Narrative:

On taxi out, tower assigned us runway 4L. We did not have a tps for this runway, so I pulled one up via ACARS, and found we were legal. As we approached the runway, we commented on the snow contamination on taxiway west, but did not think it would be a problem. We were cleared for a takeoff with a right turn out. It was the captain's takeoff. He set the power and I engaged the autothrottles. Everything looked normal. At about 120 KTS, we had an electrical failure and everything except the standby instruments went blank. The captain immediately closed the throttles and applied the brakes. Deceleration felt normal. I called the tower and told them we were aborting the takeoff on runway 4L. Tower asked if we needed the fire trucks. The captain shook his head and I responded no. Tower then told us he saw a puff of smoke as we crossed runway 36. I then asked him to roll the trucks. Another aircraft lining up behind us said the smoke looked like a blown tire. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway and I reached up and cranked the APU. The captain called the flight attendant and confirmed there were no problems and then made a PA explaining what had happened and that there was no need to evacuate/evacuation. Tower asked if we were able to vacate the runway. Once the APU had re-established electrical power, we turned off at taxiway U facing the guard ramp. I then reconfirmed we wanted the fire department to conduct a damage assessment. They arrived promptly and told us we had several blown tires on the left side, but looked good otherwise. We then called dispatch and coordinated. Callback conversation with reporter and maintenance revealed the following information: the flight crew was flying a B757-200 when they performed a high speed rejected takeoff. Maintenance later reported that both integrated drive generators were low on oil and the #1 had a high oil temperature drive indication. The #2 had the same indication and also had a bad diode pattern and a bearing and internal drive failures. When the #2 generator failed the already stressed #1 failed also. The aircraft switched to the standby electrical system. On the standby electrical system there is no anti-skid system protection for the outboard main gear brakes. This caused these tires to skid under the heavy braking and the left outboard tires overheated and blew. This first officer said that he knew about the outboard wheels not having anti-skid protection when operating on standby electrical power, but he had never understood the full meaning until after this event. He was thankful that this occurred in daylight. He said that his company has changed its servicing procedure and now the generators will be svced on the same schedule as the engines.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B757 FLC HAD A MAJOR ELECTRICAL FAILURE BELOW THEIR V1 SPD AND THEY REJECTED THEIR TKOF. DURING THE REJECT SEVERAL OUTBOARD TIRES BLEW.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT, TWR ASSIGNED US RWY 4L. WE DID NOT HAVE A TPS FOR THIS RWY, SO I PULLED ONE UP VIA ACARS, AND FOUND WE WERE LEGAL. AS WE APCHED THE RWY, WE COMMENTED ON THE SNOW CONTAMINATION ON TXWY W, BUT DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE A PROB. WE WERE CLRED FOR A TKOF WITH A R TURN OUT. IT WAS THE CAPT'S TKOF. HE SET THE PWR AND I ENGAGED THE AUTOTHROTTLES. EVERYTHING LOOKED NORMAL. AT ABOUT 120 KTS, WE HAD AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE STANDBY INSTS WENT BLANK. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CLOSED THE THROTTLES AND APPLIED THE BRAKES. DECELERATION FELT NORMAL. I CALLED THE TWR AND TOLD THEM WE WERE ABORTING THE TKOF ON RWY 4L. TWR ASKED IF WE NEEDED THE FIRE TRUCKS. THE CAPT SHOOK HIS HEAD AND I RESPONDED NO. TWR THEN TOLD US HE SAW A PUFF OF SMOKE AS WE CROSSED RWY 36. I THEN ASKED HIM TO ROLL THE TRUCKS. ANOTHER ACFT LINING UP BEHIND US SAID THE SMOKE LOOKED LIKE A BLOWN TIRE. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP ON THE RWY AND I REACHED UP AND CRANKED THE APU. THE CAPT CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND CONFIRMED THERE WERE NO PROBS AND THEN MADE A PA EXPLAINING WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO EVAC. TWR ASKED IF WE WERE ABLE TO VACATE THE RWY. ONCE THE APU HAD RE-ESTABLISHED ELECTRICAL PWR, WE TURNED OFF AT TXWY U FACING THE GUARD RAMP. I THEN RECONFIRMED WE WANTED THE FIRE DEPT TO CONDUCT A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. THEY ARRIVED PROMPTLY AND TOLD US WE HAD SEVERAL BLOWN TIRES ON THE L SIDE, BUT LOOKED GOOD OTHERWISE. WE THEN CALLED DISPATCH AND COORDINATED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR AND MAINT REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FLC WAS FLYING A B757-200 WHEN THEY PERFORMED A HIGH SPD REJECTED TKOF. MAINT LATER RPTED THAT BOTH INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATORS WERE LOW ON OIL AND THE #1 HAD A HIGH OIL TEMP DRIVE INDICATION. THE #2 HAD THE SAME INDICATION AND ALSO HAD A BAD DIODE PATTERN AND A BEARING AND INTERNAL DRIVE FAILURES. WHEN THE #2 GENERATOR FAILED THE ALREADY STRESSED #1 FAILED ALSO. THE ACFT SWITCHED TO THE STANDBY ELECTRICAL SYS. ON THE STANDBY ELECTRICAL SYS THERE IS NO ANTI-SKID SYS PROTECTION FOR THE OUTBOARD MAIN GEAR BRAKES. THIS CAUSED THESE TIRES TO SKID UNDER THE HVY BRAKING AND THE L OUTBOARD TIRES OVERHEATED AND BLEW. THIS FO SAID THAT HE KNEW ABOUT THE OUTBOARD WHEELS NOT HAVING ANTI-SKID PROTECTION WHEN OPERATING ON STANDBY ELECTRICAL PWR, BUT HE HAD NEVER UNDERSTOOD THE FULL MEANING UNTIL AFTER THIS EVENT. HE WAS THANKFUL THAT THIS OCCURRED IN DAYLIGHT. HE SAID THAT HIS COMPANY HAS CHANGED ITS SVCING PROC AND NOW THE GENERATORS WILL BE SVCED ON THE SAME SCHEDULE AS THE ENGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.