mins en route, once on the ground, the inspector cited a number of discrepancies which, in his opinion, were of significance, and he intended to take appropriate action. 1) the cockpit door was not closed prior to push back (supposedly an air carrier requirement). 2) flight attendants were not briefed properly (6TH leg with the same flight attendants. Flight attendants were briefed before the first leg). 3) although we used a power setting which would accommodate 30000 additional pounds, we did not subtract the 400 pound penalty for the engine anti-ice used on takeoff. 4) the stored EFIS flight plan entered into the computer by myself was different than the flight release flight plan. Since I entered the original EFIS stored flight plan and the corrected flight plan, I was supposedly in violation of procedure. According to the inspector, in this case, the first officer should have entered the corrected flight plan and I should have verified it. 5) the karlo arrival was not on my clipboard in front of me although the full arrival was depicted on my EFIS screen including all crossing restrs. The commercial arrival plate was readily available, although not directly in front of me. 6) the shutdown checklist was accomplished without reading the checklist. 7) standard boeing zero flap maneuvering and flaps 1 degree maneuvering were set instead of speed card flaps up and besc because the boeing speeds were higher and recommended by a boeing bulletin. My own evaluation of the inspector's criticism is that much of it was based on his own opinion and, in some cases, was grossly incorrect. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he had not heard further from the FAA regarding this en route check. He did forward the contents of this report to his director of operations. He stated that the inspector got red in the face and reacted with emotional trauma when told that the reporter did not agree with some of the discrepancies reported by the inspector. However, according to the reporter he (the reporter), made his comments to the items in a friendly and professional manner and then the inspector turned and left in an angry state of mind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B737 WERE GIVEN AN ENRTE CHK BY AN FAA INSPECTOR RESULTING IN SEVERAL DISCREPANCIES BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTN DURING THE POSTFLT BRIEFING. THE RPTING CAPT DISAGREES WITH SOME OF THE ITEMS NOTED BY THE INSPECTOR.

Narrative: ACR AIRLINES FLT FROM PORTLAND TO PHOENIX WAS RTE CHKED BY PHOENIX BASED FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR. ALTHOUGH NO MENTION WAS MADE OF ANY PROBS AFFECTING THE SAFETY OF FLT DURING THE 2 HRS 13 MINS ENRTE, ONCE ON THE GND, THE INSPECTOR CITED A NUMBER OF DISCREPANCIES WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE OF SIGNIFICANCE, AND HE INTENDED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. 1) THE COCKPIT DOOR WAS NOT CLOSED PRIOR TO PUSH BACK (SUPPOSEDLY AN ACR REQUIREMENT). 2) FLT ATTENDANTS WERE NOT BRIEFED PROPERLY (6TH LEG WITH THE SAME FLT ATTENDANTS. FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BRIEFED BEFORE THE FIRST LEG). 3) ALTHOUGH WE USED A PWR SETTING WHICH WOULD ACCOMMODATE 30000 ADDITIONAL LBS, WE DID NOT SUBTRACT THE 400 LB PENALTY FOR THE ENG ANTI-ICE USED ON TKOF. 4) THE STORED EFIS FLT PLAN ENTERED INTO THE COMPUTER BY MYSELF WAS DIFFERENT THAN THE FLT RELEASE FLT PLAN. SINCE I ENTERED THE ORIGINAL EFIS STORED FLT PLAN AND THE CORRECTED FLT PLAN, I WAS SUPPOSEDLY IN VIOLATION OF PROC. ACCORDING TO THE INSPECTOR, IN THIS CASE, THE FO SHOULD HAVE ENTERED THE CORRECTED FLT PLAN AND I SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED IT. 5) THE KARLO ARR WAS NOT ON MY CLIPBOARD IN FRONT OF ME ALTHOUGH THE FULL ARR WAS DEPICTED ON MY EFIS SCREEN INCLUDING ALL XING RESTRS. THE COMMERCIAL ARR PLATE WAS READILY AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF ME. 6) THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT READING THE CHKLIST. 7) STANDARD BOEING ZERO FLAP MANEUVERING AND FLAPS 1 DEG MANEUVERING WERE SET INSTEAD OF SPD CARD FLAPS UP AND BESC BECAUSE THE BOEING SPDS WERE HIGHER AND RECOMMENDED BY A BOEING BULLETIN. MY OWN EVALUATION OF THE INSPECTOR'S CRITICISM IS THAT MUCH OF IT WAS BASED ON HIS OWN OPINION AND, IN SOME CASES, WAS GROSSLY INCORRECT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD FURTHER FROM THE FAA REGARDING THIS ENRTE CHK. HE DID FORWARD THE CONTENTS OF THIS RPT TO HIS DIRECTOR OF OPS. HE STATED THAT THE INSPECTOR GOT RED IN THE FACE AND REACTED WITH EMOTIONAL TRAUMA WHEN TOLD THAT THE RPTR DID NOT AGREE WITH SOME OF THE DISCREPANCIES RPTED BY THE INSPECTOR. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR HE (THE RPTR), MADE HIS COMMENTS TO THE ITEMS IN A FRIENDLY AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER AND THEN THE INSPECTOR TURNED AND LEFT IN AN ANGRY STATE OF MIND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.