Narrative:

Climbing through FL200 on a flight from mem to atl, center advised us that company was trying to contact our flight. When workload allowed, company was contacted and they advised that one shipment (1 piece) of oxidizer, a dangerous goods item, had been loaded on the main deck of the aircraft. This piece should have been loaded in the designated 'hazmat can.' company wanted to know if we were going to continue to atl or return to mem. It was a mutual crew decision to continue to atl for several reasons. First, when the problem was made known to us, the flight was already half way to atl. Second, should we have returned to mem at that point, the aircraft would have been overweight for landing. (There is no fuel-dump system on the A300- 600F, we were forecasted to land in atl at maximum landing weight, and needed to continue our climb to FL330 in order to burn enough gas to be at or below maximum landing weight at atl.) third, a return to mem during the middle of the outbound 'launch' of company aircraft would surely involve extensive delays in the taxi 'up-stream' of traffic to the company ramp area. Continuing to atl would get the misloaded dangerous goods item off the aircraft in the least amount of time. The flight continued to atl with no abnormalities. A flight crew safety report was completed and filed with the company in an effort to help prevent this type of misloading in the future.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRBUS 300-600 IN CLB AT FL200 WAS ADVISED OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL LOADED IMPROPERLY ON THE MAIN DECK.

Narrative: CLBING THROUGH FL200 ON A FLT FROM MEM TO ATL, CTR ADVISED US THAT COMPANY WAS TRYING TO CONTACT OUR FLT. WHEN WORKLOAD ALLOWED, COMPANY WAS CONTACTED AND THEY ADVISED THAT ONE SHIPMENT (1 PIECE) OF OXIDIZER, A DANGEROUS GOODS ITEM, HAD BEEN LOADED ON THE MAIN DECK OF THE ACFT. THIS PIECE SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOADED IN THE DESIGNATED 'HAZMAT CAN.' COMPANY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WERE GOING TO CONTINUE TO ATL OR RETURN TO MEM. IT WAS A MUTUAL CREW DECISION TO CONTINUE TO ATL FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST, WHEN THE PROB WAS MADE KNOWN TO US, THE FLT WAS ALREADY HALF WAY TO ATL. SECOND, SHOULD WE HAVE RETURNED TO MEM AT THAT POINT, THE ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN OVERWT FOR LNDG. (THERE IS NO FUEL-DUMP SYS ON THE A300- 600F, WE WERE FORECASTED TO LAND IN ATL AT MAX LNDG WT, AND NEEDED TO CONTINUE OUR CLB TO FL330 IN ORDER TO BURN ENOUGH GAS TO BE AT OR BELOW MAX LNDG WT AT ATL.) THIRD, A RETURN TO MEM DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE OUTBOUND 'LAUNCH' OF COMPANY ACFT WOULD SURELY INVOLVE EXTENSIVE DELAYS IN THE TAXI 'UP-STREAM' OF TFC TO THE COMPANY RAMP AREA. CONTINUING TO ATL WOULD GET THE MISLOADED DANGEROUS GOODS ITEM OFF THE ACFT IN THE LEAST AMOUNT OF TIME. THE FLT CONTINUED TO ATL WITH NO ABNORMALITIES. A FLC SAFETY RPT WAS COMPLETED AND FILED WITH THE COMPANY IN AN EFFORT TO HELP PREVENT THIS TYPE OF MISLOADING IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.