Narrative:

During climb out from rjbb (osaka kansai airport, japan) on the bay one, runway 24 departure kec transition, approximately 12 NM northwest of gbe approximately passing through 6000 ft MSL received '1000' ft central aural warning system announcement. After climbing through 10000 ft MSL and accelerating got GPWS 'terrain, terrain' alert. A modified escape maneuver was begun by disconnecting the autoplt and autothrottles slowly raising the nose of the aircraft approximately 5 degrees and applying maximum power. Within 10 seconds of this action a 'windshear' alert was received. Firewall power was applied and nose up pitch to follow the pitch command for windshear. The pitch command caused the pitch limit indicator to be superimposed on top of the wings on the primary flight display, 260 KTS and decreasing (this speed was inside of the 'vmin' speed foot), and stick shaker was encountered. At this point I disregarded pitch commands and went back to basics, applying firewall power, lowering the nose, accelerating to 280 KTS and climbed at between 200 ft and 1000 FPM to FL290. During the stick shaker event the pitch limit indicator turned yellow. The entire crew discussed our problems including the poor aircraft performance after the 'windshear' alert as far as climb was concerned. The phone patch was established with operations control center, maintenance operations control center, aircraft engineering, flight operations, flight standards, et al, and the troubleshooting process began. After I briefed our situation and questions were answered for the conference team our troubleshooting process began. #2 FCC circuit breaker pulled and reset by rfo. Crew initiated the sequence of switching desired, 'auxiliary on #1 first or auxiliary on #2 first.' after a short discussion concerning what was reliable versus unreliable system we decided to switch the CADC's and note the response. At this point, we concluded that 2 of the 3 CADC's had failed. Checking the MEL, 2 of the 3 had to be operational for takeoff. Armed with that information, coupled with all of the unreliable information and data provided on this short flight, I elected to return to rjbb as there were 10+ hours of flight to mem. I told them that we were not declaring an emergency. We were vectored and descended for arrival sequencing at rjaa. No further difficulties after landing. After touchdown the pitch limit indicator went to +10 degrees nose up, which is normal. I think that the radio altimeter(south) were the cause of our faulty indications. Pulling the radio altimeter circuit breaker(south) should have been the first troubleshooting action taken. This is not the first situation of this kind caused by a faulty radio altimeter. I am told that the routing of the coax cable for the radio altimeter is such that the cable inputs false data to the radio altimeter. I am also told that there is a connector on the radio altimeter that is faulty. Because of the coax routing and connector problem the routing of the coax cable has been redesigned for the MD10 aircraft, and 3 radio altimeters will be installed instead of the two that are currently on the MD11. Switching CADC's in flight can cause data problems. (In our case the switch failed while in the auxiliary on #2 position.) information concerning the radio altimeter problems should be passed on to crew members operating MD11's. A full escape maneuver cannot be made as described in the MD11 manual, as it is currently written when the aircraft is heavy and accelerating from vcl (climb speed) to 320 KTS after climbing above 10000 ft because the power is not available to pitch of the aircraft +30 degrees nose up. This procedure needs to be reworked based on profile flown in the flight simulator at heavy takeoff weights and clbouts rather than level flight or descent profiles. The slow climb was a result of being on the back side of the power curve. Note: the crew, first officer, rfo, and relief captain all did a superb job. The teamwork was outstanding.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD11 FREIGHTER FLC RECEIVES A '1000 FT WARNING' AT 6000 FT. DURING FURTHER CLBOUT OF 10000 FT THEY RECEIVE A 'TERRAIN' WARNING. AFTER A 5 DEG EXTRA NOSE UP WITH MAX PWR THEY THEN RECEIVE A 'WINDSHEAR' ALERT. AFTER FIREWALLING THROTTLES WITH MAX PITCH APPLIED BY REF TO PITCH COMMAND CREW NOTES DECREASING AIRSPD. FLT EVENTUALLY RETURNS TO DEP ARPT AFTER BEING AT FL290 AND TROUBLESHOOTING ACFT WITH MAINT ADVISORIES. 2 CADC FAILURES OCCUR DURING THIS TROUBLESHOOTING.

Narrative: DURING CLBOUT FROM RJBB (OSAKA KANSAI ARPT, JAPAN) ON THE BAY ONE, RWY 24 DEP KEC TRANSITION, APPROX 12 NM NW OF GBE APPROX PASSING THROUGH 6000 FT MSL RECEIVED '1000' FT CENTRAL AURAL WARNING SYS ANNOUNCEMENT. AFTER CLBING THROUGH 10000 FT MSL AND ACCELERATING GOT GPWS 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' ALERT. A MODIFIED ESCAPE MANEUVER WAS BEGUN BY DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES SLOWLY RAISING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT APPROX 5 DEGS AND APPLYING MAX PWR. WITHIN 10 SECONDS OF THIS ACTION A 'WINDSHEAR' ALERT WAS RECEIVED. FIREWALL PWR WAS APPLIED AND NOSE UP PITCH TO FOLLOW THE PITCH COMMAND FOR WINDSHEAR. THE PITCH COMMAND CAUSED THE PITCH LIMIT INDICATOR TO BE SUPERIMPOSED ON TOP OF THE WINGS ON THE PRIMARY FLT DISPLAY, 260 KTS AND DECREASING (THIS SPD WAS INSIDE OF THE 'VMIN' SPD FOOT), AND STICK SHAKER WAS ENCOUNTERED. AT THIS POINT I DISREGARDED PITCH COMMANDS AND WENT BACK TO BASICS, APPLYING FIREWALL PWR, LOWERING THE NOSE, ACCELERATING TO 280 KTS AND CLBED AT BTWN 200 FT AND 1000 FPM TO FL290. DURING THE STICK SHAKER EVENT THE PITCH LIMIT INDICATOR TURNED YELLOW. THE ENTIRE CREW DISCUSSED OUR PROBS INCLUDING THE POOR ACFT PERFORMANCE AFTER THE 'WINDSHEAR' ALERT AS FAR AS CLB WAS CONCERNED. THE PHONE PATCH WAS ESTABLISHED WITH OPS CTL CTR, MAINT OPS CTL CTR, ACFT ENGINEERING, FLT OPS, FLT STANDARDS, ET AL, AND THE TROUBLESHOOTING PROCESS BEGAN. AFTER I BRIEFED OUR SIT AND QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED FOR THE CONFERENCE TEAM OUR TROUBLESHOOTING PROCESS BEGAN. #2 FCC CIRCUIT BREAKER PULLED AND RESET BY RFO. CREW INITIATED THE SEQUENCE OF SWITCHING DESIRED, 'AUX ON #1 FIRST OR AUX ON #2 FIRST.' AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION CONCERNING WHAT WAS RELIABLE VERSUS UNRELIABLE SYS WE DECIDED TO SWITCH THE CADC'S AND NOTE THE RESPONSE. AT THIS POINT, WE CONCLUDED THAT 2 OF THE 3 CADC'S HAD FAILED. CHKING THE MEL, 2 OF THE 3 HAD TO BE OPERATIONAL FOR TKOF. ARMED WITH THAT INFO, COUPLED WITH ALL OF THE UNRELIABLE INFO AND DATA PROVIDED ON THIS SHORT FLT, I ELECTED TO RETURN TO RJBB AS THERE WERE 10+ HRS OF FLT TO MEM. I TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE NOT DECLARING AN EMER. WE WERE VECTORED AND DSNDED FOR ARR SEQUENCING AT RJAA. NO FURTHER DIFFICULTIES AFTER LNDG. AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE PITCH LIMIT INDICATOR WENT TO +10 DEGS NOSE UP, WHICH IS NORMAL. I THINK THAT THE RADIO ALTIMETER(S) WERE THE CAUSE OF OUR FAULTY INDICATIONS. PULLING THE RADIO ALTIMETER CIRCUIT BREAKER(S) SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST TROUBLESHOOTING ACTION TAKEN. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST SIT OF THIS KIND CAUSED BY A FAULTY RADIO ALTIMETER. I AM TOLD THAT THE ROUTING OF THE COAX CABLE FOR THE RADIO ALTIMETER IS SUCH THAT THE CABLE INPUTS FALSE DATA TO THE RADIO ALTIMETER. I AM ALSO TOLD THAT THERE IS A CONNECTOR ON THE RADIO ALTIMETER THAT IS FAULTY. BECAUSE OF THE COAX ROUTING AND CONNECTOR PROB THE ROUTING OF THE COAX CABLE HAS BEEN REDESIGNED FOR THE MD10 ACFT, AND 3 RADIO ALTIMETERS WILL BE INSTALLED INSTEAD OF THE TWO THAT ARE CURRENTLY ON THE MD11. SWITCHING CADC'S IN FLT CAN CAUSE DATA PROBS. (IN OUR CASE THE SWITCH FAILED WHILE IN THE AUX ON #2 POS.) INFO CONCERNING THE RADIO ALTIMETER PROBS SHOULD BE PASSED ON TO CREW MEMBERS OPERATING MD11'S. A FULL ESCAPE MANEUVER CANNOT BE MADE AS DESCRIBED IN THE MD11 MANUAL, AS IT IS CURRENTLY WRITTEN WHEN THE ACFT IS HVY AND ACCELERATING FROM VCL (CLB SPD) TO 320 KTS AFTER CLBING ABOVE 10000 FT BECAUSE THE PWR IS NOT AVAILABLE TO PITCH OF THE ACFT +30 DEGS NOSE UP. THIS PROC NEEDS TO BE REWORKED BASED ON PROFILE FLOWN IN THE FLT SIMULATOR AT HVY TKOF WTS AND CLBOUTS RATHER THAN LEVEL FLT OR DSCNT PROFILES. THE SLOW CLB WAS A RESULT OF BEING ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE PWR CURVE. NOTE: THE CREW, FO, RFO, AND RELIEF CAPT ALL DID A SUPERB JOB. THE TEAMWORK WAS OUTSTANDING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.