Narrative:

Our flight was cleared to taxi to a gate at the terminal. We stopped short of the terminal to reconfirm our gate number because the gate still had another air carrier's insignia on it while the gate next to it did not. The gate for us was re-confirmed and a guideman taxi director guided us in. Brakes were set, engines shut down, wheels chocked, etc (uneventfully). Upon starting the walkaround inspection for our next leg. I noticed that we had impacted a belt loader with our left engine intake's leading edge. There was an approximately 1/2 inch deep crease, 3-4 inches long across the leading edge of the #1 engine intake (4 O'clock position when facing the intake). Additionally, there was a 1/4 to 1/2 inch deep tear in the nacelle skin about 6-8 inches aft of the leading edge impact area. This tear was approximately 1 inch long in a curved shape. No other damage was visible. Visibility was more than adequate for taxi operations. Guideman's signals were clear and were followed (by the captain) precisely. Taxi in speed was very slow. Ramp area was visually checked clear by both captain and first officer (note: nacelle is not visible from cockpit). Aircraft was stopped on the appropriate yellow line (checked on postflt). Belt loader was parked within confines of yellow safety box (checked on postflt). Perceptions: clearly these yellow safety zone lines for ground equipment were painted by the old air carrier, for their equipment! (That is, a dc-9 could have parked there without a problem.) a safety survey conducted prior to operating at another airlines' gate may have discovered such hazards and they could have been briefed to ramp personnel and flight crew. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer said that the footprint of the B737-300 was considerably different from that of the DC9-30's that used to operate in this gate when it was used by another air carrier. The other air carrier had moved out the day before and the old lines, logos and colors were still in place. The ramp agent who vectored them into the gate was very upset and the crew attempted to reassure him that it was not entirely his fault. The reporter said that he had submitted a facilities report to his company and spoken to the chief pilot about the incident, but he has not received any further information nor has he returned to cvg since the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B737 STRUCK A BELT LOADER WHILE BEING MARSHALLED INTO THE GATE. THIS GATE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LEASED TO ANOTHER ACR AND THE GND EQUIPMENT HOLD LINES HAD BEEN PAINTED FOR ANOTHER ACFT TYPE.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS CLRED TO TAXI TO A GATE AT THE TERMINAL. WE STOPPED SHORT OF THE TERMINAL TO RECONFIRM OUR GATE NUMBER BECAUSE THE GATE STILL HAD ANOTHER ACR'S INSIGNIA ON IT WHILE THE GATE NEXT TO IT DID NOT. THE GATE FOR US WAS RE-CONFIRMED AND A GUIDEMAN TAXI DIRECTOR GUIDED US IN. BRAKES WERE SET, ENGS SHUT DOWN, WHEELS CHOCKED, ETC (UNEVENTFULLY). UPON STARTING THE WALKAROUND INSPECTION FOR OUR NEXT LEG. I NOTICED THAT WE HAD IMPACTED A BELT LOADER WITH OUR L ENG INTAKE'S LEADING EDGE. THERE WAS AN APPROXIMATELY 1/2 INCH DEEP CREASE, 3-4 INCHES LONG ACROSS THE LEADING EDGE OF THE #1 ENG INTAKE (4 O'CLOCK POS WHEN FACING THE INTAKE). ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS A 1/4 TO 1/2 INCH DEEP TEAR IN THE NACELLE SKIN ABOUT 6-8 INCHES AFT OF THE LEADING EDGE IMPACT AREA. THIS TEAR WAS APPROXIMATELY 1 INCH LONG IN A CURVED SHAPE. NO OTHER DAMAGE WAS VISIBLE. VISIBILITY WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR TAXI OPS. GUIDEMAN'S SIGNALS WERE CLR AND WERE FOLLOWED (BY THE CAPT) PRECISELY. TAXI IN SPD WAS VERY SLOW. RAMP AREA WAS VISUALLY CHECKED CLR BY BOTH CAPT AND FO (NOTE: NACELLE IS NOT VISIBLE FROM COCKPIT). ACFT WAS STOPPED ON THE APPROPRIATE YELLOW LINE (CHECKED ON POSTFLT). BELT LOADER WAS PARKED WITHIN CONFINES OF YELLOW SAFETY BOX (CHECKED ON POSTFLT). PERCEPTIONS: CLRLY THESE YELLOW SAFETY ZONE LINES FOR GND EQUIPMENT WERE PAINTED BY THE OLD ACR, FOR THEIR EQUIPMENT! (THAT IS, A DC-9 COULD HAVE PARKED THERE WITHOUT A PROBLEM.) A SAFETY SURVEY CONDUCTED PRIOR TO OPERATING AT ANOTHER AIRLINES' GATE MAY HAVE DISCOVERED SUCH HAZARDS AND THEY COULD HAVE BEEN BRIEFED TO RAMP PERSONNEL AND FLC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO SAID THAT THE FOOTPRINT OF THE B737-300 WAS CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE DC9-30'S THAT USED TO OPERATE IN THIS GATE WHEN IT WAS USED BY ANOTHER ACR. THE OTHER ACR HAD MOVED OUT THE DAY BEFORE AND THE OLD LINES, LOGOS AND COLORS WERE STILL IN PLACE. THE RAMP AGENT WHO VECTORED THEM INTO THE GATE WAS VERY UPSET AND THE CREW ATTEMPTED TO REASSURE HIM THAT IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY HIS FAULT. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE HAD SUBMITTED A FACILITIES RPT TO HIS COMPANY AND SPOKEN TO THE CHIEF PLT ABOUT THE INCIDENT, BUT HE HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY FURTHER INFO NOR HAS HE RETURNED TO CVG SINCE THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.