Narrative:

A well-briefed, well-flown approach ended up with some confusion during landing rollout due to landing beyond the point of expected touchdown (but with more than enough runway to stop the aircraft), the ATC radio being inadvertently switched from tower frequency to ground frequency at some point prior to clearing the runway, and not being sure, at night, where we needed to exit the runway prior to the notamed closure (to landing traffic) and what lighting we should have expected to see at that point. Tower/ground cleared us to continue down runway and cross runway 29 at end. The captain and I discussed the landing/rollout while taxiing in, and the captain called the tower by phone to clarify situation. We were told there was no problem. To prevent confusion in the future, the last possible runway exit point (normally at the end of runway) should be briefed, not just expected and planned exit point, and what we are going to see at that last exit point in the event of a runway closure. In this instance, as we recall, the runway appeared to continue past the closure point by some visual cues. Supplemental information from acn 396428: this was my second landing at newark and the first one on runway 4R. I briefed the approach to expect to a turn-off at taxiway J. Because I have limited experience in the B767 (I completed the B757/767 qualification 3 months ago), my landing was longer than expected. I decided to let the aircraft roll out beyond taxiway J rather than apply excessive braking. When the aircraft rolled beyond taxiway left, I recall receiving a communication to the effect, 'okay, air carrier X, cross runway 29, turn left on taxiway Z, hold short of runway 29 at taxiway right.' I do not know if the clearance was given on the tower frequency or the ground frequency. The first officer was confused. He was concerned that we had rolled beyond taxiway Y. He claims that he began to switch the dual head radio to the ground frequency and discovered that the radio already was on the ground frequency. Several communications transpired between the first officer and ground/tower as he tried to mentally catch up with the situation. After parking at the gate, I telephoned ground control to ask if we had a problem. The controller stated that there were no problems. As I was about to hang up, a second controller came on the telephone and asked if we had radio problems. He stated that we did not respond to 2 xmissions -- one, a wind check on final, and two, a clearance to cross runway 29. I responded that I assumed the first officer inadvertently switched the dual head selector at the time that he dialed in the ground frequency during the final approach. After discussing the matter further with the first officer, I am not certain that he did switch the dual head prior to rollout. He may have encountered other problems with radio switches. He apparently did not hear the transmission clearing us to cross runway 29. Therefore, he did not acknowledge it and remained confused during rollout. I do not believe that the confusion would have occurred if we were operating in daylight. The runway markings at taxiway Y would have been more apparent. In the future, I will review and brief turnoffs other than the intended turnoff. In this case, if a turnoff at taxiway J is not executed, other possible turnoffs are txwys K, left and Y. The landing roll should not extend beyond taxiway Y. When operating as the PF, I will verify that the PNF has acknowledged all xmissions. Furthermore, I will attempt to monitor his operation of the radio switches.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 LANDS LONG AT EWR ARPT, MISSING THE PLANNED TURNOFF AT TXWY J. ACFT CONTINUES ON ROLLOUT PAST TXWY K AND Y AND EXITS RWY END ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD OF RWY 22L. ACFT CROSSED RWY 29 AFTER CTLR CLRED ACFT TO CROSS. FLC HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED A WIND CHK ON FINAL AND THE CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 29.

Narrative: A WELL-BRIEFED, WELL-FLOWN APCH ENDED UP WITH SOME CONFUSION DURING LNDG ROLLOUT DUE TO LNDG BEYOND THE POINT OF EXPECTED TOUCHDOWN (BUT WITH MORE THAN ENOUGH RWY TO STOP THE ACFT), THE ATC RADIO BEING INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED FROM TWR FREQ TO GND FREQ AT SOME POINT PRIOR TO CLRING THE RWY, AND NOT BEING SURE, AT NIGHT, WHERE WE NEEDED TO EXIT THE RWY PRIOR TO THE NOTAMED CLOSURE (TO LNDG TFC) AND WHAT LIGHTING WE SHOULD HAVE EXPECTED TO SEE AT THAT POINT. TWR/GND CLRED US TO CONTINUE DOWN RWY AND CROSS RWY 29 AT END. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE LNDG/ROLLOUT WHILE TAXIING IN, AND THE CAPT CALLED THE TWR BY PHONE TO CLARIFY SIT. WE WERE TOLD THERE WAS NO PROB. TO PREVENT CONFUSION IN THE FUTURE, THE LAST POSSIBLE RWY EXIT POINT (NORMALLY AT THE END OF RWY) SHOULD BE BRIEFED, NOT JUST EXPECTED AND PLANNED EXIT POINT, AND WHAT WE ARE GOING TO SEE AT THAT LAST EXIT POINT IN THE EVENT OF A RWY CLOSURE. IN THIS INSTANCE, AS WE RECALL, THE RWY APPEARED TO CONTINUE PAST THE CLOSURE POINT BY SOME VISUAL CUES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 396428: THIS WAS MY SECOND LNDG AT NEWARK AND THE FIRST ONE ON RWY 4R. I BRIEFED THE APCH TO EXPECT TO A TURN-OFF AT TXWY J. BECAUSE I HAVE LIMITED EXPERIENCE IN THE B767 (I COMPLETED THE B757/767 QUALIFICATION 3 MONTHS AGO), MY LNDG WAS LONGER THAN EXPECTED. I DECIDED TO LET THE ACFT ROLL OUT BEYOND TXWY J RATHER THAN APPLY EXCESSIVE BRAKING. WHEN THE ACFT ROLLED BEYOND TXWY L, I RECALL RECEIVING A COM TO THE EFFECT, 'OKAY, ACR X, CROSS RWY 29, TURN L ON TXWY Z, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 29 AT TXWY R.' I DO NOT KNOW IF THE CLRNC WAS GIVEN ON THE TWR FREQ OR THE GND FREQ. THE FO WAS CONFUSED. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT WE HAD ROLLED BEYOND TXWY Y. HE CLAIMS THAT HE BEGAN TO SWITCH THE DUAL HEAD RADIO TO THE GND FREQ AND DISCOVERED THAT THE RADIO ALREADY WAS ON THE GND FREQ. SEVERAL COMS TRANSPIRED BTWN THE FO AND GND/TWR AS HE TRIED TO MENTALLY CATCH UP WITH THE SIT. AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE, I TELEPHONED GND CTL TO ASK IF WE HAD A PROB. THE CTLR STATED THAT THERE WERE NO PROBS. AS I WAS ABOUT TO HANG UP, A SECOND CTLR CAME ON THE TELEPHONE AND ASKED IF WE HAD RADIO PROBS. HE STATED THAT WE DID NOT RESPOND TO 2 XMISSIONS -- ONE, A WIND CHK ON FINAL, AND TWO, A CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 29. I RESPONDED THAT I ASSUMED THE FO INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED THE DUAL HEAD SELECTOR AT THE TIME THAT HE DIALED IN THE GND FREQ DURING THE FINAL APCH. AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER FURTHER WITH THE FO, I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT HE DID SWITCH THE DUAL HEAD PRIOR TO ROLLOUT. HE MAY HAVE ENCOUNTERED OTHER PROBS WITH RADIO SWITCHES. HE APPARENTLY DID NOT HEAR THE XMISSION CLRING US TO CROSS RWY 29. THEREFORE, HE DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE IT AND REMAINED CONFUSED DURING ROLLOUT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CONFUSION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IF WE WERE OPERATING IN DAYLIGHT. THE RWY MARKINGS AT TXWY Y WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPARENT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL REVIEW AND BRIEF TURNOFFS OTHER THAN THE INTENDED TURNOFF. IN THIS CASE, IF A TURNOFF AT TXWY J IS NOT EXECUTED, OTHER POSSIBLE TURNOFFS ARE TXWYS K, L AND Y. THE LNDG ROLL SHOULD NOT EXTEND BEYOND TXWY Y. WHEN OPERATING AS THE PF, I WILL VERIFY THAT THE PNF HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ALL XMISSIONS. FURTHERMORE, I WILL ATTEMPT TO MONITOR HIS OP OF THE RADIO SWITCHES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.