Narrative:

In the course of a revenue flight, starting from an offshore oil drilling rig, taking a passenger direct to houston hobby airport in houston, tx. The flight was uneventful except having had a message passed to me via company flight following radio that directed me to return to cameron, la, for passenger pickup for air taxi to the offshore drilling rig. This was to occur immediately after passenger drop-off at hobby. Upon arrival at hobby airport, I noticed that there were numerous airplanes and helicopters at the FBO. Keeping in mind the following flight I was to execute, I deduced that it would take an inordinate amount of time to take on fuel. In addition, galveston is only a 20 min flight from present position and 'hot gas' is available there. I was solo, and it would also put me en route to cameron, a trip normally taking about 1 hour. There was the passenger waiting, in short, I initiated the short flight to gls with between 15 and 20 gals of fuel on board. The flight lasted 20 mins to sholes field, whereupon I executed a normal approach to a hover over a landing pad and hover taxied to the 'hot refuel' point, and approximately 20 ft from the refuel point, the aircraft engine flamed out due to fuel starvation. I executed a hovering autorotation and proceeded with the aircraft shutdown procedures. No damage occurred to the aircraft. Engine fuel system was purged by maintenance, refueled, and released back to service. In retrospect, I feel that the major contributing factor that led to this bad decision making was my urgency to please the customer and the need to return quickly to cameron. The predicted long wait for fuel at the FBO would certainly put me late for my passenger pickup. The fact that there was fuel nearby also influenced my decision. The aircraft fuel indicator showed between 5 and 10 gals prior to crossing the west bay (just to the northwest of gls, about 4 mi wide), certainly enough fuel to reach the airport. After landing to a hover at one of the company's helipads, I elected to hover taxi to the 'hot gas' position. Again, in retrospect, after the incident, I should have requested a check on the fuel indicator system to assure correct reading of actual fuel amount and fuel indication. At the landing pad there was a little over 5 gals indicated, however, prior to shutting down battery power, the fuel gauge read zero. I am remorseful and ashamed at having violated one of the most basic of all regulations. Due to this incident, the company I was working for terminated my employment. I have worked for over 25 yrs in aviation and my safety record is exemplary. The lesson I have learned was a hard one, indeed, the most difficult of my entire career.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A BH206B HELI STRETCHED HIS FUEL AND RAN OUT IN A HOVER ABOUT 20 FT FROM THE REFUEL POINT.

Narrative: IN THE COURSE OF A REVENUE FLT, STARTING FROM AN OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING RIG, TAKING A PAX DIRECT TO HOUSTON HOBBY ARPT IN HOUSTON, TX. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL EXCEPT HAVING HAD A MESSAGE PASSED TO ME VIA COMPANY FLT FOLLOWING RADIO THAT DIRECTED ME TO RETURN TO CAMERON, LA, FOR PAX PICKUP FOR AIR TAXI TO THE OFFSHORE DRILLING RIG. THIS WAS TO OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER PAX DROP-OFF AT HOBBY. UPON ARR AT HOBBY ARPT, I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS AIRPLANES AND HELIS AT THE FBO. KEEPING IN MIND THE FOLLOWING FLT I WAS TO EXECUTE, I DEDUCED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME TO TAKE ON FUEL. IN ADDITION, GALVESTON IS ONLY A 20 MIN FLT FROM PRESENT POS AND 'HOT GAS' IS AVAILABLE THERE. I WAS SOLO, AND IT WOULD ALSO PUT ME ENRTE TO CAMERON, A TRIP NORMALLY TAKING ABOUT 1 HR. THERE WAS THE PAX WAITING, IN SHORT, I INITIATED THE SHORT FLT TO GLS WITH BTWN 15 AND 20 GALS OF FUEL ON BOARD. THE FLT LASTED 20 MINS TO SHOLES FIELD, WHEREUPON I EXECUTED A NORMAL APCH TO A HOVER OVER A LNDG PAD AND HOVER TAXIED TO THE 'HOT REFUEL' POINT, AND APPROX 20 FT FROM THE REFUEL POINT, THE ACFT ENG FLAMED OUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. I EXECUTED A HOVERING AUTOROTATION AND PROCEEDED WITH THE ACFT SHUTDOWN PROCS. NO DAMAGE OCCURRED TO THE ACFT. ENG FUEL SYS WAS PURGED BY MAINT, REFUELED, AND RELEASED BACK TO SVC. IN RETROSPECT, I FEEL THAT THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR THAT LED TO THIS BAD DECISION MAKING WAS MY URGENCY TO PLEASE THE CUSTOMER AND THE NEED TO RETURN QUICKLY TO CAMERON. THE PREDICTED LONG WAIT FOR FUEL AT THE FBO WOULD CERTAINLY PUT ME LATE FOR MY PAX PICKUP. THE FACT THAT THERE WAS FUEL NEARBY ALSO INFLUENCED MY DECISION. THE ACFT FUEL INDICATOR SHOWED BTWN 5 AND 10 GALS PRIOR TO XING THE WEST BAY (JUST TO THE NW OF GLS, ABOUT 4 MI WIDE), CERTAINLY ENOUGH FUEL TO REACH THE ARPT. AFTER LNDG TO A HOVER AT ONE OF THE COMPANY'S HELIPADS, I ELECTED TO HOVER TAXI TO THE 'HOT GAS' POS. AGAIN, IN RETROSPECT, AFTER THE INCIDENT, I SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED A CHK ON THE FUEL INDICATOR SYS TO ASSURE CORRECT READING OF ACTUAL FUEL AMOUNT AND FUEL INDICATION. AT THE LNDG PAD THERE WAS A LITTLE OVER 5 GALS INDICATED, HOWEVER, PRIOR TO SHUTTING DOWN BATTERY PWR, THE FUEL GAUGE READ ZERO. I AM REMORSEFUL AND ASHAMED AT HAVING VIOLATED ONE OF THE MOST BASIC OF ALL REGS. DUE TO THIS INCIDENT, THE COMPANY I WAS WORKING FOR TERMINATED MY EMPLOYMENT. I HAVE WORKED FOR OVER 25 YRS IN AVIATION AND MY SAFETY RECORD IS EXEMPLARY. THE LESSON I HAVE LEARNED WAS A HARD ONE, INDEED, THE MOST DIFFICULT OF MY ENTIRE CAREER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.