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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 400667 |
Time | |
Date | 199804 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mem |
State Reference | TN |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 9800 msl bound upper : 10000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : mem |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Challenger CL604 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | cruise other cruise other descent other |
Route In Use | arrival other arrival star : star enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 170 flight time total : 2355 flight time type : 170 |
ASRS Report | 400667 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation other |
Narrative:
I was in the pilot lounge on reserve waiting to be called out on a trip. When the call came, I was supposed to taxi an aircraft from the gate to the hangar and then taxi another aircraft from the hangar to the gate. Upon arrival back at the gate, I met a different captain, one I had never flown with, and we were assigned to fly to mem and back. One of the first things out of his mouth was 'what the...took you so long at the hangar?' I thought it had taken about the usual amount of time and really did not know what to say. Then, prior to taxi, I noticed a display cool caution message and brought it to the captain's attention. He said that it was a 'pilot induced item.' he had purposely turned off the ground cooling fan for the 6 CRT displays because it was 'too noisy.' he then commented that if the displays began to automatically shut down then he would turn the fan back on adding the remark, 'wouldn't maintenance love me.' we then proceeded to taxi without headsets using the aircraft speaker instead. After departure, about the time we were issued a clearance to climb above FL180, the captain leaned his seat back, slumped down, put his head in his right hand, closed his eyes and said, 'I hope you don't mind if I just take a nap.' I no doubt should have said something about how I would really appreciate it if he would stay awake, but I didn't and he appeared to doze right off. (He later told me that he had awoken at XX00 am to get his family and himself back on the only available flight from orl where they had been vacationing for the previous few days.) another thing I should have done was tell him at some point about how I had only been with the company 10 months and had only about 170 hours in the airplane. Usually this is part of the acm/crew briefing. But I didn't believe that he was all that interested in knowing about my status. So there I was doing single-pilot and all the radios and radar and TCASII, etc. As we began initial descent on the wlder one arrival, I saw some boiling buildups ahead and requested to deviate. ATC authority/authorized deviations to the right of course and cleared me direct mem when able with the descent at my discretion. I turned on the seat belt sign, monitored the need for anti-ice, and used the radar and FMS to start down and around toward mem. This is when I should have woken up the captain, but I didn't because I thought I had everything under control. But as I entered IMC and approach began to issue further dscnts and assigned the approach to expect, my workload increased drastically. The captain stirred and I told him that I 'could use some help.' we had been cruising at about 310 KIAS at 10000 ft when ATC cleared me to rejoin 'the radial' which I interpreted to mean the wlder one arrival radial. Luckily I had not cleared the arrival and typed in direct mem as previously cleared because I would not have had the time to reprogram the arrival back into the FMS. At the same time I was told to reintercept 'the radial,' I was cleared out of 10000 ft a second time. This had to be repeated because I was still flying and working the radio and became saturated and missed/did not hear the altitude assignment. Given the sudden increase in workload, I told the autoplt to descend and about 5 seconds later realized I was still faster than 250 KIAS. So, I disengaged the autoplt and slowed to 250 KIAS at 9800 ft before continuing descent. About this time, the flight management system came upon the last fix on the arrival (clark) and with the autoplt now re-engaged began to turn to a 175 degree heading. I looked at the FMS picture and saw no fix in the direction we had turned and asked the captain, who had just gotten ATIS, 'where is it taking me?' he replied that he didn't know but 'don't let it take you there.' so I clicked off the autoplt and leveled the wings. About then both the captain and ATC told me to turn left to the 175 degree heading. As it turned out, the heading was published on the arrival for vectors to the final approach course. So I turned and we hurried through the rest of the checklists and landed. Next time I will discuss my experience level and in my opinion there should be no sleeping and certainly not once descending below FL180.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A FAIRLY NEW FO IS LEFT ON HIS OWN DURING A FLT TO MEM WHEN THE PIC DECIDES TO NAP ENRTE. FO IS 'SWAMPED' DURING APCH.
Narrative: I WAS IN THE PLT LOUNGE ON RESERVE WAITING TO BE CALLED OUT ON A TRIP. WHEN THE CALL CAME, I WAS SUPPOSED TO TAXI AN ACFT FROM THE GATE TO THE HANGAR AND THEN TAXI ANOTHER ACFT FROM THE HANGAR TO THE GATE. UPON ARR BACK AT THE GATE, I MET A DIFFERENT CAPT, ONE I HAD NEVER FLOWN WITH, AND WE WERE ASSIGNED TO FLY TO MEM AND BACK. ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS OUT OF HIS MOUTH WAS 'WHAT THE...TOOK YOU SO LONG AT THE HANGAR?' I THOUGHT IT HAD TAKEN ABOUT THE USUAL AMOUNT OF TIME AND REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO SAY. THEN, PRIOR TO TAXI, I NOTICED A DISPLAY COOL CAUTION MESSAGE AND BROUGHT IT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS A 'PLT INDUCED ITEM.' HE HAD PURPOSELY TURNED OFF THE GND COOLING FAN FOR THE 6 CRT DISPLAYS BECAUSE IT WAS 'TOO NOISY.' HE THEN COMMENTED THAT IF THE DISPLAYS BEGAN TO AUTOMATICALLY SHUT DOWN THEN HE WOULD TURN THE FAN BACK ON ADDING THE REMARK, 'WOULDN'T MAINT LOVE ME.' WE THEN PROCEEDED TO TAXI WITHOUT HEADSETS USING THE ACFT SPEAKER INSTEAD. AFTER DEP, ABOUT THE TIME WE WERE ISSUED A CLRNC TO CLB ABOVE FL180, THE CAPT LEANED HIS SEAT BACK, SLUMPED DOWN, PUT HIS HEAD IN HIS R HAND, CLOSED HIS EYES AND SAID, 'I HOPE YOU DON'T MIND IF I JUST TAKE A NAP.' I NO DOUBT SHOULD HAVE SAID SOMETHING ABOUT HOW I WOULD REALLY APPRECIATE IT IF HE WOULD STAY AWAKE, BUT I DIDN'T AND HE APPEARED TO DOZE RIGHT OFF. (HE LATER TOLD ME THAT HE HAD AWOKEN AT XX00 AM TO GET HIS FAMILY AND HIMSELF BACK ON THE ONLY AVAILABLE FLT FROM ORL WHERE THEY HAD BEEN VACATIONING FOR THE PREVIOUS FEW DAYS.) ANOTHER THING I SHOULD HAVE DONE WAS TELL HIM AT SOME POINT ABOUT HOW I HAD ONLY BEEN WITH THE COMPANY 10 MONTHS AND HAD ONLY ABOUT 170 HRS IN THE AIRPLANE. USUALLY THIS IS PART OF THE ACM/CREW BRIEFING. BUT I DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT HE WAS ALL THAT INTERESTED IN KNOWING ABOUT MY STATUS. SO THERE I WAS DOING SINGLE-PLT AND ALL THE RADIOS AND RADAR AND TCASII, ETC. AS WE BEGAN INITIAL DSCNT ON THE WLDER ONE ARR, I SAW SOME BOILING BUILDUPS AHEAD AND REQUESTED TO DEVIATE. ATC AUTH DEVS TO THE R OF COURSE AND CLRED ME DIRECT MEM WHEN ABLE WITH THE DSCNT AT MY DISCRETION. I TURNED ON THE SEAT BELT SIGN, MONITORED THE NEED FOR ANTI-ICE, AND USED THE RADAR AND FMS TO START DOWN AND AROUND TOWARD MEM. THIS IS WHEN I SHOULD HAVE WOKEN UP THE CAPT, BUT I DIDN'T BECAUSE I THOUGHT I HAD EVERYTHING UNDER CTL. BUT AS I ENTERED IMC AND APCH BEGAN TO ISSUE FURTHER DSCNTS AND ASSIGNED THE APCH TO EXPECT, MY WORKLOAD INCREASED DRASTICALLY. THE CAPT STIRRED AND I TOLD HIM THAT I 'COULD USE SOME HELP.' WE HAD BEEN CRUISING AT ABOUT 310 KIAS AT 10000 FT WHEN ATC CLRED ME TO REJOIN 'THE RADIAL' WHICH I INTERPRETED TO MEAN THE WLDER ONE ARR RADIAL. LUCKILY I HAD NOT CLRED THE ARR AND TYPED IN DIRECT MEM AS PREVIOUSLY CLRED BECAUSE I WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE TIME TO REPROGRAM THE ARR BACK INTO THE FMS. AT THE SAME TIME I WAS TOLD TO REINTERCEPT 'THE RADIAL,' I WAS CLRED OUT OF 10000 FT A SECOND TIME. THIS HAD TO BE REPEATED BECAUSE I WAS STILL FLYING AND WORKING THE RADIO AND BECAME SATURATED AND MISSED/DID NOT HEAR THE ALT ASSIGNMENT. GIVEN THE SUDDEN INCREASE IN WORKLOAD, I TOLD THE AUTOPLT TO DSND AND ABOUT 5 SECONDS LATER REALIZED I WAS STILL FASTER THAN 250 KIAS. SO, I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND SLOWED TO 250 KIAS AT 9800 FT BEFORE CONTINUING DSCNT. ABOUT THIS TIME, THE FLT MGMNT SYS CAME UPON THE LAST FIX ON THE ARR (CLARK) AND WITH THE AUTOPLT NOW RE-ENGAGED BEGAN TO TURN TO A 175 DEG HDG. I LOOKED AT THE FMS PICTURE AND SAW NO FIX IN THE DIRECTION WE HAD TURNED AND ASKED THE CAPT, WHO HAD JUST GOTTEN ATIS, 'WHERE IS IT TAKING ME?' HE REPLIED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW BUT 'DON'T LET IT TAKE YOU THERE.' SO I CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND LEVELED THE WINGS. ABOUT THEN BOTH THE CAPT AND ATC TOLD ME TO TURN L TO THE 175 DEG HDG. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE HEADING WAS PUBLISHED ON THE ARR FOR VECTORS TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE. SO I TURNED AND WE HURRIED THROUGH THE REST OF THE CHKLISTS AND LANDED. NEXT TIME I WILL DISCUSS MY EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND IN MY OPINION THERE SHOULD BE NO SLEEPING AND CERTAINLY NOT ONCE DSNDING BELOW FL180.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.