Narrative:

Our flight was assigned a heading of 140 degrees for a left downwind approach for runway 28L at sfo. WX was approximately 190 degrees/20 KTS broken 020 5 mi visibility with light rain showers over sfo and mostly clear over brijj, the OM for runway 28L. Turning base for the approach I noticed traffic directly below us proceeding to the airport that was not on TCASII. I inquired bay approach and they notified us it was an MD80 proceeding to runway 28R and cleared us the visual approach for runway 28L. We responded by saying we had the traffic and the brijj in sight, but not the airport. We were given the visual approach. Proceeding to brijj, we elected to stay to the left of course to provide more distance between us and the MD80. The MD80 appeared to have overshot the localizer and while taking corrective action to recapture it, overshot it again flying into the runway 28L localizer. The captain was very busy trying to find the airport through the rain shower that had started over the airport and reduced visibility. In addition he was also watching the MD80 to determine their location. I was concerned about the flight path of the MD80 and was not able to devote my full attention to the flight path of our aircraft. Noticing the instruments during a quick xchk I notified the captain. He did not have the airport, we were left of course and proceeding below glide path. Meanwhile, the MD80 was proceeding to intercept the runway 28L localizer (I presume) and I felt very uncomfortable with their close proximity to our aircraft. I said we should go around and the captain quickly acted. I estimate we came close to 400 ft to the MD80 horizontally and even vertically. After I notified the tower of our go around, I noticed the MD80 turn immediately back to the right. We proceeded with a normal ILS approach to runway 28R afterwards with no further incidents. The contributing factors were: WX including strong winds out of the south, and deteriorating visibility on the approach. ATC trying to do visuals under questionable conditions (WX) and high traffic load. Human factor errors by both pilots focusing on the traffic instead of assigning specific tasks for each to do and concentrate on flying the aircraft. In addition, by flying to the left of the localizer inside the OM, we were violating our sops. Human performance considerations: we were cleared the visual approach operating intentionally close to another aircraft with only the brijj in sight. Over brijj, without the runway in sight, we should have executed a go around. By not stating who would watch the traffic and who would fly the approach we failed delegating tasks. However, after recognizing the situation had deteriorated rapidly, we did execute prompt evasive action with coordinated teamwork. Lastly, I believe this is a perfect example with the current situation in san francisco. Due to the lack of space to add runways the airport is saturated with delays when confronted with WX. We were, in fact, 3 hours late. I believe they will try to 'help' prevent delays as long as possible by clearing pilots a visual approach. After our approach and subsequent go around ATC did switch back to the ILS runway 28R approach. I believe this should be of great concern throughout the ATC system but no place as significantly as san francisco.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT ON B737 RPTS SIGHTING AN MD80 ON APCH AT SFO FOR THE PARALLEL RWY. PLT IS UNABLE TO SEE THE ARPT DUE TO REDUCED VISIBILITY BUT IS CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH. PLT BECOMES UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT AND EXECUTES A MISSED APCH. THE FO BELIEVES A NMAC OCCURRED BTWN HIS FLT AND THE ACFT HE SAW AHEAD FOR THE PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS ASSIGNED A HDG OF 140 DEGS FOR A L DOWNWIND APCH FOR RWY 28L AT SFO. WX WAS APPROX 190 DEGS/20 KTS BROKEN 020 5 MI VISIBILITY WITH LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS OVER SFO AND MOSTLY CLR OVER BRIJJ, THE OM FOR RWY 28L. TURNING BASE FOR THE APCH I NOTICED TFC DIRECTLY BELOW US PROCEEDING TO THE ARPT THAT WAS NOT ON TCASII. I INQUIRED BAY APCH AND THEY NOTIFIED US IT WAS AN MD80 PROCEEDING TO RWY 28R AND CLRED US THE VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 28L. WE RESPONDED BY SAYING WE HAD THE TFC AND THE BRIJJ IN SIGHT, BUT NOT THE ARPT. WE WERE GIVEN THE VISUAL APCH. PROCEEDING TO BRIJJ, WE ELECTED TO STAY TO THE L OF COURSE TO PROVIDE MORE DISTANCE BTWN US AND THE MD80. THE MD80 APPEARED TO HAVE OVERSHOT THE LOC AND WHILE TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION TO RECAPTURE IT, OVERSHOT IT AGAIN FLYING INTO THE RWY 28L LOC. THE CAPT WAS VERY BUSY TRYING TO FIND THE ARPT THROUGH THE RAIN SHOWER THAT HAD STARTED OVER THE ARPT AND REDUCED VISIBILITY. IN ADDITION HE WAS ALSO WATCHING THE MD80 TO DETERMINE THEIR LOCATION. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FLT PATH OF THE MD80 AND WAS NOT ABLE TO DEVOTE MY FULL ATTN TO THE FLT PATH OF OUR ACFT. NOTICING THE INSTS DURING A QUICK XCHK I NOTIFIED THE CAPT. HE DID NOT HAVE THE ARPT, WE WERE L OF COURSE AND PROCEEDING BELOW GLIDE PATH. MEANWHILE, THE MD80 WAS PROCEEDING TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 28L LOC (I PRESUME) AND I FELT VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THEIR CLOSE PROX TO OUR ACFT. I SAID WE SHOULD GAR AND THE CAPT QUICKLY ACTED. I ESTIMATE WE CAME CLOSE TO 400 FT TO THE MD80 HORIZLY AND EVEN VERTLY. AFTER I NOTIFIED THE TWR OF OUR GAR, I NOTICED THE MD80 TURN IMMEDIATELY BACK TO THE R. WE PROCEEDED WITH A NORMAL ILS APCH TO RWY 28R AFTERWARDS WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENTS. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: WX INCLUDING STRONG WINDS OUT OF THE S, AND DETERIORATING VISIBILITY ON THE APCH. ATC TRYING TO DO VISUALS UNDER QUESTIONABLE CONDITIONS (WX) AND HIGH TFC LOAD. HUMAN FACTOR ERRORS BY BOTH PLTS FOCUSING ON THE TFC INSTEAD OF ASSIGNING SPECIFIC TASKS FOR EACH TO DO AND CONCENTRATE ON FLYING THE ACFT. IN ADDITION, BY FLYING TO THE L OF THE LOC INSIDE THE OM, WE WERE VIOLATING OUR SOPS. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: WE WERE CLRED THE VISUAL APCH OPERATING INTENTIONALLY CLOSE TO ANOTHER ACFT WITH ONLY THE BRIJJ IN SIGHT. OVER BRIJJ, WITHOUT THE RWY IN SIGHT, WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR. BY NOT STATING WHO WOULD WATCH THE TFC AND WHO WOULD FLY THE APCH WE FAILED DELEGATING TASKS. HOWEVER, AFTER RECOGNIZING THE SIT HAD DETERIORATED RAPIDLY, WE DID EXECUTE PROMPT EVASIVE ACTION WITH COORDINATED TEAMWORK. LASTLY, I BELIEVE THIS IS A PERFECT EXAMPLE WITH THE CURRENT SIT IN SAN FRANCISCO. DUE TO THE LACK OF SPACE TO ADD RWYS THE ARPT IS SATURATED WITH DELAYS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH WX. WE WERE, IN FACT, 3 HRS LATE. I BELIEVE THEY WILL TRY TO 'HELP' PREVENT DELAYS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BY CLRING PLTS A VISUAL APCH. AFTER OUR APCH AND SUBSEQUENT GAR ATC DID SWITCH BACK TO THE ILS RWY 28R APCH. I BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN THROUGHOUT THE ATC SYS BUT NO PLACE AS SIGNIFICANTLY AS SAN FRANCISCO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.