Narrative:

Departed iad en route to bgm on a part 121 night IFR flight. While en route, the captain and I discussed the fact that the bgm control tower would be closed at XA00 local. This was well before our estimated time of arrival. Approximately 50 mi out from landing, I obtained the ATIS, which stated that the tower was closed. Pilot controled lighting was available on 119.3, and radar services would be provided by ZNY (frequency 132.12). The pilot controled lighting was also depicted on the airport diagram. About 3-4 mi outside the OM, the captain instructed me to activate the MALSR and HIRL on communication #2. We were cleared for the approach. At 700-800 ft AGL, I visually acquired the approach lights, which were on maximum intensity. I called, 'lights,' to which the captain responded, 'continuing.' approximately 100 ft above touchdown zone elevation, the captain called, 'runway in sight.' both the captain and myself could distinctly see the runway centerline and fixed distance markers. At 30-50 ft above the runway and preparing to land, we briefly commented that the runway lights (on the edge) appeared dimmer than usual. We proceeded to land uneventfully and taxied clear of the runway. Prior to exiting the runway, it became quite clear why the lights appeared so dim -- they were not on! During the taxi to the terminal, we repeatedly tried to activate the runway lights, but to no avail. After shutdown, we immediately notified our company as well as airport operations. Since the approach lights were on, we expected the runway lights to be on. We had no reason to believe that they would not be, given that we followed the proper procedures to activate them and no mention was made on the ATIS of their being unavailable. Looking back, had we known that the lights would not be on, we most certainly would not have commenced our approach. Once we began to recognize the lack of lighting intensity, the airplane was committed to land, and the captain prudently continued the landing rather than attempt a go around, which I believe would have been more risky considering the lack of adequate lighting and the aircraft's proximity to the ground.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF BAE3201 ON APCH AT ARPT WITH PLT CTLED LIGHTING DISCOVERS AT THE LAST MIN THAT THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS ARE NOT ON. THEY HAVE HAD THE APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT DURING THE ENTIRE APCH. THEY CONTINUE THE LNDG SINCE THEY ARE SO CLOSE TO TOUCHDOWN.

Narrative: DEPARTED IAD ENRTE TO BGM ON A PART 121 NIGHT IFR FLT. WHILE ENRTE, THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THE BGM CTL TWR WOULD BE CLOSED AT XA00 LCL. THIS WAS WELL BEFORE OUR ESTIMATED TIME OF ARR. APPROX 50 MI OUT FROM LNDG, I OBTAINED THE ATIS, WHICH STATED THAT THE TWR WAS CLOSED. PLT CTLED LIGHTING WAS AVAILABLE ON 119.3, AND RADAR SVCS WOULD BE PROVIDED BY ZNY (FREQ 132.12). THE PLT CTLED LIGHTING WAS ALSO DEPICTED ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM. ABOUT 3-4 MI OUTSIDE THE OM, THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO ACTIVATE THE MALSR AND HIRL ON COM #2. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT 700-800 FT AGL, I VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE APCH LIGHTS, WHICH WERE ON MAX INTENSITY. I CALLED, 'LIGHTS,' TO WHICH THE CAPT RESPONDED, 'CONTINUING.' APPROX 100 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ELEVATION, THE CAPT CALLED, 'RWY IN SIGHT.' BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF COULD DISTINCTLY SEE THE RWY CTRLINE AND FIXED DISTANCE MARKERS. AT 30-50 FT ABOVE THE RWY AND PREPARING TO LAND, WE BRIEFLY COMMENTED THAT THE RWY LIGHTS (ON THE EDGE) APPEARED DIMMER THAN USUAL. WE PROCEEDED TO LAND UNEVENTFULLY AND TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY. PRIOR TO EXITING THE RWY, IT BECAME QUITE CLR WHY THE LIGHTS APPEARED SO DIM -- THEY WERE NOT ON! DURING THE TAXI TO THE TERMINAL, WE REPEATEDLY TRIED TO ACTIVATE THE RWY LIGHTS, BUT TO NO AVAIL. AFTER SHUTDOWN, WE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED OUR COMPANY AS WELL AS ARPT OPS. SINCE THE APCH LIGHTS WERE ON, WE EXPECTED THE RWY LIGHTS TO BE ON. WE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE, GIVEN THAT WE FOLLOWED THE PROPER PROCS TO ACTIVATE THEM AND NO MENTION WAS MADE ON THE ATIS OF THEIR BEING UNAVAILABLE. LOOKING BACK, HAD WE KNOWN THAT THE LIGHTS WOULD NOT BE ON, WE MOST CERTAINLY WOULD NOT HAVE COMMENCED OUR APCH. ONCE WE BEGAN TO RECOGNIZE THE LACK OF LIGHTING INTENSITY, THE AIRPLANE WAS COMMITTED TO LAND, AND THE CAPT PRUDENTLY CONTINUED THE LNDG RATHER THAN ATTEMPT A GAR, WHICH I BELIEVE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE RISKY CONSIDERING THE LACK OF ADEQUATE LIGHTING AND THE ACFT'S PROX TO THE GND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.