Narrative:

I served as captain and PF of flight xx. The first officer on the flight was not flying. The aircraft was an MD88. Flight xx was scheduled and operated from atl to pvd. On takeoff from runway 9L, atl tower assigned flight xx an immediate right turn to a heading of 165 degrees due to the need to vector our departure around WX. During climb on this departure atl departure vectored flight xx to a heading of 070 degrees. On this heading atl departure assigned us to climb to 12000 ft and advised us to expect higher. On this heading, atl departure advised flight xx we could expect light to moderate chop as we went through breaks in the WX. On this vector, atl departure cleared us to 13000 ft. I instructed my first officer to obtain a higher altitude and we began to climb to 13000 ft. Atl departure then advised us it would be another 5 mi before a higher altitude would be available. On this heading it became immediately apparent 13000 ft would not clear the WX ahead. It appeared that on the assigned heading, an altitude of approximately 16000 ft would have cleared the WX, however ATC advised such altitude was not available. On this heading, the WX radar was painting a red return extending 20 mi. In order to avoid the WX at the present altitude, I initiated an immediate right turn at 30 degrees bank. After executing a 30 degree bank turn I realized such rate of turn would not avoid the WX. I then increased my angle of bank to approximately 60 degrees to avoid the threatening WX. After clearing the WX, approximately 70 mi southeast of atlanta, we proceeded on to spa then flight plan route. I then spoke with flight attendant kk. Flight attendant kk advised me that the cabin crew and passenger were all okay. I then made a PA announcement explaining the necessity of the turn. At this time, there was no report of any problems with the cabin crew or passenger. During flight, approximately 40 mins from pvd, I went to the cabin to use the restroom and learned from flight attendant ll that she had 'blacked-out' during the maneuvering turn. I expressed my concern that I had not been advised of such condition. She told me such condition was only momentary and that she felt fine. The other 2 flight attendants advised methat they felt momentarily 'faint' but were also fine. I then walked through the aircraft and spoke with the passenger to learn the condition of the passenger. I learned a few passenger had felt momentarily 'dizzy' but that they felt fine. I offered a medical doctor to meet the aircraft if they wanted one. All of the passenger and cabin crew declined meeting with a medical doctor because they felt fine. Upon arrival in pvd, because the flight attendant had advised me she had 'blacked-out,' I contacted maintenance control. I called maintenance as a precautionary measure to learn the maximum 'G' load of the aircraft and to learn what was required for such a situation. I did not suspect during such maneuver that I had ever exceeded any limitations of the aircraft and would not have called maintenance but not for the report from flight attendant ll. After consulting with maintenance, the aircraft was inspected by pvd contract maintenance and was signed off. We flew and operated the same aircraft from pvd-atl. Additionally, maintenance contacted me. I spoke with a maintenance supervisor, pilot duty-officer, in-flight duty supervisor, and MD88 duty guy. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that as he approached a line of thunderstorms at 12000 ft he requested a higher altitude. ATC said higher altitude would be available shortly. He flew right up to the edge of the thunderstorm, but, no change in altitude had been available so he turned the aircraft sharply to avoid the level 3 echoes in the clouds. To make the aircraft avoid the clouds, he rolled his aircraft to a 60 degree bank and pulled back increasing the 'G' force on the aircraft. The aircraft avoided the clouds but the 'G' force was felt by all passenger and cabin crew members. As the aircraft climbed and continued on to destination, the captain inquired of the passenger and cabin flight crew. 1 flight attendant said she blacked out during the steep turn. All passenger and cabin crew were sitting down with seat belts fastened during this maneuver. No one else said there were any ill effects from the steep turn but the captain wrote the event up in the aircraft log as 'may have pulled as many 3 'G's.' the captain's motivation for writing it up was that the cabin attendant stated she blacked out. The aircraft was inspected at destination with no damage done to the airframe. The flight recorder was pulled and the 'G' loading was determined to be 1.65 'G' during the steep turn. Aircraft 'G' limit is 2.5. The FAA is looking into the event because the flight attendant who reported she blacked out, was thought she might have been made incapacitated. The captain is convinced from talking with the flight attendant, there was no incapacitation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD88 FLYING THROUGH ATL, GA, AIRSPACE IS VECTORED TOWARDS A TSTM. WHEN FLC DISCOVERS THEY ARE NOT GOING TO CLR THE STORM, FLC TAKES UP NEW HEADING ON THEIR OWN WITHOUT ANY CLRNC FROM ATC. ACFT IS TURNED STEEPLY ENOUGH THAT ALL OCCUPANTS FEEL THE EXTRA 'G' FORCE OF THE TURN.

Narrative: I SERVED AS CAPT AND PF OF FLT XX. THE FO ON THE FLT WAS NOT FLYING. THE ACFT WAS AN MD88. FLT XX WAS SCHEDULED AND OPERATED FROM ATL TO PVD. ON TKOF FROM RWY 9L, ATL TWR ASSIGNED FLT XX AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO A HDG OF 165 DEGS DUE TO THE NEED TO VECTOR OUR DEP AROUND WX. DURING CLB ON THIS DEP ATL DEP VECTORED FLT XX TO A HDG OF 070 DEGS. ON THIS HEADING ATL DEP ASSIGNED US TO CLB TO 12000 FT AND ADVISED US TO EXPECT HIGHER. ON THIS HEADING, ATL DEP ADVISED FLT XX WE COULD EXPECT LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP AS WE WENT THROUGH BREAKS IN THE WX. ON THIS VECTOR, ATL DEP CLRED US TO 13000 FT. I INSTRUCTED MY FO TO OBTAIN A HIGHER ALT AND WE BEGAN TO CLB TO 13000 FT. ATL DEP THEN ADVISED US IT WOULD BE ANOTHER 5 MI BEFORE A HIGHER ALT WOULD BE AVAILABLE. ON THIS HEADING IT BECAME IMMEDIATELY APPARENT 13000 FT WOULD NOT CLR THE WX AHEAD. IT APPEARED THAT ON THE ASSIGNED HEADING, AN ALT OF APPROX 16000 FT WOULD HAVE CLRED THE WX, HOWEVER ATC ADVISED SUCH ALT WAS NOT AVAILABLE. ON THIS HEADING, THE WX RADAR WAS PAINTING A RED RETURN EXTENDING 20 MI. IN ORDER TO AVOID THE WX AT THE PRESENT ALT, I INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE R TURN AT 30 DEGS BANK. AFTER EXECUTING A 30 DEG BANK TURN I REALIZED SUCH RATE OF TURN WOULD NOT AVOID THE WX. I THEN INCREASED MY ANGLE OF BANK TO APPROX 60 DEGS TO AVOID THE THREATENING WX. AFTER CLRING THE WX, APPROX 70 MI SE OF ATLANTA, WE PROCEEDED ON TO SPA THEN FLT PLAN RTE. I THEN SPOKE WITH FLT ATTENDANT KK. FLT ATTENDANT KK ADVISED ME THAT THE CABIN CREW AND PAX WERE ALL OKAY. I THEN MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT EXPLAINING THE NECESSITY OF THE TURN. AT THIS TIME, THERE WAS NO RPT OF ANY PROBS WITH THE CABIN CREW OR PAX. DURING FLT, APPROX 40 MINS FROM PVD, I WENT TO THE CABIN TO USE THE RESTROOM AND LEARNED FROM FLT ATTENDANT LL THAT SHE HAD 'BLACKED-OUT' DURING THE MANEUVERING TURN. I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN THAT I HAD NOT BEEN ADVISED OF SUCH CONDITION. SHE TOLD ME SUCH CONDITION WAS ONLY MOMENTARY AND THAT SHE FELT FINE. THE OTHER 2 FLT ATTENDANTS ADVISED METHAT THEY FELT MOMENTARILY 'FAINT' BUT WERE ALSO FINE. I THEN WALKED THROUGH THE ACFT AND SPOKE WITH THE PAX TO LEARN THE CONDITION OF THE PAX. I LEARNED A FEW PAX HAD FELT MOMENTARILY 'DIZZY' BUT THAT THEY FELT FINE. I OFFERED A MEDICAL DOCTOR TO MEET THE ACFT IF THEY WANTED ONE. ALL OF THE PAX AND CABIN CREW DECLINED MEETING WITH A MEDICAL DOCTOR BECAUSE THEY FELT FINE. UPON ARR IN PVD, BECAUSE THE FLT ATTENDANT HAD ADVISED ME SHE HAD 'BLACKED-OUT,' I CONTACTED MAINT CTL. I CALLED MAINT AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE TO LEARN THE MAX 'G' LOAD OF THE ACFT AND TO LEARN WHAT WAS REQUIRED FOR SUCH A SIT. I DID NOT SUSPECT DURING SUCH MANEUVER THAT I HAD EVER EXCEEDED ANY LIMITATIONS OF THE ACFT AND WOULD NOT HAVE CALLED MAINT BUT NOT FOR THE RPT FROM FLT ATTENDANT LL. AFTER CONSULTING WITH MAINT, THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED BY PVD CONTRACT MAINT AND WAS SIGNED OFF. WE FLEW AND OPERATED THE SAME ACFT FROM PVD-ATL. ADDITIONALLY, MAINT CONTACTED ME. I SPOKE WITH A MAINT SUPVR, PLT DUTY-OFFICER, INFLT DUTY SUPVR, AND MD88 DUTY GUY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT AS HE APCHED A LINE OF TSTMS AT 12000 FT HE REQUESTED A HIGHER ALT. ATC SAID HIGHER ALT WOULD BE AVAILABLE SHORTLY. HE FLEW RIGHT UP TO THE EDGE OF THE TSTM, BUT, NO CHANGE IN ALT HAD BEEN AVAILABLE SO HE TURNED THE ACFT SHARPLY TO AVOID THE LEVEL 3 ECHOES IN THE CLOUDS. TO MAKE THE ACFT AVOID THE CLOUDS, HE ROLLED HIS ACFT TO A 60 DEG BANK AND PULLED BACK INCREASING THE 'G' FORCE ON THE ACFT. THE ACFT AVOIDED THE CLOUDS BUT THE 'G' FORCE WAS FELT BY ALL PAX AND CABIN CREW MEMBERS. AS THE ACFT CLBED AND CONTINUED ON TO DEST, THE CAPT INQUIRED OF THE PAX AND CABIN FLC. 1 FLT ATTENDANT SAID SHE BLACKED OUT DURING THE STEEP TURN. ALL PAX AND CABIN CREW WERE SITTING DOWN WITH SEAT BELTS FASTENED DURING THIS MANEUVER. NO ONE ELSE SAID THERE WERE ANY ILL EFFECTS FROM THE STEEP TURN BUT THE CAPT WROTE THE EVENT UP IN THE ACFT LOG AS 'MAY HAVE PULLED AS MANY 3 'G'S.' THE CAPT'S MOTIVATION FOR WRITING IT UP WAS THAT THE CABIN ATTENDANT STATED SHE BLACKED OUT. THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED AT DEST WITH NO DAMAGE DONE TO THE AIRFRAME. THE FLT RECORDER WAS PULLED AND THE 'G' LOADING WAS DETERMINED TO BE 1.65 'G' DURING THE STEEP TURN. ACFT 'G' LIMIT IS 2.5. THE FAA IS LOOKING INTO THE EVENT BECAUSE THE FLT ATTENDANT WHO RPTED SHE BLACKED OUT, WAS THOUGHT SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE INCAPACITATED. THE CAPT IS CONVINCED FROM TALKING WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT, THERE WAS NO INCAPACITATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.