Narrative:

Myself and a co-worker were instructed to install a new aft cargo pit floor panel over stringer damage. Several holes were drilled and elongated on the stringer. We asked our lead what to do. Our lead xyz instructed us to install the panel. He wanted to know if inspection knew about the damage. We said no. We could not find the proper hardware for this panel so we were not able to install it. We returned the next day and the panel was installed and no non routine was made. The week prior to the aforementioned events, I was instructed to install a damaged #5 brake assembly by the same lead xyz. I looked up the inspection check and both the axle sleeve and the brake assembly on the left main gear were damaged. I requested inspection to generate non routines for the axle sleeve which was repaired. The brake assembly was changed due to severe pitting and galling. Inaction by this lead mechanic in addressing these defects is not acceptable. This lead mechanic attempts to utilize his position to intimidate workers into performing shoddy aircraft maintenance. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was released for service and a document check revealed no write-up on the stringer damage. The reporter said, while the stringer damage is only secondary structure, it should have been documented and made a long-term deferred item to be corrected at the next heavy check. The reporter stated this incident was reported to the union safety representative who met with the inspection department but no information was reported back to the reporter of any action taken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 WAS RELEASED BY MAINT FOR SVC WITH KNOWN AFT LOWER FUSELAGE STRINGER DAMAGE DUE TO THE MECH'S RPT NOT DOCUMENTED BY THE LEAD MECH.

Narrative: MYSELF AND A CO-WORKER WERE INSTRUCTED TO INSTALL A NEW AFT CARGO PIT FLOOR PANEL OVER STRINGER DAMAGE. SEVERAL HOLES WERE DRILLED AND ELONGATED ON THE STRINGER. WE ASKED OUR LEAD WHAT TO DO. OUR LEAD XYZ INSTRUCTED US TO INSTALL THE PANEL. HE WANTED TO KNOW IF INSPECTION KNEW ABOUT THE DAMAGE. WE SAID NO. WE COULD NOT FIND THE PROPER HARDWARE FOR THIS PANEL SO WE WERE NOT ABLE TO INSTALL IT. WE RETURNED THE NEXT DAY AND THE PANEL WAS INSTALLED AND NO NON ROUTINE WAS MADE. THE WK PRIOR TO THE AFOREMENTIONED EVENTS, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO INSTALL A DAMAGED #5 BRAKE ASSEMBLY BY THE SAME LEAD XYZ. I LOOKED UP THE INSPECTION CHK AND BOTH THE AXLE SLEEVE AND THE BRAKE ASSEMBLY ON THE L MAIN GEAR WERE DAMAGED. I REQUESTED INSPECTION TO GENERATE NON ROUTINES FOR THE AXLE SLEEVE WHICH WAS REPAIRED. THE BRAKE ASSEMBLY WAS CHANGED DUE TO SEVERE PITTING AND GALLING. INACTION BY THIS LEAD MECH IN ADDRESSING THESE DEFECTS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THIS LEAD MECH ATTEMPTS TO UTILIZE HIS POS TO INTIMIDATE WORKERS INTO PERFORMING SHODDY ACFT MAINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR SVC AND A DOCUMENT CHK REVEALED NO WRITE-UP ON THE STRINGER DAMAGE. THE RPTR SAID, WHILE THE STRINGER DAMAGE IS ONLY SECONDARY STRUCTURE, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED AND MADE A LONG-TERM DEFERRED ITEM TO BE CORRECTED AT THE NEXT HVY CHK. THE RPTR STATED THIS INCIDENT WAS RPTED TO THE UNION SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE WHO MET WITH THE INSPECTION DEPT BUT NO INFO WAS RPTED BACK TO THE RPTR OF ANY ACTION TAKEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.