Narrative:

I was copilot for a new captain (250 hours PIC). Many thousands of hours as sic in the DC9. We were about to takeoff from stl and there was very bad WX just off the departure end of the runway. We refused takeoff clearance once because of the WX. The captain acted very upset about this. I was relieved and I said, 'there are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old bold pilots.' the next time we were cleared into position he made the decision to go and was very determined in his manner, so I relied on his judgement. It turned out to be very bad judgement. The WX was as bad as it looked and he decided to keep his speed up to 280 KIAS to clear the bad rainstorm at the end of the runway. I called out 'airspeed' and he said he was exceeding 250 KIAS intentionally. I was not as aggressive as I once would have been in questioning the captain on his decisions because twice in the recent past the assistant chief pilot at air carrier has spoken with me about this and I was told, 'don't cross a captain' and 'the captain is the final authority/authorized' and 'this is a captain's airline.' CRM is certainly sick and dying here and I don't understand why. Could you please intervene. The training in CRM is awful/non existent and management needs educating. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain aborted the first takeoff when the tower issued a microburst advisory, a SIGMET for WX off the end of the active runway. The captain was upset over having had to delay the flight and made this evident on the taxi back for a later and second takeoff. That is when the speed deviation took place. This captain later apologized to the first officer for his behavior and apparent lack of judgement. The previous events that incurred interviews with the chief pilot's office had occurred when she was a new hire. Captain #1 had not finished the delayed engine start checklist and the before takeoff checklist when he accepted a takeoff clearance. The checklists were completed as the aircraft was rolling. The flight returned with a smoke problem when one of the air conditioning packs malfunctioned. The first officer had objected to the captain accepting a takeoff clearance and during the roll the captain said, 'you've got it,' meaning 'your aircraft.' she refused the controls and told the captain to fly it. The event with captain #2 descending into toronto was when she advised him 3 times that he was not going to make his altitude restr. He finally relented and advised ATC that they couldn't make it. (An ASRS report was sent in on that event.) she decried the new hire training by describing this speaker, a first officer, who gave them a lecture on how not to 'upset a captain.' she felt that to be inappropriate. During a recurrent training session, the class was led in a discussion about a cpr jet that was CFIT in south america. She felt that was not related to air carrier operations. She stated that the airline philosophy led pilots to believe that you 'have to get the flight out and in on time' (the airline had had a program to improve its on time performance). The reporter was a first officer for 2 different commuter carriers and has been with this airline for a 2 yr period. She is also a CFI.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9-10 FO RPT ON CRM SKILLS AND PIC JUDGEMENT ON TKOF IN THE FACE OF BAD WX. AN AIRSPD DEV WAS INTENTIONALLY PERFORMED TO PENETRATE THE BAD WX.

Narrative: I WAS COPLT FOR A NEW CAPT (250 HRS PIC). MANY THOUSANDS OF HRS AS SIC IN THE DC9. WE WERE ABOUT TO TKOF FROM STL AND THERE WAS VERY BAD WX JUST OFF THE DEP END OF THE RWY. WE REFUSED TKOF CLRNC ONCE BECAUSE OF THE WX. THE CAPT ACTED VERY UPSET ABOUT THIS. I WAS RELIEVED AND I SAID, 'THERE ARE OLD PLTS AND BOLD PLTS, BUT NO OLD BOLD PLTS.' THE NEXT TIME WE WERE CLRED INTO POS HE MADE THE DECISION TO GO AND WAS VERY DETERMINED IN HIS MANNER, SO I RELIED ON HIS JUDGEMENT. IT TURNED OUT TO BE VERY BAD JUDGEMENT. THE WX WAS AS BAD AS IT LOOKED AND HE DECIDED TO KEEP HIS SPD UP TO 280 KIAS TO CLR THE BAD RAINSTORM AT THE END OF THE RWY. I CALLED OUT 'AIRSPD' AND HE SAID HE WAS EXCEEDING 250 KIAS INTENTIONALLY. I WAS NOT AS AGGRESSIVE AS I ONCE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN QUESTIONING THE CAPT ON HIS DECISIONS BECAUSE TWICE IN THE RECENT PAST THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT AT ACR HAS SPOKEN WITH ME ABOUT THIS AND I WAS TOLD, 'DON'T CROSS A CAPT' AND 'THE CAPT IS THE FINAL AUTH' AND 'THIS IS A CAPT'S AIRLINE.' CRM IS CERTAINLY SICK AND DYING HERE AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY. COULD YOU PLEASE INTERVENE. THE TRAINING IN CRM IS AWFUL/NON EXISTENT AND MGMNT NEEDS EDUCATING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT ABORTED THE FIRST TKOF WHEN THE TWR ISSUED A MICROBURST ADVISORY, A SIGMET FOR WX OFF THE END OF THE ACTIVE RWY. THE CAPT WAS UPSET OVER HAVING HAD TO DELAY THE FLT AND MADE THIS EVIDENT ON THE TAXI BACK FOR A LATER AND SECOND TKOF. THAT IS WHEN THE SPD DEV TOOK PLACE. THIS CAPT LATER APOLOGIZED TO THE FO FOR HIS BEHAVIOR AND APPARENT LACK OF JUDGEMENT. THE PREVIOUS EVENTS THAT INCURRED INTERVIEWS WITH THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE HAD OCCURRED WHEN SHE WAS A NEW HIRE. CAPT #1 HAD NOT FINISHED THE DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST AND THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WHEN HE ACCEPTED A TKOF CLRNC. THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AS THE ACFT WAS ROLLING. THE FLT RETURNED WITH A SMOKE PROB WHEN ONE OF THE AIR CONDITIONING PACKS MALFUNCTIONED. THE FO HAD OBJECTED TO THE CAPT ACCEPTING A TKOF CLRNC AND DURING THE ROLL THE CAPT SAID, 'YOU'VE GOT IT,' MEANING 'YOUR ACFT.' SHE REFUSED THE CTLS AND TOLD THE CAPT TO FLY IT. THE EVENT WITH CAPT #2 DSNDING INTO TORONTO WAS WHEN SHE ADVISED HIM 3 TIMES THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE HIS ALT RESTR. HE FINALLY RELENTED AND ADVISED ATC THAT THEY COULDN'T MAKE IT. (AN ASRS RPT WAS SENT IN ON THAT EVENT.) SHE DECRIED THE NEW HIRE TRAINING BY DESCRIBING THIS SPEAKER, A FO, WHO GAVE THEM A LECTURE ON HOW NOT TO 'UPSET A CAPT.' SHE FELT THAT TO BE INAPPROPRIATE. DURING A RECURRENT TRAINING SESSION, THE CLASS WAS LED IN A DISCUSSION ABOUT A CPR JET THAT WAS CFIT IN SOUTH AMERICA. SHE FELT THAT WAS NOT RELATED TO ACR OPS. SHE STATED THAT THE AIRLINE PHILOSOPHY LED PLTS TO BELIEVE THAT YOU 'HAVE TO GET THE FLT OUT AND IN ON TIME' (THE AIRLINE HAD HAD A PROGRAM TO IMPROVE ITS ON TIME PERFORMANCE). THE RPTR WAS A FO FOR 2 DIFFERENT COMMUTER CARRIERS AND HAS BEEN WITH THIS AIRLINE FOR A 2 YR PERIOD. SHE IS ALSO A CFI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.