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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 404316 |
Time | |
Date | 199806 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : n90 |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : sgfa |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach |
Qualification | controller : radar pilot : private |
Experience | controller radar : 8 flight time total : 450 |
ASRS Report | 404316 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | oversight : supervisor |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | other physical facility procedure or policy : unspecified |
Navigational Aid | Unspecified |
Narrative:
A lightning strike took out the primary radar at isp, a class C airport. Some sort of major miscom occurred between maintenance (airways facilities), the area manager in charge, and the isp area supervisor, because the isp sector continued to control live traffic using secondary radar only. Apparently none of the requirements for using secondary radar only were done. (Ie, NOTAM on ATIS, advisories to VFR's, suspension of class C services, etc, faao 7110.65, 5-1-3a2b.) also airways facilities was performing maintenance on the isp radar system throughout this period. Airways facilities thought the system was released, but air traffic facilities obviously wasn't aware of this. Also, it appears that the FAA's lack of training for controllers (both certification training and refresher) contributed, because apparently none of the controllers, the most inexperienced crew in the area, either realized the primary radar was out, or if they did, had no clue as to the impact of a primary radar outage, nor what their responsibilities were. A back up radar system (hpn) was available for use the entire time.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RADAR FACILITY AT N90 LOST PRIMARY RADAR AND CONTINUED USING SECONDARY RADAR BUT DID NOT MAKE REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS TO USERS OR BRIEFINGS TO CTLRS.
Narrative: A LIGHTNING STRIKE TOOK OUT THE PRIMARY RADAR AT ISP, A CLASS C ARPT. SOME SORT OF MAJOR MISCOM OCCURRED BTWN MAINT (AIRWAYS FACILITIES), THE AREA MGR IN CHARGE, AND THE ISP AREA SUPVR, BECAUSE THE ISP SECTOR CONTINUED TO CTL LIVE TFC USING SECONDARY RADAR ONLY. APPARENTLY NONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR USING SECONDARY RADAR ONLY WERE DONE. (IE, NOTAM ON ATIS, ADVISORIES TO VFR'S, SUSPENSION OF CLASS C SVCS, ETC, FAAO 7110.65, 5-1-3A2B.) ALSO AIRWAYS FACILITIES WAS PERFORMING MAINT ON THE ISP RADAR SYS THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. AIRWAYS FACILITIES THOUGHT THE SYS WAS RELEASED, BUT AIR TFC FACILITIES OBVIOUSLY WASN'T AWARE OF THIS. ALSO, IT APPEARS THAT THE FAA'S LACK OF TRAINING FOR CTLRS (BOTH CERTIFICATION TRAINING AND REFRESHER) CONTRIBUTED, BECAUSE APPARENTLY NONE OF THE CTLRS, THE MOST INEXPERIENCED CREW IN THE AREA, EITHER REALIZED THE PRIMARY RADAR WAS OUT, OR IF THEY DID, HAD NO CLUE AS TO THE IMPACT OF A PRIMARY RADAR OUTAGE, NOR WHAT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES WERE. A BACK UP RADAR SYS (HPN) WAS AVAILABLE FOR USE THE ENTIRE TIME.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.