Narrative:

Upon arriving at the aircraft in ord, we debriefed with the off-going crew and both the flight engineer and the captain explained that they had a couple of write-ups, but nothing major. #1 engine start button failed to illuminate on start, APU needed servicing, an electrical light ballast problem, and roaches were found in the mid galley. The maintenance personnel were aware of the problems and were at work on repair. We proceeded to ready the airplane for departure. The extermination of the roaches took minimal time, however, the electrical ballast problem was becoming very difficult. The maintenance personnel were having to pull down each ceiling tile and finally had to call the mechanic at home that was responsible for the original write-up. The APU also was determined to have a crack in the drain mast as well as being low on oil quantity. These delays put us approximately 1 hour 30 mins behind scheduled departure. After beginning our taxi, the captain noticed the anti-skid lights illuminated, at which time I moved from my observer's seat and assisted the so (IOE in training) with contacting maintenance for a deferral. I divided the responsibilities of preparing the aircraft for departure (flows, takeoff card, etc) with the so while I contacted air carrier on commercial radio. We continued taxiing for the runway. Air carrier finally established contact, after several futile attempts, and I, at air carrier request, pulled and reset circuit breakers pertaining to the anti-skid circuit breakers and the parking brake system located on the so lm circuit breaker panel with park brake on and park brake off. The system would test satisfactory, however, once the parking brake was off, the lights would stay on with the anti-skid system armed. During this troubleshooting, I mentioned to captain that going to cleveland with this problem might be a problem, as cleveland usually didn't have a fully staffed maintenance facility. At which time he asked us to look up the takeoff and landing requirements with anti-skid inoperative. I had previously asked so to begin the data search for the takeoff with anti-skid inoperative and looked over his shoulder as a backup. We computed that we would need 10000 ft of runway for the takeoff. A few mins later, we looked up landing distance requirements. The cle 9200 ft runway was deemed to be too short at flaps 50 degrees. But, we flipped to the preceding page in the flight manual and ran the numbers for flaps 35 degrees, overlooking the fact that this was not an anti-skid inoperative page. This was an oversight on my part as I should have seen the data we were examining was for a normal performance limit and not the flaps 35 degrees anti- skid inoperative data that logically would have preceded the flaps 50 degrees anti-skid inoperative data. Regardless, I told the captain that we should be good for landing in cleveland with flaps 35 degrees. In the meantime, we continued making our way for a longer runway and finally after approximately 15-20 mins of troubleshooting, deferred the anti-skid and operations placarded the system giving us a dispatch release. I also ran the landing runway data on ACARS, at the first officer's request and it came back as no information was available at that time. It is not part of the so's normal takeoff procedures to calculate the landing data as this does not give an accurate portrayal of the weights, winds, speeds for the time of your arrival. Takeoff was non eventful. After dodging several thunder cells on the way out of ord, and approximately 30 mins into the flight, dispatch selcaled us. I answered the call on VHF and he told me that cle runway length was inadequate for flaps 50 degrees anti-skid inoperative, still believing that we had looked up the correct data, choosing flaps 35 degrees as a possible alternative I passed this on to him and he, the dispatcher, rogered that as being ok. We then questioned ourselves and took another look at the landing data finding our mistake almost immediately. After discussing the predicament, carefully considering fuel, WX, and runway conditions at both ord and cle, we made the decision to go to cle using flaps 50 degrees. The captain made a very nice uneventful approach and landing, making the second or third turnoff from the end with no problems. After taxiing tothe gate, setting the parking brake, and shutting down the aircraft, I went down and examined the brakes and the tires. The brakes were cool and the tires and the tire pressures were all within normal parameters. Afterwards, we thoroughly debriefed the flight recapping the chain of events, stressing our lessons learned and the importance of the 'safety chain.' the captain called the dispatcher and spoke to him over the phone. The dispatcher was very apologetic for the mistake. Cle maintenance went right to work on the aircraft and found a bad parking brake valve, which they operations placarded and then jumpered the valve out giving us normal anti-skid indications. They, cle maintenance, did a precautionary brake and landing gear structural inspection, I believe it was for an overweight landing, however we landed at approximately 345,000 pounds -- well within the normal landing regime, however slightly out of the flaps 50 degrees anti-skid inoperative parameters. The wind had been calm. We had a normal flight, landing, and approach back to ord landing at runway 30L. The so and I remained a while longer exploring the differences of the -30 aircraft, lower galley, doors, etc. We then left for flight operations and continued with our debrief. After completing our debrief, I complimented him on his outstanding job during IOE, reiterating our lessons learned and signed him off safe for solo. Cause of problem: primary -- inattn to detail on flight crew's part and the dispatcher's. Recommendations: if a new printed release would have been sent over ACARS versus over the radio, the remarks would have been read stating a greater than 10000 ft runway was required. Flight manual procedural location: this procedure should be categorized as an irregular procedure versus part of the normal landing section. The adjacent page to the flaps 50 degrees anti-skid inoperative page is the normal landing runway performance limit charts, thus making it very easy for a person(south) in a rush to overlook the print at the top right corner of the page. Considerations should be given to placing irregular takeoff and landing operations in its own category. Manually computing the numbers is a contributing factor. In summary, attention to detail prior to takeoff could have averted a situation on the ground that led to a decision to continue for landing at cle once airborne. Had WX and fuel not been an issue, the decision to return to ord would have been easy. Automation of landing data with system inoperative could have also assisted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DC10 FLC MISREADS THEIR PERFORMANCE CHARTS AND DECIDE THAT THEY CAN LAND SAFELY AT THEIR DEST WITH THE ANTI-SKID SYS INOP. THEY DISCOVER THEIR ERROR ENRTE, BUT DECIDE TO LAND ANYWAY BECAUSE THE RWY WAS ALMOST AT LEGAL LENGTH. THE LNDG WAS SUCCESSFUL.

Narrative: UPON ARRIVING AT THE ACFT IN ORD, WE DEBRIEFED WITH THE OFF-GOING CREW AND BOTH THE FE AND THE CAPT EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD A COUPLE OF WRITE-UPS, BUT NOTHING MAJOR. #1 ENG START BUTTON FAILED TO ILLUMINATE ON START, APU NEEDED SVCING, AN ELECTRICAL LIGHT BALLAST PROB, AND ROACHES WERE FOUND IN THE MID GALLEY. THE MAINT PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF THE PROBS AND WERE AT WORK ON REPAIR. WE PROCEEDED TO READY THE AIRPLANE FOR DEP. THE EXTERMINATION OF THE ROACHES TOOK MINIMAL TIME, HOWEVER, THE ELECTRICAL BALLAST PROB WAS BECOMING VERY DIFFICULT. THE MAINT PERSONNEL WERE HAVING TO PULL DOWN EACH CEILING TILE AND FINALLY HAD TO CALL THE MECH AT HOME THAT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ORIGINAL WRITE-UP. THE APU ALSO WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE A CRACK IN THE DRAIN MAST AS WELL AS BEING LOW ON OIL QUANTITY. THESE DELAYS PUT US APPROX 1 HR 30 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULED DEP. AFTER BEGINNING OUR TAXI, THE CAPT NOTICED THE ANTI-SKID LIGHTS ILLUMINATED, AT WHICH TIME I MOVED FROM MY OBSERVER'S SEAT AND ASSISTED THE SO (IOE IN TRAINING) WITH CONTACTING MAINT FOR A DEFERRAL. I DIVIDED THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PREPARING THE ACFT FOR DEP (FLOWS, TKOF CARD, ETC) WITH THE SO WHILE I CONTACTED ACR ON COMMERCIAL RADIO. WE CONTINUED TAXIING FOR THE RWY. ACR FINALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT, AFTER SEVERAL FUTILE ATTEMPTS, AND I, AT ACR REQUEST, PULLED AND RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS PERTAINING TO THE ANTI-SKID CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THE PARKING BRAKE SYS LOCATED ON THE SO LM CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL WITH PARK BRAKE ON AND PARK BRAKE OFF. THE SYS WOULD TEST SATISFACTORY, HOWEVER, ONCE THE PARKING BRAKE WAS OFF, THE LIGHTS WOULD STAY ON WITH THE ANTI-SKID SYS ARMED. DURING THIS TROUBLESHOOTING, I MENTIONED TO CAPT THAT GOING TO CLEVELAND WITH THIS PROB MIGHT BE A PROB, AS CLEVELAND USUALLY DIDN'T HAVE A FULLY STAFFED MAINT FACILITY. AT WHICH TIME HE ASKED US TO LOOK UP THE TKOF AND LNDG REQUIREMENTS WITH ANTI-SKID INOP. I HAD PREVIOUSLY ASKED SO TO BEGIN THE DATA SEARCH FOR THE TKOF WITH ANTI-SKID INOP AND LOOKED OVER HIS SHOULDER AS A BACKUP. WE COMPUTED THAT WE WOULD NEED 10000 FT OF RWY FOR THE TKOF. A FEW MINS LATER, WE LOOKED UP LNDG DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS. THE CLE 9200 FT RWY WAS DEEMED TO BE TOO SHORT AT FLAPS 50 DEGS. BUT, WE FLIPPED TO THE PRECEDING PAGE IN THE FLT MANUAL AND RAN THE NUMBERS FOR FLAPS 35 DEGS, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THIS WAS NOT AN ANTI-SKID INOP PAGE. THIS WAS AN OVERSIGHT ON MY PART AS I SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE DATA WE WERE EXAMINING WAS FOR A NORMAL PERFORMANCE LIMIT AND NOT THE FLAPS 35 DEGS ANTI- SKID INOP DATA THAT LOGICALLY WOULD HAVE PRECEDED THE FLAPS 50 DEGS ANTI-SKID INOP DATA. REGARDLESS, I TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE SHOULD BE GOOD FOR LNDG IN CLEVELAND WITH FLAPS 35 DEGS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE CONTINUED MAKING OUR WAY FOR A LONGER RWY AND FINALLY AFTER APPROX 15-20 MINS OF TROUBLESHOOTING, DEFERRED THE ANTI-SKID AND OPS PLACARDED THE SYS GIVING US A DISPATCH RELEASE. I ALSO RAN THE LNDG RWY DATA ON ACARS, AT THE FO'S REQUEST AND IT CAME BACK AS NO INFO WAS AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. IT IS NOT PART OF THE SO'S NORMAL TKOF PROCS TO CALCULATE THE LNDG DATA AS THIS DOES NOT GIVE AN ACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF THE WTS, WINDS, SPDS FOR THE TIME OF YOUR ARR. TKOF WAS NON EVENTFUL. AFTER DODGING SEVERAL THUNDER CELLS ON THE WAY OUT OF ORD, AND APPROX 30 MINS INTO THE FLT, DISPATCH SELCALED US. I ANSWERED THE CALL ON VHF AND HE TOLD ME THAT CLE RWY LENGTH WAS INADEQUATE FOR FLAPS 50 DEGS ANTI-SKID INOP, STILL BELIEVING THAT WE HAD LOOKED UP THE CORRECT DATA, CHOOSING FLAPS 35 DEGS AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE I PASSED THIS ON TO HIM AND HE, THE DISPATCHER, ROGERED THAT AS BEING OK. WE THEN QUESTIONED OURSELVES AND TOOK ANOTHER LOOK AT THE LNDG DATA FINDING OUR MISTAKE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. AFTER DISCUSSING THE PREDICAMENT, CAREFULLY CONSIDERING FUEL, WX, AND RWY CONDITIONS AT BOTH ORD AND CLE, WE MADE THE DECISION TO GO TO CLE USING FLAPS 50 DEGS. THE CAPT MADE A VERY NICE UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG, MAKING THE SECOND OR THIRD TURNOFF FROM THE END WITH NO PROBS. AFTER TAXIING TOTHE GATE, SETTING THE PARKING BRAKE, AND SHUTTING DOWN THE ACFT, I WENT DOWN AND EXAMINED THE BRAKES AND THE TIRES. THE BRAKES WERE COOL AND THE TIRES AND THE TIRE PRESSURES WERE ALL WITHIN NORMAL PARAMETERS. AFTERWARDS, WE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED THE FLT RECAPPING THE CHAIN OF EVENTS, STRESSING OUR LESSONS LEARNED AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 'SAFETY CHAIN.' THE CAPT CALLED THE DISPATCHER AND SPOKE TO HIM OVER THE PHONE. THE DISPATCHER WAS VERY APOLOGETIC FOR THE MISTAKE. CLE MAINT WENT RIGHT TO WORK ON THE ACFT AND FOUND A BAD PARKING BRAKE VALVE, WHICH THEY OPS PLACARDED AND THEN JUMPERED THE VALVE OUT GIVING US NORMAL ANTI-SKID INDICATIONS. THEY, CLE MAINT, DID A PRECAUTIONARY BRAKE AND LNDG GEAR STRUCTURAL INSPECTION, I BELIEVE IT WAS FOR AN OVERWT LNDG, HOWEVER WE LANDED AT APPROX 345,000 LBS -- WELL WITHIN THE NORMAL LNDG REGIME, HOWEVER SLIGHTLY OUT OF THE FLAPS 50 DEGS ANTI-SKID INOP PARAMETERS. THE WIND HAD BEEN CALM. WE HAD A NORMAL FLT, LNDG, AND APCH BACK TO ORD LNDG AT RWY 30L. THE SO AND I REMAINED A WHILE LONGER EXPLORING THE DIFFERENCES OF THE -30 ACFT, LOWER GALLEY, DOORS, ETC. WE THEN LEFT FOR FLT OPS AND CONTINUED WITH OUR DEBRIEF. AFTER COMPLETING OUR DEBRIEF, I COMPLIMENTED HIM ON HIS OUTSTANDING JOB DURING IOE, REITERATING OUR LESSONS LEARNED AND SIGNED HIM OFF SAFE FOR SOLO. CAUSE OF PROB: PRIMARY -- INATTN TO DETAIL ON FLC'S PART AND THE DISPATCHER'S. RECOMMENDATIONS: IF A NEW PRINTED RELEASE WOULD HAVE BEEN SENT OVER ACARS VERSUS OVER THE RADIO, THE REMARKS WOULD HAVE BEEN READ STATING A GREATER THAN 10000 FT RWY WAS REQUIRED. FLT MANUAL PROCEDURAL LOCATION: THIS PROC SHOULD BE CATEGORIZED AS AN IRREGULAR PROC VERSUS PART OF THE NORMAL LNDG SECTION. THE ADJACENT PAGE TO THE FLAPS 50 DEGS ANTI-SKID INOP PAGE IS THE NORMAL LNDG RWY PERFORMANCE LIMIT CHARTS, THUS MAKING IT VERY EASY FOR A PERSON(S) IN A RUSH TO OVERLOOK THE PRINT AT THE TOP R CORNER OF THE PAGE. CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PLACING IRREGULAR TKOF AND LNDG OPS IN ITS OWN CATEGORY. MANUALLY COMPUTING THE NUMBERS IS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. IN SUMMARY, ATTN TO DETAIL PRIOR TO TKOF COULD HAVE AVERTED A SIT ON THE GND THAT LED TO A DECISION TO CONTINUE FOR LNDG AT CLE ONCE AIRBORNE. HAD WX AND FUEL NOT BEEN AN ISSUE, THE DECISION TO RETURN TO ORD WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY. AUTOMATION OF LNDG DATA WITH SYS INOP COULD HAVE ALSO ASSISTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.