Narrative:

On taxi out from gate to runway 6 in manchester, england, the int'l service manager (ism) informed the cockpit crew that fumes were present in the cabin. I turned off all of the packs so the air would clear (thinking the fumes were coming from outside of the aircraft). The captain had me turn the packs back on because he thought they were originating inside. We were taxiing back to the gate when the ism came up again and said that there was a fog starting to form in the cabin. The captain was having me look for a 'fume removal' checklist. The only thing that came close was the 'air conditioning smoke removal' checklist and this only applies in flight anyway. The control tower shortly thereafter reported flames coming from engine #2 and so the aircraft was parked right there on the taxiway and #2 shutdown. There had been no fire warnings in the cockpit and start up and taxi had been normal. The fire trucks recommended an evacuate/evacuation and so we did (although there were mistakes made then, too -- the captain did not follow the evacuate/evacuation checklist and never made a PA and shut off power before the ism could make one). Everyone (about 250 people) got out without injuries in less than 1 min. The problem was caused by a rupture in the fuel/oil heat exchanger so that fuel was being pumped out of the tailcone and being set on fire by the exhaust. I believe an evacuate/evacuation may not have been necessary if I could have kept the packs off and the fuel therefore would have ceased entering the cabin. However, the captain later stated he thought the fumes were from 2 empty gasoline cans he had brought onboard (unbeknownst to the rest of the crew). I also feel that if I had not been asked to look for a non applicable checklist I may have seen abnormal oil quantity or pressure indications on engine #2. The captain acted as a hindrance to both good CRM and safety in this incident -- his use of expletives against both the first officer and myself were unnecessary and distracting. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a DC10-30 and the #2 engine was supplying pneumatic air for the air-conditioning system. The reporter said the crew resource management was very poor. The reporter stated the failure of the fuel-oil heat exchanger was not detectable from the engine instruments as none appeared abnormal. The reporter said the captain tripped off the power before any PA warning and instructions could be given to the passenger. Callback conversation with reporter on acn 396300 revealed the following information: the reporter said the aircraft was taxiing when the first flight attendant reported fuel fumes in the cabin and the reporter immediately instructed the first officer to advise the tower of the necessity of a return to the gate. The reporter said the so was instructed to ventilate the cabin. The reporter stated not being aware of any abnormal engine indications and no fire or overheat warnings were sounding. The reporter said the fumes got stronger and the tower advised us of a #2 engine tailpipe fire. The reporter stated the aircraft was stopped and the reporter ordered the aircraft evacuate/evacuationed. The reporter said the #2 engine firewall handle was pulled and the engine shut down as the other engines were secured. The reporter said the evacuate/evacuation went well except for slides at door 3L where the overwing slide deployed but the portion from the wing to the ground failed and the slide at door 1R inflated to only 60%. The reporter said the first officer and the so may have been able to observe the problem sooner if the oil quantity indicator for #2 engine was noted as increasing after engine start.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10-30 ON TAXI OUT DECLARED AN EMER AND EVACED THE ACFT DUE TO SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE CABIN CAUSED BY A #2 ENG FIRE.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT FROM GATE TO RWY 6 IN MANCHESTER, ENGLAND, THE INT'L SVC MGR (ISM) INFORMED THE COCKPIT CREW THAT FUMES WERE PRESENT IN THE CABIN. I TURNED OFF ALL OF THE PACKS SO THE AIR WOULD CLR (THINKING THE FUMES WERE COMING FROM OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT). THE CAPT HAD ME TURN THE PACKS BACK ON BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THEY WERE ORIGINATING INSIDE. WE WERE TAXIING BACK TO THE GATE WHEN THE ISM CAME UP AGAIN AND SAID THAT THERE WAS A FOG STARTING TO FORM IN THE CABIN. THE CAPT WAS HAVING ME LOOK FOR A 'FUME REMOVAL' CHKLIST. THE ONLY THING THAT CAME CLOSE WAS THE 'AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE REMOVAL' CHKLIST AND THIS ONLY APPLIES IN FLT ANYWAY. THE CTL TWR SHORTLY THEREAFTER RPTED FLAMES COMING FROM ENG #2 AND SO THE ACFT WAS PARKED RIGHT THERE ON THE TXWY AND #2 SHUTDOWN. THERE HAD BEEN NO FIRE WARNINGS IN THE COCKPIT AND START UP AND TAXI HAD BEEN NORMAL. THE FIRE TRUCKS RECOMMENDED AN EVAC AND SO WE DID (ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MISTAKES MADE THEN, TOO -- THE CAPT DID NOT FOLLOW THE EVAC CHKLIST AND NEVER MADE A PA AND SHUT OFF PWR BEFORE THE ISM COULD MAKE ONE). EVERYONE (ABOUT 250 PEOPLE) GOT OUT WITHOUT INJURIES IN LESS THAN 1 MIN. THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY A RUPTURE IN THE FUEL/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SO THAT FUEL WAS BEING PUMPED OUT OF THE TAILCONE AND BEING SET ON FIRE BY THE EXHAUST. I BELIEVE AN EVAC MAY NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY IF I COULD HAVE KEPT THE PACKS OFF AND THE FUEL THEREFORE WOULD HAVE CEASED ENTERING THE CABIN. HOWEVER, THE CAPT LATER STATED HE THOUGHT THE FUMES WERE FROM 2 EMPTY GASOLINE CANS HE HAD BROUGHT ONBOARD (UNBEKNOWNST TO THE REST OF THE CREW). I ALSO FEEL THAT IF I HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO LOOK FOR A NON APPLICABLE CHKLIST I MAY HAVE SEEN ABNORMAL OIL QUANTITY OR PRESSURE INDICATIONS ON ENG #2. THE CAPT ACTED AS A HINDRANCE TO BOTH GOOD CRM AND SAFETY IN THIS INCIDENT -- HIS USE OF EXPLETIVES AGAINST BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF WERE UNNECESSARY AND DISTRACTING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A DC10-30 AND THE #2 ENG WAS SUPPLYING PNEUMATIC AIR FOR THE AIR-CONDITIONING SYS. THE RPTR SAID THE CREW RESOURCE MGMNT WAS VERY POOR. THE RPTR STATED THE FAILURE OF THE FUEL-OIL HEAT EXCHANGER WAS NOT DETECTABLE FROM THE ENG INSTS AS NONE APPEARED ABNORMAL. THE RPTR SAID THE CAPT TRIPPED OFF THE PWR BEFORE ANY PA WARNING AND INSTRUCTIONS COULD BE GIVEN TO THE PAX. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ON ACN 396300 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THE ACFT WAS TAXIING WHEN THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT RPTED FUEL FUMES IN THE CABIN AND THE RPTR IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ADVISE THE TWR OF THE NECESSITY OF A RETURN TO THE GATE. THE RPTR SAID THE SO WAS INSTRUCTED TO VENTILATE THE CABIN. THE RPTR STATED NOT BEING AWARE OF ANY ABNORMAL ENG INDICATIONS AND NO FIRE OR OVERHEAT WARNINGS WERE SOUNDING. THE RPTR SAID THE FUMES GOT STRONGER AND THE TWR ADVISED US OF A #2 ENG TAILPIPE FIRE. THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS STOPPED AND THE RPTR ORDERED THE ACFT EVACED. THE RPTR SAID THE #2 ENG FIREWALL HANDLE WAS PULLED AND THE ENG SHUT DOWN AS THE OTHER ENGS WERE SECURED. THE RPTR SAID THE EVAC WENT WELL EXCEPT FOR SLIDES AT DOOR 3L WHERE THE OVERWING SLIDE DEPLOYED BUT THE PORTION FROM THE WING TO THE GND FAILED AND THE SLIDE AT DOOR 1R INFLATED TO ONLY 60%. THE RPTR SAID THE FO AND THE SO MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE THE PROB SOONER IF THE OIL QUANTITY INDICATOR FOR #2 ENG WAS NOTED AS INCREASING AFTER ENG START.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.